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Responses to Sub prime Mortgage & Housing
Crisis
AB 69 (Lieu)
Debt management and settlement: credit counselors: This requires
mortgage lenders to report to their respective regulatory agency
information regarding loan loss mitigation efforts.

Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 277, Statutes of 2008.

AB 180 (Bass and Lieu)
Mortgages: foreclosure consultants: This bill amends existing law relative
to foreclosure consultants. AB 180 prohibits a foreclosure consultant from
entering specified pre-foreclosure agreements with a homeowner, allows a
homeowner to cancel within five days of signing a contract with a
foreclosure consultant, and requires the foreclosure consultant to maintain
a surety bond. Also has a translation provision to allow owners to request
a completed copy of the contract if any language described in Civil Code
Section 1632 (Spanish, Chinese, Tagalog, Vietnamese, and Korean). The
surety bond requirement requires a single $100,000 surety bond in favor of
the State of California for the benefit of homeowners damaged by the
foreclosure consultant's violation, and allows the Department of Justice to
refuse to issue or revoke a certification of registration for violations of the
chapter on Mortgage Foreclosure Consultants.
Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 278, Statutes of 2008.

AB 529 (Torrico)
Mortgages: adjustable interest rates: notification: This bill requires a
borrower to receive notice if their loan is scheduled to switch from an initial
fixed rate to an adjustable rate, or set to reset to a fully amortizing loan.
This notification must occur between 90 and 120 days before the loan is
scheduled to switch or reset. The notice must include the current
payment, the month and year the loan will change, an example of the
potentially monthly payment after reset, and a number the borrower may
contact for more information about the terms of the loan.
Status: Vetoed by the Governor.
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AB 628 (Price)
Residential mortgage loans: gifts: This bill would prohibit that real estate
broker or a residential mortgage lender or servicer from making a gift, as
defined, to a borrower or a potential borrower.
Status: Vetoed by the Governor.

AB 941 (Torrico)
Real property loans: documents: This bill requires the Department of Real
Estate to review the real property transaction disclosure process, and to
post a draft report on its Internet Web site by July 1, 2008. The
Department would be required to consult with other departments as
necessary, and submit a final report to the Legislature by January 1, 2009.
Status: Vetoed by the Governor.

AB 1538 (Lieu)
Housing Trust Fund: home loan refinance assistance: This bill establishes
a home loan refinance assistance program to be administered by the
California Housing Finance Agency (CHFA) to assist borrowers who may
face foreclosure.
Status: Died in Assembly Appropriations Committee.

AB 1830 (Lieu, Bass, Nava, Wolk)
Lending: This bill enacts duties, requirements and prohibitions relating to
higher priced mortgage loans. Establishes consumer protections for
borrowers who receive subprime mortgage loans and requires that
mortgage brokers act as fiduciaries of borrowers.
Status: Vetoed by the Governor.

AB 1837 (Garcia)
Consumer loans: subprime and nontraditional loans: This bill prohibits a
covered loan from including a prepayment penalty after the first 24 months
from the date of consummation of the loan and would authorize a covered
loan to include a prepayment penalty before that time period if specified
conditions are satisfied. The bill would also prohibit a licensed person from
receiving any compensation for originating a subprime loan or
nontraditional loan with an interest rate above the wholesale par rate for
which the consumer qualifies.
Status: Held in Assembly Banking & Finance Committee.
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AB 2161 (Swanson)
Loans: consumer complaints: This bill requires the Department of Real
Estate, the Department of Financial Institutions, and the Department of
Corporations to report to the Legislature on consumer complaints related to
nontraditional loans.

Status: Held in Senate Appropriation Committee.

AB 2187 (Caballero)
Mortgages: foreclosure: This bill imposes certain requirements on
mortgage lenders that are foreclosing on property. AB 2187 requires a
lender foreclosing on real estate property to include with the notice of
default a foreclosure statement of rights, which specifies the process of
foreclosure and sets forth the rights of the borrower regarding contracts
with mortgage foreclosure consultants. Also, requires that the foreclosure
notice be provided in the language of the borrower. Provides, until January
1, 2013, a mortgage lender or other person acquiring a property through
the foreclosure process maintain the exterior of vacant residential property.
This bill authorizes governmental entities to levy fines of up to $1,000 per
day for violations. However, it requires the governmental entity to provide
the owner with notice of the claimed violation and an opportunity to correct
the violation within 30 days prior to levying the fine.
Status: Died in Assembly Appropriation Committee.

AB 2359 (Jones)
Loans: This bill provides that an originator, beneficiary, trustee or
assignee shall not require as a condition of an agreement regarding a
covered loan, subprime loan, or non-traditional loan that the applicant
waive any duties, remedies, or forums of California law with respect to a
residential mortgage or mortgage foreclosure.
Status: Died in Senate Banking, Finance & Insurance Committee.

AB 2509 (Galgiani)
Housing finance: mortgage guarantee program: This bill requires the
California Housing Finance Agency (CalHFA) to establish the
Homeownership Preservation Mortgage Guarantee Program (Program).

Status: Died in Senate Banking, Finance & Insurance Committee.

AB 2740 (Brownley)
Home loans: servicing: This bill establishes various prohibited acts and
requirements applicable to the servicing of home loans. AB 2740 regulates
3

how and when a fee may be imposed by a home loan servicer, requires a
servicer to respond within specified periods to a borrower's request for
information, documents, and dispute resolution and to promptly correct
errors, authorizes the recovery of damages by a borrower or other party
who is injured by a servicer's violation, and authorizes the Commissioner of
Financial Institutions, the Commissioner of Corporations, and the Attorney
General to bring an action to recover damages.
Status: Died in Senate Banking, Finance & Insurance Committee.

AB 2751 (Strickland)
Mortgages: residential property: insurance money: This bill would require
every person or financial institution that makes loans upon the security of
real property containing only a one- to 4-family residence and that is
located in this state, or purchases obligations secured by that property,
that receives money for payment of settlement proceeds, as defined, to
place that money in an interest bearing account. The bill would require,
when the damaged property is replaced or repaired to the satisfaction of
the claimant, that the person or entity holding the money pay to the
claimant any remaining balance in the account together with all interest
that accrued while the funds were in escrow.
Status: Held in Assembly Banking & Finance Committee.

AB 2880 (Wolk)
Mortgage lending: This bill specifies that mortgage brokers have a
fiduciary responsibility to borrowers and requires mortgage brokers to
maintain a surety bond.
Status: Held in Assembly Appropriation Committee.

AJR 45 (Coto)
Mortgage loans: federal conforming and FHA mortgage loan limits: This
resolution memorializes the Congress of the Untied States to enact, and
the President of the United States to sign, a permanent increase in the
conforming mortgage loan limit and the Federal Housing Administration
limit, to the levels to which these limits were increased in the Economic
Stimulus Act of 2008.

Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Resolution Chapter 81, Statues
of 2008.

AJR 59 (Solorio)
California subprime mortgage foreclosures: This resolution urges the
President of the United States and Congress to require more oversight of
4

mortgage lenders and loan servicers and increase disclosures and
enforcement of mortgage laws. Asks Congress, the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency, the
Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
to recognize the important role of states in the regulation of mortgage
lending and in providing customer protections.
Status: Held in Assembly Banking & Finance Committee.

SB 385 (Machado)
Real estate: mortgages: real estate brokers: This bill applies federal
guidance relating nontraditional mortgage products to state-regulated
mortgage lenders and brokers.

Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 301, Statutes of 2007.

SB 1053 (Machado)
Real estate: brokers and salespersons: This bill requires real estate
brokers that make, arrange, or service residential mortgage loans to notify
the Department of Real Estate of their business activity, and requires
brokers to file certain reports and statements with DRE.
Status: Held in Assembly Banking & Finance Committee.

SB 1054 (Machado)
Real estate: brokers and salespersons: This bill allows the Department of
Real Estate to prohibit, bar or suspend a real estate salesperson or broker
from participating in any business activity relating to real estate for up to
36 months.
Status: Failed Passage in Assembly Banking & Finance Committee.

SB 1065 (Correa)
Home financing programs: This bill allows cities and counties to use
revenue bond funds to make or purchase refinanced home mortgages that
are federally insured, federally guaranteed, or eligible to be purchased by
the Federal National Mortgage Association or the Federal Home Loan and
Mortgage Corporation.
Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 283, Statutes of 2008.

SB 1137 (Perata)
Residential mortgage loans: foreclosure procedures: This bill enacts
changes related the foreclosure process in response to the subprime
lending/foreclosure crisis. Requires face-to-face contact with a borrower at
5

least 30 days before the filing of a notice of default. Gives tenants of
foreclosure property additional time to vacate the property after it has
been sold at a foreclosure auction.

Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 69, Statues of 2008.

SB 1448 (Scott)
Real estate brokers and salespersons: fines: This bill increases the
maximum fine for an unlicensed person acting or advertising themselves as
a real estate broker or a real estate salesperson from $10,000 to $20,000
and for an unlicensed corporation from $50,000 to $60,000, and requires
any fine collected in excess of $10,000 from an individual or in excess of
$50,000 from a corporation be deposited into the Real Estate Fraud
Prosecution Trust fund if one exists in the county where the conviction
occurs.
Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 156, Statues of 2008.

SJR 21 (Machado)
Mortgage loans: conforming loan limit: This measure would respectfully
memorialize the President and Congress of the United States to enact
legislation that would increase the federal conforming loan limit.

Status: Held in Assembly Banking & Finance Committee.
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Consumer Loans
AB 7 (Lieu)
Armed service members: consumer loans: This bill provides that on or
after October 1, 2007, that deferred deposit transaction (DDT) licensees
and California Finance Lender (CFL) licensees must comply with federal
regulations relating to the extension of credit to members of the armed
services.

Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 358, Statutes of 2007.

AB 634 (Charles Calderon)
Deferred deposit transaction licensees: This bill clarifies that a deferred
deposit transaction, under the Deferred Deposit Transaction Law (DDTL), is
an agreement where a person defers the deposit of a customer's check
pursuant to an agreement for a fee or charge.
Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 235, Statues of 2007.

AB 1528 (Committee on Banking & Finance)
Military service: This bill prohibits any person or entity from marketing
financial services or products to a service member, or former service
member, or the spouse of a service member in a false or deceptive
manner.

Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 363, Statues of 2007.

AB 1534 (Nunez)
Deferred deposit transactions: Commissioner of Corporations report: This
bill requires the Department of Corporations to prepare a report containing
specified information relating to payday lending.
Status: Put on the Inactive File in the Senate by Senator Perata.

AB 2845 (Jones)
Deferred deposit transactions: This bill states the intent of the Legislature
to enact and implement changes to the California Deferred Deposit
Transaction Law that include recommendations made by the Department of
Corporations.
Status: Held in Assembly Rules Committee.
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Pawnbrokers

AB 264 (Mendoza)
Pawnbrokers: This bill prohibits a pawnbroker from charging more than
2.5% per month on the unpaid principal balance of any loan and prohibits
the pawn loan setup fee from exceeding $5 or 2%, whichever is greater,
not to exceed $50.
Status: Vetoed by the Governor.

SB 580 (Calderon)
Pawnbrokers: This bill revises limits on pawnbroker compensation and
loan setup fees. SB 580 provides for a minimum charge of no more than $3
a month on any loan and prohibits the pawn loan setup fee from exceeding
$5 or 2%, whichever is greater, not to exceed $10.
Status: Chaptered by the Secretary of State, Chapter 340, Statutes of
2008.
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Credit
AB 372 (Salas)
Consumer credit reports: security freezes: This bill revises the consumer
credit report security freeze law.
Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 151, Statues of 2008.

AB 588 (De Leon)
Credit history: public utilities: This bill requires utilities, as defined, to
allow subscribers to choose to release their utility service payment history
to a financial institution or consumer credit reporting agency (CRA).
Status: Held in Senate Judiciary Committee.

AB 1313 (Charles Calderon)
Credit cards: cancellations: This bill provides that a private label credit
card issuer, as defined, may terminate a class of the card issuer's credit
card accounts if the issuer provides the cardholder with written notice with
60 days of the termination.
Status: Held in Assembly Judiciary Committee.

AB 1570 (Mendoza)
Retail sales: credit applications: This bill requires a retailer that offers a
limited-term special price, sale, or interest rate on any purchase to extend
that promotional offer by one business day under specified circumstances.
Status: Died in Assembly Banking & Finance Committee.

AB 2021 (Fuentes)
Credit cards: personal information: This bill provides that an entity that
accepts credit cards for the transaction of business via Internet, telephone
or mail may use personal information, as defined, for the purpose of fraud
detection or prevention.
Status: Failed Passage in Senate Judiciary Committee.

SB 500 (Corbett)
Credit service organizations: This bill expands the list of prohibited lending
practices a credit services organization, as defined, may not be engaged in
when it seeks annual registration, as required, with the Department of
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Justice/Attorney General. This bill also provides that the Department of
Justice/Attorney General shall not register any credit services organization
that engages in any of the lending practices that will be prohibited by this
bill.
Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 91, Statues of 2007.
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Community Investment
AB 1418 (Arambula)
Credit Union Membership Investment Model: This bill requires the Credit
Union Advisory Committee (CUAC) to develop a Credit Union Membership
Investment Model (Model) to identify best practices for credit unions
relating to community development, small business and micro enterprise
financing and investments of credit union capital.
Status: Vetoed by the Governor.

AB 1502 (Lieu)
Banking development districts: This bill establishes a Banking
Development District (BDD) program to encourage the establishment of
bank branches and services in locations with a demonstrated need for
mainstream financial services. Was later amended into
Status: Vetoed by the Governor.

AB 3045 (Committee on Jobs, Economic Development, and the
Economy)
Economic development: This bill adds definitions to the statute relating to
the states economic development programs.

Status: Vetoed by the Governor.
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Regulatory Reform

AB 1301 (Gaines)
Financial institutions: deposits: This bill revises and recasts provisions of
the Banking Law and the Department of Financial Institutions (DFI)
regulatory oversight.
Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 125, Statues of 2008.

AB 1508 (Lieu)
Money transmission: licensees and agents: This bill provides for technical
and restructuring changes to the statutes regulating money transmitters.
Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 242, Statues of 2007.

AB 1516 (Maze)
Commissioner of Corporations: This bill would authorize the Commissioner
of Corporations to develop, recommend, and implement guidelines to
achieve greater efficiency and cost-effective services in connection with
certification or licensure, examination, investigation, enforcement, and
other responsibilities, as needed, to carry out these various provisions
under the commissioner’s jurisdiction.

Status: Held in Assembly Banking & Finance Committee.

AB 1518 (Committee on Banking & Finance)
Credit unions: This bill enacts a variety of changes intended to modernize
the Credit Union Law, by allowing credit unions to share the results of their
regulatory examinations with more professionals, as specified belong to
economic development and trade organizations, make large gifts and
donations, make loans on which one member and one non-member cosign, and establish executive committees with broader responsibilities than
those provided for under current law, among others.

Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 148, Statutes of 2007.

AB 2749 (Gaines)
Financial institutions: disclosure and reporting requirements: This bill
recasts and clarifies provision of the banking law.

Status: Chaptered by the Secretary of State, Chapter 501, Statutes of
2008.
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SB 998 (Cox)
Commissioner of Corporations: business regulation: This bill enacts
various changes to the laws governing entities licensed under the
Department of Corporations (DOC).

Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 101, Statues of 2007.

SB 1037(Committee on Banking, Finance and Insurance)
Banking and trust business: This bill makes technical changes to the laws
administered by the Department of Financial Institutions (DFI).
Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 99, Statues of 2007.
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Financial Literacy
AB 150 (Lieu)
California Financial Literacy Initiative: This bill establishes the California
Financial Literacy Initiative for the purpose of improving financial literacy
by offering instructional materials for teachers and parents to provide highquality financial literacy education for pupils in kindergarten and grades 1
to 12, inclusive. The initiative would be administered by the
Superintendent of Public Instruction. The Superintendent would be
authorized to provide, among other things, an online library of financial
literacy resources and materials to be made available for schools, teachers,
parents, and pupils. The Superintendent also would be authorized to
convene a Financial Literacy Advisory Committee that may include
representatives of the office of the Superintendent, the office of the
Treasurer, the Department of Corporations, the Department of Financial
Institutions, and the office of the Controller. (Note: This bill was not heard
in this committee)
Status: Vetoed by the Governor.

AB 2123 (Lieu)
California Financial Literacy Initiative: This bill establishes the California
Financial Literacy Initiative, administered by the State Controller, and
authorizes the Controller to convene a Financial Literacy Advisory
Committee. AB 2123 requires the Controller to establish and oversee a
California Financial Services Corps, subject to the availability of resources
for that purpose, and requires the Controller to make annual reports to the
Legislature.
Status: Vetoed by the Governor.
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Investment advisors
AB 1583 (Maze)
Investments: investment advisers: securities: This bill makes various
changes to the law governing investment advisors.
Status: Held in Assembly Banking & Finance Committee.

AB 2149 (Berg)
Broker-dealers and investment advisers: This bill prohibits an investment
advisor or broker-dealer from using specific credentials or professional
designations in such a way as to mislead any person.
Status: Chaptered by the Secretary of State, Chapter 476, Statutes of
2008.

AB 2460 (Davis)
Redevelopment agencies: affordable housing: Redevelopment agencies:
affordable housing: Extends the authority for Los Angeles County to make assistance
available from its low- and moderate-income housing fund directly to home-buyers
and separately defines affordable housing cost
for these purposes.

Status: Re-referred to Assembly Rules Committee.
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Credit Counseling & Debt Settlement
AB 2611 (Lieu)
Debt management and settlement: credit counselors: This bill provides for
the regulation of debt settlement organizations and non-profit credit
counselors.
Status: Held in Senate Banking, Finance & Insurance Committee.

SB 1678 (Florez)
Debt management and settlement: This bill provides for the regulation and
licensing of debt settlement organizations.
Status: Held in Senate Rules Committee.
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Personal Information
AB 703 (Ruskin)
Social security numbers: This bill prohibits a person or entity from using a
social security number as an identifier, except as required by federal or
state law. AB 703 would also require that records containing social
security numbers be discarded or destroyed in a specified manner, and
would require the encryption or locked storage of records containing social
security numbers.
Status: Held in Assembly Judiciary Committee.

AB 1656 (Jones).
Personal information: security breaches: This bill prohibits a person,
business, or agency that sells goods or services to any resident of
California and accepts as payment a credit card, debit card, or other
payment device, from storing, retaining, sending, or failing to limit access
to payment-related data, as defined, retaining a primary account number,
or storing sensitive authentication data subsequent to an authorization,
unless a specified exception applies. Provides that if the owner or licensee
of the information is the issuer of the credit or debit card, or the payment
device then the owner or licensee must provide to the consumer a
notification of the breach that includes specified information. (Note: this bill
was not heard by this committee)
Status: Vetoed by the Governor.

AB 2918 (Lieber)
Employment: usage of consumer credit reports: This bill prohibits, except
as specified, the user of a consumer credit report from procuring a
consumer credit report for employment purposes unless the information in
the report is either substantially job related, as defined, or required by law
to be disclosed to, or obtained by, the user of the report.
Status: Vetoed by the Governor.

SB 328 (Corbett)
Personal information: prohibited practices: This bill includes a telephone
calling pattern record or list, as defined, in the definition of personal
information" that a business is required to ensure personal privacy. The
bill also prohibits any person, as defined, from, among other things,
obtaining or attempting to obtain, or causing or attempting to cause the
17

disclosure of, personal information about a customer or employee
contained in the records of a business through specified methods, such as
by making false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations,
with specified exceptions. The bill provides civil remedies for the violation
thereof, and would make related and conforming changes in that regard.
Status: Held in Assembly Banking & Finance Committee.
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Escrow
AB 804 (Huff)
Escrow agents: This bill enacts various changes to the laws involving
independent escrow agents, some of which are technical, some of which
are intended to ease compliance burdens for licensed escrow agents, and
some of which are intended to be pro-consumer.
Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 237, Statues of 2007.

AB 1188 (Coto)
Escrow: disbursements: This bill requires an escrow agent or title
company who make disbursements in conjunction from an escrow account
of loan funds to notify the lender as to the disbursement date of the loan
funds.
Status: Chaptered by the Secretary of State, Chapter 428, Statutes of
2008.

AB 2323 (Huff)
Escrow agents: This bill expands the background checks currently required
to be performed on applicants for an escrow agent license and an Escrow
Agents Fidelity Corporation certificate from a state-only background check
to a state and federal background check, and requires the information
returned from the background checks to be given to the Department of
Corporations and EAFC.
Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 262, Statutes of 2008.

SB 1286 (Machado)
Escrow Agents' Fidelity Corporation: This bill requires that any private
insurance policy maintained by an escrow agent be applied as primary
coverage, in the event of a loss covered by both the private insurance and
the Escrow Agents Fidelity Corporation. SB 1286 clarifies the procedures
that must be followed by a person who has had their EAFC Certificate
revoked or their EAFC Certificate application rejected, before they may
reapply for an EAFC Certificate. This bill also requires Escrow Law
licensees who use the services of accountants or 3rd party-contractors, to
require these accountants or 3rd party-contractors to notify the
Department of Corporations and Fidelity Corporation upon the occurrence
of various events or discoveries. SB 1286 specifies that an agreement
between an Escrow Law licensee and a financial institution be accompanied
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by a letter from the licensee authorizing and requesting the financial
institution to immediately notify DOC and Fidelity Corporation of account
closure or the occurrence of an overdraft balance, with the opportunity for
a waiver of this requirement if the financial institution fails to agree. The
contents of this bill were later amended to become SB 1604 (Machado).
Status: Failed passage in Assembly Banking & Finance Committee.
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Miscellaneous
AB 251 (DeSaulnier)
Corporations: distributions: This bill prohibits a corporation and its
subsidiaries from making a dividend distribution if it has failed to make a
payment into its pension plan.
Status: Failed passage in Senate Banking, Finance & Insurance
Committee.

AB 786 (Lieu)
Financial institutions: greenhouse gas emissions: This bill states that
banks providing financial incentives to assist other entities in reducing
greenhouse gases prior to January 1, 2012 may receive an appropriate
credit under the greenhouse gas emissions reduction program adopted by
the Air Resources Board.
Status: Failed passage in Assembly Appropriation Committee.

AB 952 (Mullin)
Common interest developments: assessments: low- and moderate-income
residents: This bill requires a Common Interest Development to establish
a payment plan for all regular and special assessment imposed on units for
those owner occupants who request one.

Status: Vetoed by the Governor.

AB 1104 (Aghazarian)
Small Business Expansion Fund: This bill allows the California Small
Business Expansion Fund (CSBEF) to expand its authority to provide small
business loan guarantees to areas of the state affected by a state of
emergency as declared by the President of the United States, or the U.S.
Small Business Distraction, or as declared by the Governor.

Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 624, Statues of 2007.

AB 1533 (Committee on Banking and Finance)
Registered warrants: reimbursement warrants: This bill authorizes the
State Controller to sell registered reimbursement warrants, also known as
RAWs (revenue anticipation warrants), at fixed or variable rates in
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negotiated sales on the terms and conditions the State Controller shall
approve. This is in addition to current law, which only allows the ale of
RAWs at fixed rates in public sale under competitive bidding.

Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 336, Statues of 2007.

AB 2249 (Niello)
Financial institutions: accounts: This bill provides for specific
circumstances in which a government entity may access account
information of a customer's account at a bank, credit union or savings
association.

Status: Chaptered by the Secretary of State, Chapter 234, Statutes of
2008.

AJR 17 (Lieu)
Currency: accessibility: This resolution urges the United States Treasury
Department to withdraw its appeal in a case regarding accessible currency,
and urge Congress and the President to enact legislation requiring the U.S.
Treasury Department to make its currency accessible to persons who are
blind or visually impaired.

Status: Chaptered by Secretary of State, Chapter 74, Statues of 2007.

SB 1007 (Machado)
Exchange facilitators: This bill requires a person or entity engaging in
business as an exchange facilitator (EF) to comply with certain bonding and
insurance requirements.
Status: Chaptered by the Secretary of State, Chapter 708, Statutes of
2008.

SB 1224 (Machado)
Insurance viatical and life settlement contracts: This bill expands the
definition of security to include a fractional or proportional interest in a life
insurance policy benefit, including a viatical settlement contact. Enacts the
Life Settlement Consumer Protection Act of 2008
Status: Failed passage in Assembly Banking & Finance Committee.

SB 1311 (Simitian)
California Pollution Control Financing Authority: Capital Access Loan
Program: This bill reduces the monetary contribution of the California
Pollution Control Financing Authority to an amount equal to the amount of
fees paid by a participating financial institution. Also provides that CPCFA
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may withdraw from the loss reserve account all interest or other income
that has been credited to that account for the purpose offsetting
administrative costs and contributions.
Status: Chaptered by the Secretary of State, Chapter 401, Statutes of
2008.

SB 1409 (Ackerman)
Corporations: annual reports: This bill authorizes certain California
corporations to follow a recently-issued Securities and Exchange
Commission rule allowing proxy materials to be provided over the Internet.
Status: Chaptered by the Secretary of State, Chapter 177, Statues of
2008.

SB 1511 (Ducheny)
Common interest developments: mortgages: successors in interest: This
bill allows an association, with respect to separate interests governed by
the association, to record a request that a mortgagee, trustee, or other
person authorized to record a notice of default regarding any of those
separate interest to mail to the association a copy of any trustee's deed
upon sale concerning a separate interest. This bill requires the mortgagee
or trustee to mail that information to the association within 15 business
days following the date the trustee's deed is recorded. This bill specifies
that failure to mail the request, pursuant to that provision, would not affect
the title to real property.
Status: Chaptered by the Secretary of State, Chapter 527, Statutes of
2008.
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Bills Heard in Special Session
ABX 4 (Lieu)
Residential mortgage loans: foreclosure. Required loan servicers to provide
evidence of a comprehensive loan modification plan that meets specific
criteria to the Secretary of the Business, Transportation and Housing
Agency. A servicer that does not have a comprehensive loan modification
plan would have to delay foreclosure on specified properties for 120 days.
Status: Vote was not taken. Bill heard in committee for informational
purposes only.
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Assembly Committee on Banking & Finance
Informational Hearing
Financial Literacy in California
"All the perplexities, confusion and distress in America arise, not from defects in their
Constitution or Confederation, not from want of honor or virtue, so much as from the
downright ignorance of the nature of coin, credit and circulation."
John Adams-1787
Annual percentage rate, compound interest, adjustable rate mortgage, FICO score,
reverse mortgage, universal default, prepayment penalties, negative amortization, 401(k),
IRA, annuity, Certificates of Deposit, capital gain, equity, principal and

balance transfer fees are just some of the terms of the contemporary
financial universe. Access to credit is available now more than ever before
allowing millions of Americans to own homes, access goods and services
and pay for educational needs. This world of growing credit also means
greater responsibility on the part of consumers and providers. The market
place functions best when educated consumers are able to make informed
choices regarding their personal financial needs and goals. A well informed
and financially literate consumer can save thousands of dollars at the
closing table, avoid abnormal fees and charges and build up savings for
retirement. Financial literacy is not only about learning the skills need to
balance a check book, it is about personal empowerment.
The statistics on American's financial literacy present a contradiction
between the existing knowledge of financial matters and the actual use of
finances. For example, in early 2006 there were 190 million credit card
holders who charged an average of $8,500 during 2005, with the average
outstanding credit card balance for American households with at least two
adults is over $13,000. 1 Contrasts these statistics with the revelation that
only 27% of Americans feel well informed about managing household
finances. 2 Furthermore, in 2006 the savings rate for Americans fell to
negative 1 percent, the lowest margin since the great depression! 3
Many explanations for this abound, however among the most widely held,
is a lack of financial awareness: "Economists have put forward various
reasons to explain the current lack of savings. These range from a feeling
on the part of some people that they do not need to save because of the
run-up in their investments such as homes and stock portfolios to an effort
by many middle-class wage earners to maintain their current lifestyles
1

Prepared statement of Robert D. Manning, PhD, Research Professor of Consumer Finance and Director of the
Center for Consumer Financial Services, US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 1/25/07
2
Networks Financial Institute, Indiana State University.
3
Report of the US Commerce Department
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even though their wage gains have been depressed by the effects of global
competition." 4
As mentioned before, the financial market place works best with informed
consumers, and obviously this is the philosophy of many conumser
protection laws at the federal and state level. Current statututorily
required consumer protections in the financial arena are, in most cases,
centered around consumer disclosures of terms and obligations. Needless
to say, disclosures are ineffective when the consumer is unable to place the
information in the proper context.
Apply for a credit card and you will receive a large pamplet of disclosure
notices discussing interest rates and late fees. Thinking of buying a home?
Almost 20 different state and federally mandated disclosures will find their
way into a consumers hands even though most americans don’t have the
financial background to properly compute a mortgage amortization table. 5
What is Financial Literacy?:
Before continuing, it is important to establish what exactly is the meaning
of financial literacy, or what skills would we expect a person to have if they
were financially literate? The National Endowment for Financial Education
defines Financial Literacy as:
"Personal financial literacy is the ability to read, analyze, manage,
and communicate about the personal financial conditions that affect
material well being. It includes the ability to discern financial choices,
discuss money and financial issues without (or despite) discomfort,
plan for the future and respond competently to life events that affect
everyday financial decisions, including events in the general
economy."
The U.S. Financial Literacy and Education Commission defines financial
literacy as “the ability to make informed judgments and to take effective
actions regarding the current and future use and management of money.”
Financial literacy is not only the basic skills of balancing a checkbook, or
computing interest rates, but the ability to use that information to make
informed decisions about ones financial future and stability.
Financial Literacy Among Students:
4

2006 personal savings fall to 74-yr. low, Business Week. February 1, 2007
For an overview of state and federally mandated mortgage transaction disclosures go to the "existing law"
section of the Assembly Banking Committee analysis of AB 459 (Oropeza) of 2005, April 26, 2005 version.

5
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Financial literacy education often doesn't receive the same attention as
other life skills such as math and science education. Furthermore, with
decreasing resources to devote to education, government officials and
educators must make difficult decisions as to what subjects they will teach
to students in the k-12 setting. Vital subjects such as financial literacy left
behind. However the importance of financial awareness may have a direct
impact on other vital learning skills. A recent study examining the overall
literacy of college students found that 20% of students in 4-year colleges
and institutions have basic or below average quantitative literacy skills. 6
Considering this result, it is not surprising that Nellie Mae, an originator of
student loans, found that 83% of undergraduate students have at least one
credit card with an average balance of $2,237 and by the time they
graduate with will have an average of $20,402 in credit card and education
loan balances.
The Jump$tart Coalition for Financial Literacy conducted a survey of high
school students that resulted in 52.4% of survey respondents getting the
right answers, a score that translate to an F minus.
Undergraduates reported freshman year as the most prevalent time for
obtaining credit cards, with 56% reporting having obtained their first card
at the age of 18 with an average balance of $1,585. 7 Young people are
using credit and engaging in the financial mainstream, yet appear to have
a lack of basic skills and knowledge. Needless to say, this is a dangerous
contradiction.
Furthermore, the overall results for adult Americans also reveals a dismal
picture. While 65.1% of Americans consider themselves very
knowledgeable when it comes to personal finance, 52% do not regularly
review their credit reports, and 36.1% do not use any type of budget to
manage their family expenditures. 8 In 2005 the Capital One Financial Back
to School survey, found that 91% of students whose parents would be with
them on their back to school shopping trips revealed that their parents had
not discussed back to school finances with them. With 60% of parents
spending at a rate of $125 per child this is a vital opportunity missed. In
addition, a recent A.G. Edwards Nest Egg Score Survey (March 2006)
found that:

6

"The Literacy of America's College Students." American Institutes for Research, January 2006. (Quantitative
literacy was defined as the ability to perform computations such as balancing checkbooks, calculating tips and
completing order forms.)
7
Undergraduate Students and Credit Cards in 2004: An Analysis of Usage Rates and Trends, Nellie Mae, May
2005.
8
Results of a Capitol One/Consumer action joint survey.
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•

Only 57 percent of parents with children ages six to 17 have ever
discussed savings or investing with their kids, while only 53 percent of
parents with children aged six to 12 have.

•

40% of parents of six- to 17-year-olds consider their children too young
to understand. That number increases to 48 percent for parents of
children aged six to 12.

Many other opportunities are missed for linking together the everyday
activities of teens and young adults and financial literacy. We are no
longer in the days where we must use hypothetical abstractions such as
the number of apples and oranges in a transaction. For those students
with Ipods, they pay up to 99 cents a song on Itunes, which can only be
accomplish with a credit or debit card. Many popular video game servers
and sites offer online gaming a content, which also can only be acquired
with credit or debit cards.
Programs and Approaches:
A myriad of programs and options exist to assist and direct the financial
literacy education of students and young adults. Most all banking
institutions offer some type of literacy program or make materials available
educators to use in the class room. However, efforts have come about in
recent years to find creative approaches to this problem.
For example, the Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law
established the Curie Branch of Park Federal Savings Bank is a student-run
bank located in Curie Metro High School in Chicago, Illinois. Each year
Curie High School selects 10 students to be hired by Park Federal and
trained as bank tellers, savings counselors, or teller supervisors. The
student bankers earn wages working about 15 hours per week as part of
the Chicago Public Schools’ Education To Careers program in accounting at
Curie High School. The Curie Branch opened on April 12, 2005. The branch
is open to students, faculty, staff, parents, and others at Curie on school
business. Account holders have access to all Park Federal products. The
Shriver Center is currently working other efforts to open similar branches
in schools across the country including locations in California.
Student run banks are not alone in this approach, as currently, 74 credit
unions in 25 states operate student-ruin branches in 238 schools. 9

9

Colleen Kelly, Financial Literacy* in Schools: The Credit Union Commitment, (Washington, D.C.: Credit Union
National Association, 2002).
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California's credit unions also engage in numerous programs and
approaches. The California Credit Union League and the Richard Myles
Johnson Foundation (a 501(c)3 charitable organization affiliated with the
League) provide credit unions with access to many financial literacy
programs.
Eight credit unions participate in USA TODAY Education’s “Choice is Power”
program. Schools receive daily delivery of 20 copies of the USA TODAY
newspaper, and a lesson plan that is specific to the news in that day’s
paper. Credit union sponsorships reach more than 35,000 students. Fifteen
or more credit unions are expected to participate in the 2007-08 school
year. Credit unions are also the sole sponsors of an upcoming PBS
television program, “Biz Kid$,” which teaches entrepreneurship and basic
money management skills. The program will debut with a special episode in
April, during Financial Literacy Month.
Other innovative approaches include using board and computer games to
teach financial skills. The oldest of these is the Stock Market Game, which
allows students to simulate the trading of stocks on the stock market using
real time data. Starting with a virtual cash account of $100,000, students
strive to create the best-performing portfolio using a live trading
simulation. They work together in teams, practicing leadership,
organization, negotiation, and cooperation as they compete for the top
spot. In the process of playing this, game students learn core financial
concepts and skills. Since 1977, more than 8 million students have
participated in The Stock Market Game.
West Virginia has a new state law mandating financial education as a high
school graduation requirement with the West Virginia Treasurer’s office
tasked with delivering financial education to the schools in that state.
In order to assist in ensuring that all West Virginian high school students
receive the appropriate knowledge Visa, in partnership with the National
Football League, recently developed an educational video game and
accompanying curriculum called Financial Football. Based on the model of
other popular football video games, players advance down the field and
score points by correctly answering questions about personal finance. This
innovative approach to learning financial life skills quickly turned into a
classroom favorite for teachers and students alike. Financial Football is
offered free of charge and can be accessed over the Internet or shipped on
a CD.
The Treasurer’s Office conducted a multi-week pilot program to test the
effectiveness and response of the curriculum. The pilot was conducted in
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five West Virginia high schools and the response from the teachers and
students was overwhelmingly positive. Visa simultaneously hired a West
Virginia educational expert to ensure that the lessons learned in the
Financial Football curriculum mapped closely with state academic
requirements.
Based on the success of the pilot program, the Treasurer’s office and Visa
agreed to a statewide roll out of Financial Football. The statewide roll out
will begin on December 19, 2006 and will involve the Treasurer’s office
sending Financial Football CDs to all 184 high schools and 176 libraries in
West Virginia. The CDs will be co-branded with the Treasurer’s name and
Seal and will be accompanied by a letter from the Treasurer explaining the
program, along with an informational brochure describing Practical Money
Skills for Life.
Government Response:
Title V of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act (FACT Act)
established the Financial Literacy and Education Commission (Commission)
with the purpose of improving the financial literacy and education of
persons in the United States. This program is a partnership between
twenty federal agencies to provide materials and resources for those
interested in providing financial literacy services and programs. Congress
charged the commission with improving "the financial literacy and
education of persons in the United States through the development of a
national strategy to promote financial literacy and education." In 2006, the
Commission released their strategic plan for national financial literacy
entitled, Taking Ownership of the Future, the National Strategy for
Financial Literacy. 10
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) created Money Smart, a
financial literacy program composed of ten training modules that can be
used by financial institutions and schools. The FDIC also provides trainers
to assist in teaching the program or to bring together interested parties to
form partnerships.
At least 37 states have personal finance educational standards, however,
these standards are often included in courses on general economics. At
least seven states, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, New York, South
Carolina and Utah, have actual requirements that students complete a
personal finance management skills course.

10

Report can be found at http://www.mymoney.gov/

32

Currently in California, there is no mandated curriculum on financial
literacy. Many other states have financial literacy programs that are fully
funded, or have created public-private partnerships. Also, some states
have taken a creative approach by creating a central clearinghouse of
information and curricula available for schools who decide to teach courses
in financial literacy.
Policy Recommendations:
The National Conference of State Legislatures, in their report on financial
literacy outlined some policy choices for legislatures around the country.
•

Personalized flyers to send to constituents and to use in events.
Many state agencies and organizations have flyers and pamphlets that
legislators can personalize and distribute to constituents through
mailings, town hall meetings and other constituent contacts. Another
option for legislator involvement is to participate in activities such as
housing fairs, which often are used to reach out to low- and moderateincome individuals who may be buying their first homes. Fairs and other
activities often occur in April, which several states have designated as
“Financial Literacy Month.” Legislators’ involvement in financial literacy
efforts demonstrates to constituents the importance of this issue.

•

Build partnerships between private and public organizations.
State legislators can help build partnerships between private and public
organizations to encourage these groups to work together on financial
literacy efforts for school and college age individuals, and for adults.
New Jersey, for example, created the New Jersey Financial Literacy
Awareness Network (NJFLAN) through the state Department of Banking
and Insurance. The network is a statewide distribution channel that
aggregates and provides easy access to existing financial education
programs and materials through a learning center display and resource
guides, both online and in book version, to children and adults.

•

Federal and state financial literacy initiatives for adults. The
federal Financial Literacy and Education Commission established under
the Financial Literacy and Education Improvement Act of 2003 as part of
the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003—could focus
increased attention on the financial literacy needs of baby boomers and
older people

•

Establish interagency councils to coordinate efforts. Interagency
councils could be used to coordinate existing and future efforts to
increase financial literacy. These councils could include organizations
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and agencies that serve older persons, such as financial service
providers, consumer groups, researchers, educators and government
agencies, such as a state Department of Aging.
•

Increase funding for financial education efforts. Funding and
assistance for student financial education efforts can be increased
through the Excellence in Economic Education Act of 2001, created
through the federal No Child Left Behind Act. The Excellence in
Economic Education Act promotes economic and financial literacy for K12 students. The objectives of this program are to: 1) increase
students’ knowledge of and achievement in economics; 2) strengthen
teachers’ understanding of economics; 3) encourage economic
education research and development, disseminate effective instructional
materials, and promote best practices and exemplary programs that
foster economic literacy; 4) help states to measure the effects of
education in economics; and 5) leverage and expand increased private
and public support for economic education partnerships at the national,
state and local levels.

•

Create state-level office to coordinate state financial education
policies. A state-level office dedicated to coordinating and promoting
the state’s financial education programs and policies could further a
state’s financial education policies, similar to an office created in
Pennsylvania. The Office of Financial Education will help state agencies
work together and with community and private sector partners to create
and maintain a clearinghouse with an accurate and up-to-date inventory
of help available.

•

Include financial education in assistance programs. States could
include financial education efforts for low-income families through the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. Legislatures
could recognize participation in financial literacy training as an approved
work activity meeting the 30-hour per week work requirement for TANF
recipients, similar to the state of Illinois. TANF funds can be used to
support financial education strategies. States could also increase
funding for individual development account (IDA) programs, which often
include financial education as part of participation requirements.

•

Financial literacy professional development for teachers.
Investing in professional development for teachers and encouraging and
motivating teachers to incorporate financial literacy into their lesson
plans will help further financial literacy efforts. The Pennsylvania
Governor’s Task Force concluded that, “ … it cannot be assumed that all
teachers have a full understanding of financial principles themselves.
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Professional development opportunities must be made available to
teachers to enhance their own knowledge and skills.”
•

Sponsor additional research to improve the effectiveness of
financial literacy programs. The private sector, foundations, federal
and state governments, and others could support additional research
aimed at improving the effectiveness of financial literacy and consumer
counseling programs, particularly with regard to obtaining outcomes
that lead to better money management and wealth-building behaviors
and skills.

Conclusions:
Financial literacy is not just about computing the interest on an auto loan,
or the rate on a savings account or government bond. Financial literacy is
the foundation to personal financial empowerment and a powerful defense
mechanism against bad actors in the financial market. As mentioned
previously, the majority of our consumer protect laws are disclosure based,
or at the least require the consumer to know who they should report to in
the event of an incident. These skills can ensure that a borrower gets the
best mortgage for which the qualify, or how to spot unusual fees or
charges. If a young consumer never learns to examine their credit report,
or that they can access their three reports for free once per year, they may
never learn that they are victims of identity theft or false charges against
their credit. If they are unaware of the difference between a 550 and a
750 FICO score they will never know the benefits of maintaining good
credit.
While numerous programs exist in California from the financial community
and from non-profit organizations, no central authority determines what
materials or programs are best suited for students in high schools. If a
high-school in California decided to teach a course in financial education
they would not find any guidance from the state, nor a central location to
go for materials. At this point, educators are on their own to find materials
and speakers for a personal finance class.
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Assembly Committee on Banking & Finance
Informational hearing
The Unbanked and Methods of Access to the Financial
Mainstream
The American financial landscape contains a mix of financial services and
sectors from banking institutions, investment houses, and check cashing
centers. However, when we think of banking and financial services most
often we imagine the quintessential bank branch or credit union. Many
Americans are so accustom to mainstream banking and electronic
transactions that rarely is any thought given to those systems that are
outside of the mainstream. In 2003, electronic payments surpassed other
types of payments for in-store purchases for the first time in the United
States. 11 In an evolving electronic financial world, those with out a
banking relationship can loose out on many cost savings benefits.
The unbanked, or those without a transaction account with a financial
institution constitute approximately 22 million, or 20% of Americans. This
population spends $10.9 billion on more than 324 million alternative
financial service transactions per year. BearingPoint, a global management
and technology consulting company, estimates that the unbanked
population expands to 28 million when you include those who do not have
a credit score. In addition, BearingPoint puts the underbanked population,
defined as those with a bank account but a low FICO 12 score that impedes
access to incremental credit, at an additional 45 million people. Although
estimates find that at least 70% of the population has some type of bank
account, these individuals continue to use non-bank services, ranging from
the purchase of money orders, use of payday lenders, pawn shops or
sending of remittances. 13 The Federal Reserve Board has noted that 50%
of current unbanked households claim to have had an account in the past.
In California, 28% of adults do not have a checking or savings account,
according to the U.S. Census. In San Francisco, the Brookings Institution
estimated that one in five San Francisco adults, and half of its AfricanAmericans and Hispanics, do not have accounts. Recent market research
indicates that Fresno and Los Angeles have the second and third highest
11

Dove Consulting
A FICO score is a credit score developed by Fair Isaac & Co. Credit scoring is a method of determining the
likelihood that credit users will pay their bills. Fair, Isaac began its pioneering work with credit scoring in the late
1950s and, since then, scoring has become widely accepted by lenders as a reliable means of credit evaluation. A
credit score attempts to condense a borrowers credit history into a single number. Fair, Isaac & Co. and the credit
bureaus do not reveal how these scores are computed.
13
Center for Financial Services Innovation, Making Financial Services Work for Everyone, October 2005.
12
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percentages of un-banked residents in the country
Nationwide, the unbanked are disproportionately represented among
lower-income households, among households headed by African-Americans
and Hispanics, among households headed by young adults, and among
renters. 14 A Harvard Poll of Hurricane Katrina evacuees in the Superdome
found that seven out of ten did not have a checking or savings account.
The unbanked poor pay more to conduct their financial lives. Check cashing

outlets can charge between 2-3 percent of the face value of a check. So,
an individual
who makes $30,000 a year can pay $800 a year in fees to cash their
payroll checks and pay their bills. The lack of access to mainstream
banking cost both consumers and society, as well as, the financial
community that misses out on this untapped market.
Families without accounts don’t have a safe place to keep their money.
They may walk around with wads of cash in their pockets, or keep it at
home in a coffee can. Robberies are more prevalent around check cashing
outlets. A burglary, or a fire, could cost them their life’s savings in a matter
of moments. A bank account helps people take the first step onto this
path. Without an account, it is much more difficult to get well-priced car
loans, credit cards, or mortgages—the exact financial tools needed to climb
up the economic ladder. Stable societies are built on financially stable
families who have access to high-quality, low-cost financial services.
A 2001 Federal Reserve study on consumer finances asked "Why don’t you
have a checking account?" The reasons given were:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Do not write enough checks to make it worthwhile (28.6%).
Do not like dealing with banks (22.6%).
Do not have enough money (14%).
Service charges are too high (10.2%).
Cannot manage or balance a checking account (6.6%).
Minimum balance is too high (6.5%).
Does not need/want a checking account (5.3%).
Credit problems (3.6%)
No bank has convenient hours or location (.4%)
Other (2.1%)

How did we get here? 15
14

John P Caskey, Bringing Unbanked Households into the Banking System, January 2002.
Seidman and Tescher, Unbanked to Homeowner: Improving Financial Services for Low-Income, Low Asset
Customers. 2005, Brookings Institutions Press. (Guidance for this section)
15
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The general assumption in the past involves low-income customers, who
are likely unbanked or underbanked, had low account balances and high
transaction volumes, which is an unprofitable combination for the
traditional banking model. Unlike a number of other states that required
lifeline banking accounts for seniors and the poor, little emphasis was
made to service this market. Banking regulators focused on the
importance of providing loans and investments to lower-income
communities, rather than asset building services.
Greater recognition has occurred in the financial services environment of
the unbanked in regard to the asset poor and the connection to asset
building.
What has led to this newfound recognition of the unbanked? First,
technological innovation that assisted the increase in homeownership
through risk-based automated underwriting models began to have an
impact on the retail market with a greater use of automated transactions
and internet banking. For example, some financial institutions offer full
service ATMs that allow the reloading of a payroll card, payment of bills,
money order purchase, deposit into a savings account and check cashing
service. These electronic systems have brought down the cost of serving
retail banking customers and allowing greater innovation relating to
expanding services to fringe markets.
Second, the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 required all federal
payments to individuals be made by direct deposit. In the process of
implementing this new law, the Treasury Department realized that many
federal benefit recipients did not have bank accounts. This led to the
Treasury commissioning research to examine the reasons why people were
unbanked.
Third, alternative financial sectors exploded in growth in the 1990s. The
number of payday lenders, check cashing outlets, pawn shops tripled and
sometimes quadrupled in locations, particularly in states with relaxed
regulation of these types of providers.
Finally, the United States underwent major demographic changes as found
in results of the 2000 Census. These changes encouraged financial service
firms to focus more heavily on the opportunities presented by these
changes. Specifically, the Latino population grew by 58% in the 1990s and
by 2004 totaled 13% of the total U.S. population. Sixty percent of Latinos
were born in the U.S. with 55% residing in the suburbs with a purchasing
power estimated at $600 billion annually. In spite of this sizable economic
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power, estimates reveal that as many as 34% of Latinos are unbanked.
These growing demographic trends have forced mainstream financial
institutions to reexamine this once overlooked market.
Products and services currently targeted toward unbanked and
underbanked.
The last decade has seen a rise in product offerings to the unbanked
population. This section will provide a brief overview of some products and
innovative approaches that not only target those without a banking
relationship, but target those who may have minimum contact with
mainstream banking.
Stored value cards (SVC), specifically, payroll cards have emerged as a
growing trend and product marketed to the unbanked and underbanked
population. Growing numbers of employers use SVCs as a way to provide
employees with wages or other benefits such as flexible spending accounts
that pay for out-of-pocket medical expenses. It is estimated that in 2004
2.3 million payroll cards were issued, and the use of these cards may climb
to over 6 million workers. 16
Payroll cards can be a cost-effective way for employers to pay their
employees because the cost of loading funds on a card can be less than the
cost of issuing a check. SVCs can also be cost-effective for employees,
particularly for those employees without a bank account, because
accessing funds through a SVC may cost little or nothing while check
cashers typically charge high fees for their services.
Once the wages are credited to the account, the wages can be withdrawn
using the payroll card at an ATM, which may charge a fee. The card can
also be used to purchase goods and services like a debit card. If a payroll
card is reported stolen or lost within 48 hours, it will be replaced and the
lost pay restored. An employee may incur a fee to replace a card.
University Bank in St. Paul, Minnesota, and Central Bank of Kansas City
have emerged as innovators in serving the unbanked through stored value
cards. 17 Both institutions tried to create a “personal spend card” which is a
stored value card that combined the functions of the single-purpose
products that are typical in today’s market, while also retaining the
ownership and administration of the account underlying the SVC cards The
rationale for the multi-purpose card is if the product is to be an alternative
16
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From Margins to the Mainstream: A Guide to Building Products and Strategies for Underbanked Markets.
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to a checking account or ATM-enabled savings account, then it must have
the same versatility and functionality.
University Bank began developing its stored value card, which aimed to
give customers a banking product that combined the retail features of a
bank account—a place to keep money, the ability to withdraw cash, make
electronic payments, debit purchases—with the benefits of a credit card—
retail and online purchases, flexibility, the absence of cash—but without the
risks associated with either one. Once customers had established a
relationship with University Bank and accustomed themselves to bank-like
transactions through the SVC, the bank hoped users would eventually
move into a traditional banking account and on up into other financial
vehicles.
Second chance checking accounts have also emerged as a growing product
for those individuals who had a bank account in the past but incurred
several overdraft charges that made them risky customers to banks.
Legacy Bank of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, originally designed its Financial
Liberty First Accounts for those customers who never had a bank account,
but this soon changed into a product to capture those customers who are
underbanked. 18 Part of the design this particular account included early
monitoring by the bank for potential problems that customers may face,
such as overdrafts. This approach known as tech-meets-touch is a system
that combines electronic monitoring of accounts with employee to
customer outreach if a problem is spotted. Legacy Bank has a strict
intervention policy that requires financial education classes in combination
with credit counseling if they have more than three overdrafts. This
program effectively used community partnerships to overcome three of the
most important barriers to becoming banked: financial illiteracy, market
penetration, and a lack of trust among customers. The success of Legacy
is rooted in its institutional strategy to reach the unbanked. The bank
estimates that one-third of overall staff time goes into reaching out to the
unbanked through classes, new accounts, monitoring and account
administration. 19
An early innovation in providing asset-building opportunities for the
underbanked includes Individual Development Accounts (IDAs). IDAs
represent one of the first attempts to create a vehicle for underbanked
individuals and families to save and build assets. By rewarding participants
with matching money added to their monthly savings, IDAs programs
promote home ownership, educational attainment and economic
independence. There appears to be more than 500 IDA initiatives in
18
19
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existence in communities across the country, with at least 15,000 people
saving in IDAs. 20 Though they vary in design and implementation, IDAs
are dedicated savings accounts that match participants’ contributions to
the account. Participants have a strong incentive to save as their
contributions are matched at very favorable ratios by government,
philanthropic and private-sector institutions. The programs have a cap on
matching funds and a vesting period in which to earn them. The
participants can withdraw their own funds before the vesting period is
completed, but will lose the matching money. Participants can only
withdraw the matching money for an asset purchase, such as paying for
college, buying a home or starting their own business. While eligibility
guidelines vary by program and by region, IDAs are generally available to
those with household incomes below $35,000 a year. An additional
component of IDA programs is financial education and counseling to help
participants manage and repair their credit, set a budget and savings
schedule, and prepare to purchase and manage an asset.
As individual IDA participants have succeeded in buying homes, starting
businesses, going to college and saving for retirement, they have helped to
prove that lower-income,
underbanked families can and will save if given the appropriate access,
ease and
incentives. Within the American Dream Demonstration (ADD), a 13-site
IDA demonstration that began in the late 1990s, participants accumulated
an average of $700 per year including matches. More importantly, as their
savings increased, participants were more likely to achieve their monthly
deposit targets, demonstrating that their saving behavior, like that of
wealthier individuals, is influenced by the incentives they receive.
Financial institutions play a variety of roles in IDA programs, from
providing the accounts to holding the pooled matching funds, to providing
financial coaching and making financial contributions. IDA-sponsoring
institutions are overwhelmingly commercial banks and thrifts (81%), with
credit unions making up the remaining total (19%). Citigroup, Bank of
America and others have been at the forefront, serving as depositories for
IDAs and providing matching funds.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) offers a financial
education program, Money Smart, which encourages participants to open
an account. This program provides participants with financial literacy skills
to assist them in making informed financial decisions. The program
consists of 10 instructor-led training modules that cover various topics.
The FDIC does not look to Money Smart to encourage the opening of an
20
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account but to give participants the skill needed to make the most
appropriate decisions based on their circumstances which may not be a
bank account. 21
The success of innovative product solutions has built upon successful
models that incorporate some key concepts related to the unbanked.
Some of those strategies have included:
•

Developing an understanding of the needs and demographics of the
unbanked market by acknowledging that the unbanked are not just
people with less money.

•

Mimicking the transactional aspects of non-traditional products,
such as payday loans, while limiting their predatory aspects.
Several banks and credit unions offer competing products for payday
loans and check cashing services.

•

Understanding that families' living paycheck to paycheck access to
cash is critical. Institutions seeking to service the unbanked have
had more success when designing products that take into account
the need for quick cash as small dollar amounts.

•

Monitoring and early intervention to preemptively engage with
customers before a problem reaches unfixable proportions. Early
monitoring reduces risk for the institutions while helping a customer
develop good financial habits.

•

Products that meet immediate needs, such as payroll cards, check
cashing services, starter accounts and others should serve as entry
points to more traditional products that help with long-term asset
building needs.

•

Leveraging public and private partnerships to assist in reaching out
to customers and to ensure long-term success.

Obstacles to reaching the unbanked.
As the Center for Financial Services Innovation (CFSI) points out, a major
hurdle for addressing unbanked populations is the tendency to view the
population as a group who all share the same problem. CFSI continues:
Low-income consumers are not a homogeneous group, and a one21
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size-fits-all
strategy in marketing and product development for low- and moderateincome consumers runs the risk of appealing to no one in particular. In
addition to the remarkable demographic diversity in this market, we have
also seen that there is substantial diversity in attitudes, preferences, and
experience. For example, for the half of unbanked households that have
had a bank account in the past, the issue is winning back those whose
experience with the system has not been positive—a fundamentally
different marketing challenge from attracting those who have never had a
bank account. Customers who find managing a checking account difficult
may require a different set of products and services than customers who
routinely make payments with checks. Financial education curricula also
need to be tailored to the needs of individual groups. Curricula developed
to bring the unbanked into the banking system need to differ from curricula
for segments that were formerly banked, although both need to offer
preventive tools designed to address account management issues.
Other, less obvious, factors can also discourage low-income consumers. A
lack of bilingual frontline services coupled with a culture that does not
emphasize customer service. Also, some surveys suggest that the
unbanked are concerned with privacy issues, particularly with
undocumented immigrants who may fear repercussions for not possessing
the appropriate identification. 22 As Seidman and Tescher note:
Comparing a typical menu of bank products with the reasons why
some Americans choose not to have a banking relationship suggests that
the problem may not be lack of demand, but rather the lack of an
appropriate and appealing supply. While traditional banking institutions are
well positioned to meet low income families’ long-term financial needs,
most are ill-equipped to meet their immediate and short-term needs.
Traditional checking accounts are predicated on consumer liquidity, a
luxury poor people generally do not have. Even banks that have one or two
products appropriate for modest-income consumers generally lack a full
line of products that would enable consumers to build on their initial
successes. In addition, bank branches are often inconveniently located for
the poor and do not offer them a comfortable atmosphere. While the
financial services industry is quite sophisticated about segmenting upperincome consumers and crafting appropriate marketing messages to reach
them, little attention has been paid to outreach efforts at the lower end of
the income scale.
Alternative Credit Data
22
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A growing option and trend for both the unbanked and underbanked is the
use of alternative credit data. An estimated 32 million Americans have
credit files that do not have sufficient information to calculate a standard
credit score. Obviously, a lack of credit information can leave otherwise
qualified persons outside the credit system that enables people to buy
houses, cars, or in some cases simply open a bank account.
In recent decades, access to credit has dramatically expanded for the great
majority of
Americans with the spread of automated “credit scoring” systems that
make credit decisions easier and more consistent. For many of those
outside the credit fold, the dilemma is in one sense simple and difficult in
another. It is simple in that the problem of access is often a problem of
information. That is, many of those with a credit disadvantage lack
information in their credit files (are “thin-filed”) or lack files altogether
(“null-filed”). The problem is complex in that access to credit, at
reasonable prices, requires payment information, which, in turn, requires
credit. One solution to this hurdle is to use payment information not from
lenders but from providers of “credit-like” services. These services, such as
utilities, are often supplied in advance of payment, are automated and
recurrent, and thereby provide sufficient information to establish patterns.
Alternative or nontraditional data provide lenders with information to help
evaluate the risk of lending to a consumer. 23
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has revealed some companies have
recently begun utilizing or investigating credit scoring models relying on
alternative credit data:
• In 2005, MassHousing, the housing finance agency for the state of
Massachusetts, became the first nationwide lender to qualify borrowers
using a credit scoring system based on alternative sources of credit data.
The scoring system, Anthem, was created by First American CREDCO.
• Pay Rent, Build Credit (PRBC), considered an alternative credit bureau,
also calculates a credit score based on alternative data. Consumers can
have Third parties (lenders or service/product providers) report payment
data to PRBC, or consumers can report their data directly and have a third
party verify the information. PRBC has obtained letters from the Federal
Reserve and other government entities stating that lending institutions
may receive credit under the CRA when they serve as a conduit for rental
23
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payment information.
• In 2004, the Fair Isaac Corporation launched its Expansion Score,
combining alternative data such as payday loan payments and product
purchase-payment plans with traditional payment data.
• Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and CitiMortgage are jointly testing the
usefulness of the alternative data collected by PRBC for use in their own
credit models.
• Bank of America has examined the use of alternative data by using it in
conjunction with its existing credit evaluation processes for some
customers.
• Some national payday lending chains have started collecting the
repayment information of customers that can printed out and used by the
customer to show a history of repayment of loan obligations.
• In 2005, Experian announced that it has begun incorporating phone bill
payment data into its scoring models.
The use of other sources of credit data is not without concerns. Consumer
advocates are concerned that alternative credit data could turn out to be
used disproportionately by high cost lenders. Advocates suggest that it is
necessary to make certain that both low cost and high cost lenders reach
out to borrowers with alternative sources of credit data. Because credit
scoring models are proprietary, it is not always clear what data is being
used in the calculations and how much weight is being given to each
source. It is therefore theoretically possible for a lender to unfairly lock
consumers into low scores and high interest rates. Advocates are also
concerned about the potential misuse of alternative credit scoring models
for non-credit purposes. Credit scores today are used for such purposes as
initial employment and job retention and to determine insurance eligibility
and prices. Advocates argue that the use of alternative credit scoring
models for these other purposes should be limited to situations where the
accuracy, relevance, and predictive value of the data have been proven.
An additional set of concerns focuses on data sharing. The potentially large
number of companies that could potentially report and process alternative
credit data raises questions about privacy and the potential for identity
theft. Some advocates also suggest that under current law, the accuracy
and completeness reporting standards for data providers are not as clear
as the standards for credit bureaus and require clarification. Advocates
maintain that this is of concern because alternative data providers
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generally do not use alternative data themselves and, therefore, have less
incentive than providers of standard data to report accurate and complete
information.
Conclusions and policy recommendations.
Many of the issues associated with the unbanked and underbanked
community have been left to the market place outside of the legislative
arena However, in years past attempts have been made to address
singular objects or product solutions.
Assemblyman Benoit introduced AB 822 in February 2005. As amended on
May 2, 2005, AB 822 would have allowed employers, if voluntarily
authorized by an employee, to transfer wages to a payroll card that can be
used to access funds at an ATM, provided that the employee was entitled
to at least one pay card transaction without charge per pay period. AB 822
was held in the Assembly Labor Committee.
Even without AB 822, some California employers are already using payroll
cards to provide wages to their employees. It is unclear at this time how
many California employers are offering payroll cards and how many
employees are using them. Based on what the Assembly Committee on
Banking and Finance staff has learned, employers who offer payroll cards
are issuing them only when employees voluntarily agree to accept them
and at least one transaction per pay period is provided at no cost to the
employee.
Assembly bill 588 (de Leon), of 2007 states legislative intent to examine
issues relating to alternative credit data. At this time, it appears that
Assemblymember de Leon and other Legislators are interested in finding
solutions for people who have a lack of traditional credit data.
The Chair of Banking and Finance, Assemblymember Ted Lieu has
introduced AB 1502, a bill designed to bring banking services into
underserved communities that typically have a large number of unbanked
populations. AB 1502 would create a Banking Development District
program in California. The goal of this legislation is to spur increased and
enhanced banking services in under-served communities that will spur
greater financial inclusion. The desired outcome is that more Californians
will enter the financial mainstream and build savings and wealth through
participating banks’ offerings and marketing of appropriate transactional,
loan, and credit products that can lead to longterm wealth building
opportunities.
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The Banking Development District program will make available a range of
state—and potentially—local government incentives available to
participating financial institutions. The legislation is inspired by New York
State’s Banking Development District program.
While many financial institutions may see the long-term business potential
of under-served area, they may have a short-term concern that it would
take a number of years before they can attract enough retail deposits to
become viable. Those concerns are magnified by the fact that lower
income workers often need to use banking services in off-business hours
because they work in multiple jobs, making it more difficult for them to
attract customers. The incentives provided through the program aim to
help banks get over these short-term obstacles, enabling them to branch
into neighborhoods with long-term business potential or better serve lowincome consumers with existing bank branches.
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Assembly Committee on Banking & Finance
Review of the Department of Corporations
June 18, 2007
Department Background:
The Department of Corporations (DOC) is California's Investment and
Financing Authority, and has exclusive authority to bring both civil and
administrative actions under the laws subject to the jurisdiction of the
California Corporations Commissioner.
DOC licenses and regulates a variety of businesses, including securities
brokers and dealers, investment advisers and financial planners, and
certain fiduciaries and lenders. In addition, they also regulate the offer and
sales of securities, franchises and off-exchange commodities.
The Department has certified certain national securities exchanges under
Corporations Code section 25100(o), such as the New York Stock Exchange
as well as the National Global System of the NASDAQ Stock Market LLC, to
exempt from the Department's review and approval process under the
Corporate Securities Law of 1968, as amended, warrants or rights to
purchase or subscribe to a security listed on the certified exchange.
However, securities listed on the second tier of some national securities
exchanges and on the NASDAQ Small Cap Market, and any warrants or
rights to purchase or subscribe to those securities, remain subject to the
Department's review and approval process, unless otherwise exempted
under the law.
The Department reports to the Business, Transportation and Housing
Agency, and is a piece of the three headed regulation of mortgage lending
activity under DOC, Department of Real Estate, and the Department of
Financial Institutions.
Since 2001, according to information on the DOC website, the Department
has brought approximately 3,729 enforcement actions, including but not
limited to, against people or companies perpetrating frauds, making
misrepresentations, and pursuing predatory practices. They also have
oversight over the following licensees:
•
•
•
•

3,472 broker-dealers,
251,894 agents or registered representatives,
2,822 investment advisers,
40,949 investment adviser representatives or associated persons,
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•
•
•
•

845 independent escrow agents,
7,927 consumer and commercial finance lenders,
444 residential mortgage lenders or mortgage bankers, and
476 deferred deposit originators at 2499 locations.

Bureau of State Audits report:
In January, 2007, the California State Auditor (Auditor) released a report titled
"Department of Corporations (DOC): It needs stronger oversight of its
operations and more efficient processing of license applications and
complaints."
In this report the California State Auditor found several weaknesses in the
department and made key recommendations to improve the day-to-day
functions.
The Auditor found that DOC overcharged for some fees and undercharged for
others. The overcharging was so excessive that the amount collected not only
covered the costs of administration for the undercharged fees, but has
contributed to the large fund reserve. New legislation will require DOC to limit
the size of its reserve to 25% of expenditures by June 30, 2007. DOC
receives revenues earned from fees charged for processing applications for
notices, registration certificates, permits, and the initial issuance and renewal
of licenses. These fees are deposited in the State Corporations Fund. DOC
also earns revenues through annual assessments levied on businesses
conducting certain types of activities; it generates additional revenues by
charging for its regulatory examinations of certain existing licensees. Fees for
the licenses processed by DOC are generally set by statute. DOC has limited
authority to set fees below the statutory maximum for businesses dealing with
certain securities transactions, offering investment advice, and acting as
broker-dealers, the only way it can increase fees above the statutory cap is to
seek a change in law. Since 2001, DOC has accumulated excess revenue
totaling $22.2 million. DOC will have to collect $11.1 million less than it
spends in fiscal year 2006-07 to reduce its reserve to the statutory limit.
Overall, DOC's strategic planning efforts are undercut by inaccurate statistical
information about its actual performance as reported in its monthly and
quarterly performance reports. DOC uses both manual and automated
systems to collect information and then compiles the information for summary
in a performance report. The information used to produce the performance
reports comes from a variety of sources, such as forms, data system queries,
spreadsheets maintained by team leaders, and other documents that may or
51

may not be reviewed for accuracy. The performance report for the quarter
ending September 30, 2006 indicated that DOC fell short with 8 out of the 10
critical measures. Since DOC does not gather sufficient data and does not
always identify benchmark goals for its performance measures, the
effectiveness of DOC's Education and Outreach Unit is uncertain.
The
outreach unit has two primary consumer protection programs, Seniors Against
Investment Fraud and Troops Against Predatory Scams Investor Education
Project.
Unfortunately, DOC does not always process applications within the time limits
set by state law. For applications submitted between January 2004 and May
2006, the average time exceeded the time intended by law for many of the
application types reviewed by the Auditor.
In Addition, the Auditor found DOC did not always resolve complaints related
to securities regulation and financial services as quickly as possible.
Currently, there is no legal requirement dictating the length of time DOC has
to resolved complaints. When DOC does not investigate complaints promptly,
its ability to protect consumers from fraudulent activities is compromised. The
information systems used by DOC to track complaints are unreliable because
they contain a large number of blank fields, duplicate entries, and
inaccuracies.
Contrary to law, DOC has not conducted at least 170 (37%) of its required
examinations of escrow office licensees within the last four years. Under
California law, all entities or individuals conducting business governed by DOC
should be licensed or qualified before commencing business. Businesses
cannot legally operate or consummate transactions before receiving DOC
approval, therefore it is imperative that applications are approved or denied
promptly. Delays could result in entities being unable to conduct business and
could increase the likelihood that businesses will conduct unlicensed financial
transactions.
After all these findings, the Auditor offered a number of recommendations to
improve the operations of DOC.
The Auditor recommends that DOC:
•

Consider creating a legal requirement dictating the length of time DOC has
to resolve complaints; seek legislative authority allowing DOC to set fees
by regulation;

•

Require DOC to calculate and report performance measures quarterly
rather than monthly; strengthen and promote consumer protection
programs;
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•

Consider assessing the need for new automated data systems; and,
instruct DOC to examine every licensed finance lender at least once every
four years to match current law with licensed escrow offices and mortgage
lenders.

SUMMARY OF LAWS ADMINISTERED AND ENFORCED BY
THE DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATIONS
The following are the laws administered and enforced by the Department of
Corporations (in alphabetical order):
•
Bucket Shop Law (Corporations Code Sections 29000 – 29201)
prohibits the offering or making of any contract constituting bucketing
(e.g., the sale of securities or commodities in connection with certain price
quotations), except as specified; and provides civil and criminal remedies
for violations of law.
•
California Commodity Law of 1990 (Corporations code Sections
29500 – 29572) prohibits misrepresentation, fraudulent and deceptive acts
in the offer and sale of certain off-exchange commodities, except as
specified; and provides administrative, civil and criminal remedies for
violations of law.
•
California Deferred Deposit Transaction Law (Financial Code
Sections 23000 – 23106) requires licensing and regulation of deferred
deposit originators (so-called payday lenders), except as specified;
prohibits misrepresentation, fraudulent and deceptive acts in connection
with these transactions; and provides administrative, civil and criminal
remedies for violations of law.
•
California Finance Lenders Law (Financial Code Sections 22000 –
22780) requires licensing and regulation of finance lenders and brokers
making and brokering consumer and commercial loans, except as
specified; prohibits misrepresentation, fraudulent and deceptive acts in
connection with making and brokering of loans; and provides
administrative, civil and criminal remedies for violations of law.
•
California Residential Mortgage Lending Act (Financial Code
Sections 50000 – 50603) requires licensing and regulation of residential
mortgage lenders and servicers of specified federally-regulated mortgage
loans, except as specified; prohibits misrepresentation, fraudulent and
deceptive acts in connection with making, brokering and servicing of these
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residential mortgage loans; and provides administrative, civil and criminal
remedies for violations of law.
•
Capital Access Company Law (Corporations Code Sections 28000
– 28958) requires licensing and regulation of capital access companies
which provide financial and managerial assistance to small business firms,
except as specified; prohibits misrepresentation, fraudulent and deceptive
acts in connection with the provision of financial and managerial
assistance; and provides administrative, civil and criminal remedies for
violations of law.
•
Check Sellers, Bill Payers and Proraters Law (Financial Code
Sections 12000 – 12403) requires licensing and regulation of persons
issuing negotiable instruments and paying bills or obligations on behalf of
customers, except certain persons including nonprofit consumer credit
counselors; prohibits misrepresentation, fraudulent and deceptive acts in
connection with these business activities; and provides administrative, civil
and criminal remedies for violations of law.
•
Corporate Securities Law of 1968 (Corporations Code Sections
29500 – 29572) requires persons offering or selling securities such as
stocks or bonds to qualify (e.g., submit to the Department for review and
approval) the proposed securities, and requires licensing and regulation of
securities broker-dealers and certain investment advisers, except as
specified; prohibits misrepresentation, fraudulent and deceptive acts in the
offer and sale of securities; and provides administrative, civil and criminal
remedies for violations of law.
●
Covered Loan Law (Financial Code Sections 4970 – 4979.8) sets
forth various limitations and prohibitions on certain mortgage loans; and
provides administrative, civil, and criminal remedies for violations of law.
•
Escrow Law (Financial Code Sections 17000 – 17654) requires
licensing and regulation of independent escrow companies, except as
specified; prohibits misrepresentation, fraudulent and deceptive acts in
connection with certain escrow transactions; creates a private indemnity
arrangement to protect licensed escrow companies against specified
losses; and provides administrative, civil and criminal remedies for
violations of law.
●
Financial Information Privacy Act (Financial Code Sections 4050
– 4060) prohibits financial institutions from sharing personal financial
information, as specified; and sets forth various remedies including civil
penalties for violations of law.
54

•
Franchise Investment Law (Corporations Code Sections 31000 –
31516) requires persons offering or selling franchises to register (e.g.,
submit to the Department for review and approval) the proposed franchises
with the Department, except as specified; prohibits misrepresentation,
fraudulent and deceptive acts in the offer and sale of franchises; and
provides administrative, civil and criminal remedies for violations of law.
•
Securities Depository Law (Financial Code Sections 30000 –
30704) requires licensing and regulation of persons holding securities as
custodians on behalf of securities owners, except as specified; prohibits
misrepresentation, fraudulent and deceptive acts in connection with
securities depository activities; and provides administrative, civil and
criminal remedies for violations of law.
NOTE: The Department also enforces Insurance Code Section 1280.7 and
Corporations Code Section 25100(q) relating to physician indemnity
arrangements.
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Assembly Banking and Finance Committee
Informational Hearing Background
Impact of Mortgage Turmoil on California Communities
INTRODUCTION
The last few months have been marked by a severe market correction in
the subprime mortgage industry. In response to the extreme financial
losses incurred by investors, the market for subprime mortgages has
adjusted sharply. Investors are demanding that mortgage originators
employ tighter underwriting standards, and some large lenders are pulling
back from the use of brokers. Many people hope that the reassessment
and resulting increase in the attention to loan quality should help prevent a
recurrence of the recent subprime problems. However, this reasoning
assumes that the markets will remain in their current conservative position
for the long term.
Additionally, California is now facing the prospect of reduced revenues due
to foreclosures and increase local government cost to mitigate foreclosure
related issues. This crisis has also been labeled as a "turning back of the
clock" on the recent gains of homeownership and asset building
opportunities for many communities that have been left out of other wealth
building opportunities. Several California communities rank in the top ten
nationwide in the number of foreclosures and defaults. According to
Realtytrac, Stockton, California leads the way with 1 out of every 27 homes
in foreclosure.
It is estimated that the subprime lending crisis in the United States will
result in almost 2 million foreclosures nationwide. 24 In California, lenders
filed 72,571 "notices of default" on borrowers in the third quarter of 2007,
eclipsing a record of 61,541 set in 1996, according to DataQuick
Information Systems. Most of the loans that went into default last quarter
were originated between July 2005 and August 2006. Actual losses of
homes to foreclosure statewide totaled 24,209 during the third quarter, the
highest number since DataQuick began recording data in 1988, up 38.7
percent from last quarter and up six-fold year-over-year.
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October 2007.
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In the midst of this market correction, borrowers are facing increased
pressures as adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) reset to higher rates,
home prices decline, and new borrowers are limited in options as the
market engages in retrenchment.
The crisis is the result of a confluence of circumstances that has played into
the unusually poor performance of subprime mortgages that were
originated in 2006. Among the largest contributing factors were relaxed
underwriting standards and subsequent deterioration in mortgage payment
performance. In addition, many market participants have suggested that
fraud, such as misrepresentations made by mortgage brokers, appraisers
and the borrowers themselves, has also played a significant role and
exacerbated the problem. Numerous sources have indicated that home
values, borrowers’ incomes as well as other information may have been
overstated and the intended use of the home was often misstated (i.e., as
a primary residence rather than an investment property).
Second, the mortgage lending system allowed incentives to push some
people into loans that they should never have taken. For instance, some
brokers received incentives if they placed a person in a subprime loan even
though the person also qualified for a prime loan. Some brokers were also
incentivized to sell as many loans as they could, since they receive their
commissions regardless of whether or not a person defaulted on the loan a
year or two later.
Third, the decline in home prices on a national basis has been a significant
factor in the decline in subprime mortgage loan credit performance. People
who now had homes at lower values, or had loans larger than the value of
their homes, were frequently unable to refinance with other lenders.
Also, variety of mortgage companies that had issued subprime loans
overextended themselves in the market causing many of their creditors to
demand payments on lines of credit immediately. This meant that several
of the largest non-bank lenders of subprime loans were forced to file
bankruptcy and foreclose on loans. Stricter lending practices by remaining
mortgage companies have also been a factor in the subprime mortgage
crisis, since some of the homeowners were ineligible for any type of loans
based on new criteria.
July 2007 marked the twelfth consecutive month of home price decline on
a year-over-year basis. 25 This is the longest period of declining home
25
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prices on a national basis since 1969, and declining home prices have
reduced borrowers’ equity in their homes and constrained their refinancing
opportunities. The borrowers most affected by the housing downturn have
been those who because of the timing of their purchase did not realize
benefit from the price appreciation that had occurred in prior years.
Compounding the problem of declining home prices is that many borrowers
took out ARMs with low introductory rates in the hopes that housing prices
would continue to rise and afford the borrower enough equity to refinance
at a fixed APR.
Fourth, the introduction of exotic products in the market-place including
option-ARMS, low teaser rate loans, no-documentation, stated-income and
other non-traditional products originally meant for sophisticated borrowers
were used as tools to circumvent traditional underwriting standards. In
addition, the increase in zero down payment, 100% financed subprime
loans increased home ownership opportunities, but at the same time
increased the riskiness of those loans. People who were on a thin financial
cushion were offered the opportunity to take out multi-hundred thousand
dollar loans with no down payment, sometimes with no income
documentation.
Finally, the stunning lack of financial literacy was a major contributing
factor to the subprime crisis. A recent Wall Street Journal article noted
that in a survey, approximately one-third of homeowners had no idea what
type of home loan they had. The typical borrower is often overwhelmed by
the complicated process of purchasing a home. In many cases, had a
borrower known the right questions to ask they could have avoided longterm financial collapse. Unlike some other states, California does not
require that financial literacy concepts be taught in its school curriculum.
During the past two years, serious delinquencies among subprime ARMs
have increased dramatically. The fraction of subprime ARMs past due
ninety days or more or in foreclosure reached nearly 15 percent in July,
roughly triple the low seen in mid-2005. 26 For so-called near-prime loans
in alt-A securitized pools (those made to borrowers who typically have
higher credit scores than subprime borrowers but still pose more risk than
prime borrowers), the serious delinquency rate has also risen, to 3 percent
from 1 percent only a year ago. These patterns contrast sharply with
those in the prime-mortgage sector, in which less than 1 percent of loans
are seriously delinquent.
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Higher delinquencies have begun to show through to increased
foreclosures. About 320,000 foreclosures were initiated in each of the first
two quarters of this year (just more than half of them on subprime
mortgages), up from an average of about 225,000 during the past six
years. Foreclosure starts tend to be high in states with stressed economic
conditions and rise where house prices have decelerated or fallen.
Adjustable-rate subprime mortgages originated in late 2005 and in 2006
have performed the worst, with some of them defaulting after only one or
two payments (or even no payment at all). Relative to earlier vintages,
more of these loans carried greater risks beyond weak borrower credit
histories--including very high initial cumulative loan-to-value ratios and
less documentation of borrower income. The originate-to-distribute model
seems to have contributed to the loosening of underwriting standards in
2005 and 2006. When an originator sells a mortgage and its servicing
rights, depending on the terms of the sale, much or all of the risks are
passed on to the loan purchaser. Thus, originators who sell loans may
have less incentive to undertake careful underwriting than if they kept the
loans. Moreover, for some originators, fees tied to loan volume made loan
sales a higher priority than loan quality. This misalignment of incentives,
together with strong investor demand for securities with high yields,
contributed to the weakening of underwriting standards.
The fragmented market structure of mortgage originators in the subprimelending industry may also have contributed. Data collected under the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act show that independent mortgage
companies--those that are not depository institutions or their subsidiaries
or holding company affiliates--made nearly half of higher-priced first-lien
mortgages in 2006 but only one-fourth of loans that were not higherpriced.
In addition, the sharp deceleration in home prices since 2005, including
outright declines in some markets, left many of these more-recent
borrowers with little or no home equity. In this situation, some borrowers
(particularly owner-investors) may have found that simply walking away
from their properties was their best option. Moreover, low home equity
has made refinancing--the typical way for many subprime borrowers to
avoid large scheduled interest rate resets--difficult or impossible for many.
Thus, with house prices still soft and many borrowers of recent-vintage
subprime ARMs still facing their first interest rate resets, delinquencies and
foreclosure initiations in this class of mortgages are likely to rise further. It
is difficult to be precise about the number of foreclosure initiations
expected in coming quarters, as it will depend on (among other factors)
the evolution of house prices, which will vary widely across localities.
60

Historically, about half of homeowners who get a foreclosure notice are
ultimately displaced from their homes, but that ratio may turn out to be
higher in coming quarters because the proportion of subprime borrowers,
who have weaker financial conditions than prime borrowers, is higher.
The increased portion of homes lost to foreclosure reflects the slow real
estate market, as well as the number of homes bought during the height of
the market with multiple-loan financing. In selling a home, all loans must
be paid off, which is not the case in the formal foreclosure process, where
second mortgages and lines of credit are most often written off.
Exotic mortgages with low "teaser" interest rates that increase significantly
after several years, interest-only mortgages, and mortgages made with
little or no income verification have helped drive the homeownership rate
in the United States to a record seventy percent. These subprime loans are
made possible in part by mortgage securitization, where pools of principal
and interest payments for mortgages are bundled into securities and sold
to investors, a process that diversifies the risk of lending to borrowers with
less than optimal credit. Nontraditional credit and securitization have been
useful tools to make credit available to those who might not otherwise
qualify.
Unfortunately, many of the borrowers who took advantage of subprime
loans have been unable to afford the mortgages they received. As interest
rates have risen and property values decreased, foreclosures have
occurred at alarming rates and delinquencies continue to climb. Many
borrowers were duped into mortgages they could not repay, or simply
made poor financial decisions. The consequences are grim. Millions may
lose their homes. Even borrowers with good credit are having more
difficulty finding lenders willing to grant those mortgages. Many mortgage
lenders are going bankrupt. Credit standards are tightening. Investors are
losing money on subprime mortgage bonds. Economists predict that the
effect of these lending practices on the economy will be felt for years to
come.
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SUBPRIME LENDING
Traditionally, 15 and 30 year fully amortizing conventional loan products
have decreased from 62% of total originations in 2003 to just 33% by the
end of 2006, while the origination of loans to subprime borrower , and
origination of interest only and option-ARM loans to prime or near-prime
borrower, have increased. 27
Subprime mortgages are mortgages granted to customers of poor solvency
and which therefore present greater risk of default than those to "normal"
customers. These mortgages are thus qualified when they are granted to
persons with a problematic credit history or to those unable to provide all
the necessary documents (proof of income sources, for example) or in
those cases where the amount of the mortgage represents a very high
percentage of the price of the home being financed (more than 85%) or
the monthly payment represents more than 55% of available earnings, etc.
The majority of subprime loans are not originated by traditional banks
regulated by the Office of Comptroller of Currency for Federal banks or the
California Department of Financial Institutions for state chartered banks.
Subprime lending originated by banks, last year, only amounted to 10% of
total subprime originations. The vast majority of subprime originations are
made by non-depository institutions and brokers. The various lending
institutions and brokers operate under different regulatory and supervisory
regimes with varying intensities of enforcement effort. That fragmentation
makes monitoring brokers and lenders difficult for regulators and investors
alike.
Twenty years ago, the subprime mortgage market barely existed. There
were a few lenders and brokers who offered these loans, but for the most
part, borrowers with credit problems simply could not get a mortgage.
This left millions of Americans unable to purchase a home or forced them
to sell if they got into financial straits.
Homeownership has hit record-high levels in recent years largely due to a
sustained period of record-low interest rates. But many experts also feel
that the expansion of subprime lending has contributed to the gains in
homeownership.
The growth of the subprime market can be attributed to several factors,
including federal deregulation of the mortgage rates, the expanding use of
27
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credit scores and technological advances. In addition, as prime mortgage
lending became more competitive, banks and other traditional mortgage
lenders sought higher profits in the subprime market.
As they are more risky, sub-prime mortgages usually carry a higher
interest rate. Normally, customers often pay a differential of between 2%
and 3% more than the rate on a standard or prime mortgage.
Subprime mortgages emerged on the financial landscape more than two
decades ago, but did not begin to expand significantly until the mid1990s. The expansion was fueled by innovations--including the
development of credit scoring--that made it easier for lenders to assess
and price risks. In addition, regulatory changes and the ongoing growth of
the secondary mortgage market increased the ability of lenders, who once
typically held mortgages on their books until the loans were repaid, to sell
many mortgages to various intermediaries, or "securitizers." The
securitizers in turn pooled large numbers of mortgages and sold the rights
to the resulting cash flows to investors, often as components of structured
securities. This "originate-to-distribute" model gave lenders (and, thus,
mortgage borrowers) greater access to capital markets, lowered
transaction costs, and allowed risk to be shared more widely. The resulting
increase in the supply of mortgage credit likely contributed to the rise in
the homeownership rate from 64 percent in 1994 to about 68 percent now-with minority households and households from lower-income census tracts
recording some of the largest gains in percentage terms.
However, for all its considerable benefits, the broadening of access to
mortgage credit that has occurred during the past decade also had
important negative aspects. Not surprisingly, given their weaker credit
histories and financial conditions, subprime borrowers default on their
loans more frequently than prime borrowers. The consequences of
default may be severe for homeowners, who face the possibility of
foreclosure, the loss of accumulated home equity, and reduced access to
credit. In addition, clusters of foreclosures can lead to declines in the
values of nearby properties and do great damage to neighborhoods.
In 1994, the subprime mortgage lending was only $35 billion. 28 By 2003,
the market had grown to $330 billion. Nationally, in 2003 the subprime
market was 9 percent of the total mortgage market, but in California,
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subprime lending was 13.3% of the market. 29 That share may be growing.
In 2004, the prime mortgage market was sluggish, but subprime lending
more than doubled in California to $197 billion.
Between 2001 and 2006 ARMs as a share of total subprime loans increased
from 73 percent to more than 91 percent. The share of no-documentation
or low-documentation loans increased from 28 percent to more than 50
percent and the percentage of borrowers who took out interest only
payment loans increased from zero to more than 22 percent. Furthermore,
ARM loans account for 44 percent of new foreclosures in the second quarter
of 2007.While consumer groups applaud the fact that more families have
access to credit, they have consistently expressed concerns that the
subprime industry is selling people higher-priced loans when they could
qualify for prime loans.
Although there is no single source that tracks covered loan volume in
California, anecdotal evidence indicates that it is a small percentage of the
overall mortgage market.
Not surprisingly, foreclosure rates are higher for subprime borrowers. In
mid-2004, 4.6 percent of subprime loans were in foreclosure compared to
0.5 percent for prime loans. Consumer groups worry that when interest
rates rise, too many subprime borrowers will find themselves saddled with
loans they cannot afford and the foreclosure rates will climb even higher.
In the drive to extend credit into new markets and increase profit margins,
the lending community turned to the secondary market in order to mitigate
credit risk and increase the levels of subprime lending. Suddenly, loans
that had been held by a bank were being sold to Wall Street in the form of
securities guided by complex financial arrangements and agreements.
Most important to the growth of the subprime market, however was the
creation of a secondary market for subprime loans. In the early 1990s,
Wall Street's acceptance of mortgage-backed securities comprised of pools
of subprime loans greatly increased. A few years ago, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac began purchasing these loans as well. These market-based
activities have provided lenders with the funds needed to make new
mortgages, thus bringing additional capital into the subprime arena.
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SECONDARY MARKET
In recent history, banks funded mortgage loans through their customer's
deposits with mortgage credit dictated by the volume of bank deposits.
Furthermore, banks kept loans on their books. Today, banks and other
non-depository lenders have the option to sell their loan on the secondary
market. Some lenders issue their own securities based of loans they
originate or purchase.
Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are securities sold to investors like
stocks and bonds. MBS are created when originators or financial
intermediaries pool large volumes of mortgage loans and sell securities
backed by the monthly payments made by borrowers on the underlying
mortgage loans. When a homeowner, whose loan is secured in an
investment pool, makes his or her monthly payment, the payment
combined with the payments of other loans goes into the pool and forms
the basis of cash flows for investors. Investors choose their position in
mortgage pool based on priority of payments from the pool in the event of
a default. The pools typically have several investment grade tranches,
ranging from AAA ratings down to subprime rated traunches that would
absorb the most losses in the event of default but offer the most return.
Bonds are also structured as tranches that collect only interest on the
underlying mortgage obligation, or trauches that received payments from
the principle payments on the mortgage.
At this time, the US mortgage market amounts to 10,000 billion dollars, of
which sub-prime mortgages represent 13% of the total market and 9% of
nominal gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States. 30 Most of
these sub-prime mortgage loans are granted by financial institutions that
are not deposit-taking entities and therefore are subject to lower
regulatory and supervision requirements compared with those for other
banks and deposit institutions. Once the customer uses the loan to buy a
house, the debt is noted in the balance sheet of the institution granting the
loan. However, in order to boost their business, these institutions relieve
themselves of these mortgages and sell them to commercial banks or
investment banks. The new holders, in turn, package the mortgages in
blocks and issue securitization bonds (CDO, or Collateralized Debt
Obligations) using the sub-prime mortgages as security or collateral. That
is to say, based on subprime mortgages, they create a new kind of asset
that is more easily negotiable in the markets and it is this bond that carries
the risk in the operation. To the extent that the holders of the mortgages
30
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keep paying off their debt every month, these funds are used to pay those
who have bought these bonds.
The MBS market is the largest fixed income market in the United States.
At the end of 2006, approximately $6.5 trillion of securitize mortgagerelated debt was outstanding compared to $4.3 trillion of U.S. Treasury
securities and $5.4 trillion of corporate debt.31
CDOs are a global phenomenon extending far beyond national boundaries
or domestic capitol controls. JPMorgan estimate that $1.5 trillion in CDOs
exist globally with $500 billion in structured finance CDOs meaning those
made up of bonds back by subprime mortgages. 32
Those buying CDOs are usually investment funds, insurance companies,
liquid asset holders, traders, etc. who obtain higher yields from these
assets than the market average although, naturally, running greater risk.
This new product is broken down according to the credit risk assumed and
a qualification or credit rating is assigned by the rating agencies.
The key elements to a typical securitization include the following:
•
•

•
•

•

Issuer - A bankruptcy-remote special purpose entity (SPE) formed to
facilitate a securitization and to issue securities to investors.
Lender - An entity that underwrites and funds loans that are eventually
sold to the SPE for inclusion in the securitization. Lenders are
compensated by cash for the purchase of the loan and by fees. In some
cases, the lender might contract with mortgage brokers. Lenders can be
banks or non-banks.
Mortgage Broker - Acts as a facilitator between a borrower and the
lender. The mortgage broker receives fee income upon the loan's
closing.
Servicer - The entity responsible for collecting loan payments from
borrowers and for remitting these payments to the issuer for distribution
to the investors. The servicer is typically compensated with fees based
on the volume of loans serviced. The servicer is generally obligated to
maximize the payments from the borrowers to the issuer, and is
responsible for handling delinquent loans and foreclosures.
Investors - The purchasers of the various securities issued by a
securitization. Investors provide funding for the loans and assume
varying degrees of credit risk, based on the terms of the securities they
purchase.
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•

•

•

•
•

Rating Agency - Assigns an initial rating to the various securities
issued by the issuer and updates these ratings based on subsequent
performance and perceived risk. Rating agency criteria influence the
initial structure of the securities.
Trustee - A third party appointed to represent the investors' interests
in a securitization. The trustee ensures that the securitization operates
as set forth in the securitization documents, which may include
determinations about the servicer's compliance with established
servicing criteria.
Securitization Documents - The documents create the securitization
and specify how it operates. One of the securitization documents is the
Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA), which is a contract that defines
how loans will be combined in a securitization, the administration and
servicing of the loans, representations and warranties, and permissible
loss mitigation
strategies that the servicer can perform in event of loan default.
Underwriter - Administers the issuance of the securities to investors.
Credit Enhancement Provider - Securitization transactions may
include credit enhancement (designed to decrease the credit risk of the
structure) provided by an independent third party in the form of letters
of credit or guarantees.

OBSTACLES TO LOAN MODIFICATIONS
The ability to offer workout options are predicated on the assumption that
the borrower contacts his or her institution before becoming seriously
delinquent on his or her loan or that the lender reaches out to contact
borrowers who have missed a payment or who the lender believes are
likely to run into trouble upon an interest rate reset. The ability to engage
in workouts listed above also assumes that the institution which holds the
loan is able to negotiate freely with the borrower to develop a workout
option in the best interests of both. This latter assumption is valid when
the originating lender retains the loan in its portfolio, but can be less
accurate when the loan has been securitized, because the terms of the
securitization governing documents may place restrictions on the servicer’s
flexibility to engage in loan modifications
When difficulty arises in making payments on a securitized loan, the
borrower generally will not be dealing with the local banker with whom
there might be an established relationship. Instead, the borrower will be
dealing with a servicer. The servicer has responsibilities defined in the
securitization documents that are substantially different than those of a
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lender. The servicer and the trustee are responsible for taking actions that
are in the best interest of the investors who purchased portions of the
securitization. Protecting the investors means determining the best
alternative that would bring the maximum recovery on a defaulted loan on
a present-value basis. If the servicer determines that a workout or
modification of the loan achieves that goal, then there is an alignment of
the investor/servicer/borrower relationship. However, if liquidation of the
collateral (through a foreclosure or other means) results in the highest net
present value of cash flows, the servicer may be bound by the terms of the
securitization to pursue this approach to the benefit of the investor despite
the resulting detriment to the borrower.
Even if a modification to the loan looks like the right approach, other
factors might limit the servicer’s options. Most securitizations are
established as Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs). The
REMIC structure provides considerable tax benefits, (i.e., only the investors
are subject to tax, not the conduit itself) but also includes provisions that
could limit the flexibility of a servicer to modify a borrower’s loan terms in
a proactive manner. To qualify for tax-advantaged status, the pool of loans
securitized in a REMIC must generally be treated as a static pool, which
usually precludes modifying loans in the pool. An exception to this general
prohibition allows for modifications when default is reasonably foreseeable.
Once a determination is made that default is reasonably foreseeable, most
securitization agreements provide significant flexibility for the servicer to
modify terms of the loan. This allows for modification of terms when a loan
has defaulted, but may prohibit changes to loans that are current.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) leaves it to servicers to determine
what “reasonably foreseeable” means as it relates to default, which makes
these determinations dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each
mortgage. In many cases, servicers would likely need to seek legal
determinations from outside counsel, especially with respect to whether a
default was reasonably foreseeable, in order to modify loans in the pool.
Some securitization documents indicate that once a loan is delinquent for a
certain amount of time, for example, 60 days, modifications of the terms
may be allowed, subject to REMIC laws. In some deals, the servicer must
certify with a legal opinion that a modification of loan terms would not
result in an adverse REMIC event. Therefore, while some flexibility is
available, the specifics are often unclear. Further clarification regarding
permissible modification activities under REMIC laws would improve the
servicer’s ability to work through problems with the borrower.
Aside from the restraints imposed on modifications by the REMIC structure,
the personal service agreement (PSA) can also impose barriers to loan
68

modification. The language in each PSA is different and each establishes
the rules about how a particular securitization operates or what needs to
be done to change those rules. Many PSAs contain more than 200 pages of
dense legal verbiage. The PSA provides a blueprint as to how cash flows
and losses are allocated and distributed to the various parties, and
establishes the rules that the servicer must abide by in managing this
critical function in the transaction. The PSA sets forth whether and how a
servicer can modify the underlying loans in a securitization. The documents
will also identify the other parties in the transaction who might have an
important role in this decision.
If the PSAs terms and conditions regarding modifications prove to be overly
restrictive, changing the PSA can be very difficult and may require
extraordinary actions, such as obtaining the consent of two-thirds or all of
the investors. In some deals, the PSA is quite explicit in allowing the
servicer flexibility in modifying delinquent loans, while in other transactions
the language is vague.
Even if the servicer can arrange a modification of terms, the servicer may
still be limited in the ability to take a proactive approach to modifying a
loan. If a servicer foresees problems on the horizon for a group of
borrowers that is currently paying as agreed, the servicer might not be
able to modify the terms of the loan until the borrower enters into the
“imminent default” category. For example, following Hurricane Katrina,
some banks granted blanket payment moratoria for borrowers with homes
in the Gulf Coast region, but many servicers were limited in their ability to
grant similar blanket moratoria for mortgages that were securitized.
Instead, these servicers had to make modifications on a case-by-case basis
based on the facts and circumstances of each borrower. In situations like
this, waiting for the borrower to fall behind in payments may not be the
most prudent course of action for any of the parties involved. If solutions
could be reached to forestall a problem, the result would be greater
flexibility for servicers and possibly loss mitigation.
While the servicer has an important role in the decisions relating to the
underlying borrower, there are other parties involved in the transaction
whose views also carry significant weight. In most older deals (and some
more recent), the servicer must obtain the consent and approval of the
rating agency and bond insurer before considering loan modifications in
amounts greater than 5 percent of the total transaction. Yet, excessive
modifications might be viewed as a negative factor when ratings are
reviewed by the ratings agencies.
Financial guarantors and other credit enhancement providers have become
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more involved in the structured finance market as well, often providing
insurance on the deeply subordinated tranches of securitizations to
facilitate the sale of these more risky positions. In this role, a guarantor
steps in and absorbs losses should the underlying collateral begin to
deteriorate. Therefore, the guarantor has a vested interest in the decisions
made by the servicer in dealing with distressed borrowers. In some
transactions, the servicer is required to gain the prior written consent of
the credit enhancement provider for any modification, waiver, or
amendment that would cause the aggregate number of outstanding
mortgage loans which have been modified, waived or amended to exceed 5
percent of the original pool balance. Whether the credit enhancement
provider, servicer, and borrower share the same interest will depend on the
facts and circumstances of the specific situation. If their interests are not
aligned, however, the credit enhancement provider’s demands will no
doubt have a large effect on the ultimate outcome.
The accounting rules also play an important role in the decisions made by
the various parties. Securitization is often used as a balance sheet
management strategy, whereby assets sold into a securitization are
removed from the seller’s books, thus freeing up resources such as capital.
Lenders must meet strict accounting requirements before they can remove
assets from their books, to show that they no longer “control” these assets,
and that the risks and rewards associated with the loans have been
transferred to the investors.
Overall, the ability to securitize pools of such mortgages certainly helped to
make mortgage loans available and has reduced the cost of credit for
borrowers. However, the securitization structure also has introduced a
number of new participants and complexities into the loan relationship,
which reduces flexibility for addressing the problems of distressed
borrowers.

OPTIONS FOR HOMEBUYERS FACING
FORECLOSURE
•

Reinstatement-This means bringing the mortgage current. This is rare,
unless you get a tax refund, a bonus check, or some other windfall that
could catch you up on owed mortgage payments.

•

Partial Reinstatement-Pay off a portion of what is owed.

•

Forbearance-Lender agrees to take less than the full payment.
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•

Repayment Plan- Outstanding debt is paid off over the course of
several months or a year so a large payment can be broken down into
smaller ones.

•

Loan Modification-This changes the terms of loan—a later pay-off date
or a change in the interest rate.

•

Refinance-You may need decent credit to qualify, but this can get you
a new loan with a better fee schedule or interest rate.

If a borrower can’t afford to make payments at all, then they have three
options for liquidation:
•

Short Sell-A short sell is selling your house for less than the amount
you owe. Lenders consider this a settlement and may forgive your
remaining debt.

•

Deed in lieu of Foreclosure-This is a voluntary transfer of your
property to your lender.

•

Assumption-This option lets someone else assume your mortgage for
you.

RECENT ACTIONS
The national Hope Campaign provides free, twenty-four hour, bilingual
counseling for people that are in fear of losing their homes. The number is
1-800-HOPE. In addition, the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development has a list of regional counseling services. Although
picking up the phone will not put money in the bank, it can reduce the
probability of a foreclosure. A 2004 study by Freddie Mac indicated that
retention options could reduce the possibility of foreclosure by 60–80
percent, depending on the type of loan.
Countrywide Financial Corp., the largest U.S. home-mortgage lender by
volume, said it will refinance or restructure up to $16 billion in loans by the
end of next year for homeowners facing higher payments because of
interest-rate resetting.
Countrywide also recently announced it's partnering with the Neighborhood
Assistance Corporation of America (NACA), a community and advocacy
group that that has often been at odds with Countrywide’s lending policies.
Borrowers wanting to rework loans through NACA are required to go
through the organization's comprehensive approval process. They fill in an
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application on NACA’s website. Then they must attend a home buyer's
workshop of about four hours long held at any of the organization's 33
offices in 19 states. The workshop covers mundane, but misunderstood,
aspects of mortgage borrowing, such as what a settlement statement
means. After that, borrowers make an appointment for one-on-one
counseling sessions of about 90 minutes to two hours. The counselors help
prepare realistic budgets, looking at incomes and expenses including car
payments and child-care costs.
Wells Fargo, of San Francisco, offered some 80,000 repayment plans and
made 25,000 "workouts" - including loan modifications — aimed at helping
borrowers keep their homes.
The Housing Finance Agencies of Maryland, Massachusetts, New York and
Ohio have all started refinance programs to assist distressed borrowers
with long term, fully underwritten prime mortgage products. These
programs are not give-aways of state funds, but rather loan guarntee
programs where the state steps in to gaurantee the payment of the loan.
Each state has contributed one hudred million dollars or more to this effort.
In response to the subprime fallout, federal regulators (Office of
Comptroller of Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Reserve
Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and National Credit Union
Administration) issued guidance on nontraditional mortgage product risks.
The guidance applies to both prime and nonprime loans and covers
federally-regulated financial institutions, their subsidiaries and affiliates,
and federally-insured financial institutions.
Key components of the federal guidance include the following:
1. Financial institutions' analyses of borrowers' repayment capacity
should include an evaluation of ability to pay the fully indexed rate,
not just the initial low introductory rate. Analyses of repayment
capacity should avoid over-reliance on credit scores as a substitute
for income verification.
2. Institutions should avoid the use of loan terms and underwriting
practices that will heighten the need for a borrower to rely on the
sale or refinancing of the property once amortization begins.
3. Higher pricing of loans with elevated risks should not replace the
need for sound underwriting.
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4. Second mortgages with minimal or no owner equity should not have
a payment structure that allows for delayed or negative amortization
unless the risk is mitigated.
5. Institutions with high concentrations of nontraditional products
should have good risk management practices in place and capital
levels commensurate with the risk, and;
6. Institutions that offer nontraditional mortgage products should make
the potential consumer of these products aware of all possible risks
and should provide this information to potential borrowers in a clear,
balanced, and timely manner. Payment shock, negative
amortization, prepayment penalties, and the cost of reduced
documentation loans should be explained. Monthly statements on
payment-option adjustable rate mortgages should explain the
consequences of each payment option.
7. In issuing the guidance, the federal regulators urged states to work
quickly to apply similar guidance to state-regulated entities engaged
in mortgage lending and brokering. In November 2006, CSBS and
AARMR issued guidance substantially similar to the federal guidance,
but deleted sections of the federal guidance that were inapplicable to
nondepository institutions (i.e., sections dealing with capital reserve
requirements).
8. Subsequent to the issuance of this guidance State Senator Mike
Machado introduced SB 385, which was also co-authored by the
Assembly Banking Chair, Assemblymember Ted Lieu, in order to
clearly give state regulators the authority to enforce the guidance on
their licensees. SB 385 was signed by the governor October 5, 2007.
On April 17, 2007 the federal regulators also issued guidnace to lenders
concerning their efforst to work with troubled borrowers:
"The federal financial institutions regulatory agencies encourage
financial institutions to work constructively with residential borrowers who
are financially unable to make their contractual payment obligations on
their home loans. Prudent workout arrangements that are consistent with
safe and sound lending practices are generally in the long-term best
interest of both the financial institution and the borrower.
Many residential borrowers may face significant payment increases
when their adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) loans reset in the coming
months. These borrowers may not have sufficient financial capacity to
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service a higher debt load, especially if they were qualified based on a low
introductory payment. The agencies have long encouraged borrowers who
are unable to meet their contractual obligations to contact their lender or
servicer to discuss possible payment alternatives at the earliest indication
of such problems.
The agencies encourage financial institutions to consider prudent workout
arrangements that increase the potential for financially stressed residential
borrowers to keep their homes. However, there may be instances when
workout arrangements are not economically feasible or appropriate.
Financial institutions should follow prudent underwriting practices in
determining whether to consider a workout arrangement. Such
arrangements can vary widely based on the borrower’s financial capacity.
For example, an institution might consider modifying loan terms, including
converting loans with variable rates into fixed- rate products to provide
financially stressed borrowers with predictable payment requirements.
Financial institutions may receive favorable Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA) consideration for programs that transition low and moderate income
borrowers from higher cost loans to lower cost loans, provided the loans
are made in a safe and sound manner."
On May 2, 2007 United States Senator Chris Dodd held a Homeownership
Preservation Summit that reached a series of principles with lenders and
services on efforts to assist trouble borrowers. Those principles are:
1) Early contact and evaluation of borrowers prior to loan reset.
2) Modify loans to create long-term affordability.
3) Establish dedicated teams or resources in order to handle
modifications in an efficient and timely manner.
4) For those who are eligible, low cost financing options should be
offered.
5) Lenders should work with GSEs to make credit available to borrowers
through new products and expanded programs that will help
borrowers out of resetting subprime ARMS.
6) Maximize success, minimize damage.
7) Systems should be developed so that parties can track progress and
establish accountability.
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IMPACTS OF FORECLOSURES
A recent report released by the Congressional Joint Economic Committee
(CJEC) has highlighted some dismal impacts as a result of the foreclosure
crisis:
•

Approximately $71 billion in housing wealth directly destroyed through
the process of foreclosure.

•

More than $32 billion in housing wealth indirectly destroyed by the
spillover effect of foreclosures which reduces value of neighboring
properties.

•

States and local governments will lose more than $917 million in
property tax revenue as a result of the destruction of housing wealth
caused by subprime foreclosures.

Additionally, CJEC has found that as a result of foreclosures, California
could lose $110,921,021 in property tax revenue. They also estimate
almost 200,000 foreclosures in California over the next five quarters. In
another study regarding the typical cost of foreclosure to municipalities,
the City of Chicago was used as an example.33 In a review of the impact of
foreclosure son Chicago it was found that the cost per property in some
cases exceeded $30,000. Municipalities face increased expenditures due to
foreclosures because they require direct expenditures for increased policing
and fire suppression, demolition contracts, building inspections, legal fees
and fees associated with managing the foreclosure process.

33

Apgar, William & Mark Duda. "Collateral Damage: The Municipal Impact of Today's Mortgage Foreclosure
Boom" Homeownership Preservation Foundation. 2005
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APPENDIX I
FORECLOSURE TIMELINE 34 :
Day 1
It's the first of the month, and the mortgage payment is due. The borrower
misses the payment.
Day 16 to day 30
A late charge is assessed on payment.
The company that processes the borrower's payments (called the mortgage
servicer) starts attempting to make contact to find out what happened.
Day 45 to day 60
The servicer sends a "demand" or "breach" letter to the borrower pointing
out that terms of the mortgage have been violated. The borrower is given
30 days to resolve the situation by paying the delinquent amount.
Day 90 to day 105
The servicer refers the loan to its foreclosure department and hires a local
attorney or other firm to initiate foreclosure proceedings. Depending on
the state where the home is located, the servicer's representative may
record a formal notice of foreclosure at the local courthouse, publish details
of the debt in the local newspaper, attend hearings on the case and make
appropriate court filings.
Day 150 to day 415
The house is sold at a foreclosure sale or auction. The wide time range is
due to different state requirements. Borrowers in states with judicial
foreclosures, or those in which lenders have to retake property titles via
the court system, can get almost a year to straighten out their affairs
before the sale. Those in nonjudicial states have as little as two months.

34

Courtesy of Bankrate.com
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APPENDIX II
SUBPRIME CRISIS HISTORICAL TIMELINE
DECEMBER 2006
• December 28: Ownit Mortgage Solutions files for bankruptcy.
FEBRUARY 2007
• February 7: The Senate Banking Committee holds the first hearing of the
110th Congress addressing legislative solutions to predatory lending in the
subprime sector.
• February 12: ResMae Mortgage files for bankruptcy.
• February 20: Nova Star Financial reports a surprise loss.
MARCH 2007
• March 2: The Federal Reserve announces draft regulations to tighten
lending standards. Lenders would be required to grant loans on a
borrower's ability to pay the fully indexed interest rate that would apply
after the low, initial fixed-rate period of two or three years. New
regulations are met with skepticism in Congress.
• March 2: Fremont General stops making subprime loans and puts its
subprime business up for sale.
• March 8: New Century Financial, the second largest subprime lender in
2006, stops making loans.
• March 20: People’s Choice files for bankruptcy.
• March 22: The Senate Banking Committee holds a hearing to investigate
the sharp increase in defaults and foreclosures, questioning banking
regulators, a Federal Reserve representative, industry executives and two
homeowners. Both Democrats and Republicans criticize banking regulators
for failing to respond more quickly to curb the growth in risky home loans
to people with weak credit.
• March 27: At a Joint Economic Committee hearing, Ben Bernanke,
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, says
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housing market weakness "does not appear to have spilled over to a
significant extent.” More Bernanke: “At this juncture, however, the impact
on the broader economy and financial markets of the problems in the
subprime market seems likely to be contained. In particular, mortgages to
prime borrowers and fixed-rate mortgages to all classes of borrowers
continue to perform well, with low rates of delinquency.”
APRIL 2007
• April 2: New Century Financial files for bankruptcy.
• April 6: American Home Mortgage writes down the value of risky
mortgages rated one step above subprime.
• April 11: The JEC, chaired by Senator Charles Schumer, releases a report
analyzing the subprime mortgage foreclosure problem and its economic
impact on the most vulnerable communities. The report, entitled
“Sheltering Neighborhoods from the Subprime Foreclosure Storm,” argues
that foreclosure prevention is cost-effective and presents policy
suggestions for curbing future subprime foreclosures.
• April 12: Senator Schumer calls on Federal Government to intervene on
behalf of homeowners in response to a National Association of Realtors
report showing falling home prices due to rising foreclosures and a Los
Angeles Times story in which the White House blamed homeowners for
signing up for deceptive subprime mortgages.
• April 12: According to the Los Angeles Times, Tony Fratto, Spokesman
for the White House, said “individuals need to Legend: In the Markets In
Congress In the Administration JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE Senator
Charles E. Schumer, Chairman August 2007 make smart decisions in taking
on debt, and there has to be some responsibility for making those
decisions.” He also said that any federal action would be unwelcome and
would encourage “risky behavior.”
• April 18: Senator Dodd hosts the Homeownership Preservation Summit,
bringing together some of the largest subprime lenders, securitizers, and
servicers, as well as consumer and civil rights groups, to discuss ideas and
develop solutions to the subprime mortgage market crisis. Following the
summit, Senator Dodd states, “I am not overly anxious to legislate… We
think there may be enough laws on the books.”
• April 18: Freddie Mac announces plans to refinance up to $20 billion of
loans held by subprime borrowers who would be unable to afford their
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adjustable-rate mortgages at the reset rate.
• April 24: The National Association of Realtors announces that sales of
existing homes fell 8.4% in March from February, the sharpest month-tomonth drop in 18 years.
MAY 2007
• May 3: Senator Schumer introduces the first comprehensive plan to help
homeowners avoid foreclosures. The plan includes a request for $300
million in federal funds for community non-profits to help homeowners
refinance current mortgages through personalized financial counseling.
Schumer calls on banks and lenders to also provide funding for nonprofit
counselors. Senator Schumer, along with Senators Brown and Casey also
introduce the “Borrower’s Protection Act of 2007,” which proposes federal
regulation for mortgage brokers in order to avoid future defaults on
subprime loans. The bill seeks to regulate mortgage brokers and
originators under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) by establishing on behalf
of consumers a fiduciary duty and other standards of care. In addition, the
bill outlines standards for brokers and originators to assess a borrower’s
ability to repay a mortgage and holds lenders accountable for brokers and
appraisers.
• May 4: The House Financial Services Committee passes the “Expanding
American Home Ownership Act”. The bill would allow Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac to purchase and securitize larger mortgages (up to $625,500
or the region’s median home price) in high-cost areas of the U.S. where
the median price exceeds $417,000 (the current loan limit). The bill would
also authorize zero down payment loans and direct the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to serve higher risk borrowers who
would otherwise turn to predatory and high priced mortgage loan
alternatives.
• May 9: The Federal Open Market Committee meets and leaves rates
unchanged. The FOMC states in their minutes, “The correction of the
housing sector was likely to continue to weigh heavily on economic activity
through most of this year, somewhat longer than previously expected.”
However, the FOMC continued to refer to the housing crisis as a
“correction”.
• May 17: At the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Forty-Third Annual
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Chairman Bernanke
reiterates his March statement by saying the Fed does not foresee a
broader economic impact from the growing number of mortgage defaults.
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• May 25: The National Association of Realtors reports that sales of existing
homes fell by 2.6 percent in April to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of
5.99 million units, the slowest sales pace since June 2003. The number of
unsold homes left on the market reached a record total of 4.2 million.
JUNE 2007
• June 4: Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Secretary Alfonso
Jackson endorses counseling and financial education as the best way to
tackle the subprime foreclosure boom in a speech at the National Press
Club.
• June 5: At an International Monetary Conference in Cape Town South
Africa, Chairman Bernanke endorses the basis of a proposal made by
Schumer to increase federal funds for community non-profits engaged in
helping families in unsuitable subprime loans avoid losing their homes to
foreclosure.
• June 6: ZipRealty Inc., a national real-estate brokerage firm, announces
that the number of homes listed for sale in 18 major U.S. metropolitan
areas at the end of May was up 5.1% from April. This is a striking deviation
from the general trend as tracked by the Credit Suisse Group, which says
on a national basis; inventories of listed homes have typically been little
changed in May during the past two decades.
• June 12: RealtyTrac announces U.S. foreclosure filings surged 90 percent
in May from May 2006. Foreclosure filings were up 19 percent from April.
There were 176,137 notices of default, scheduled auctions and bank
repossessions in May. The median price for a U.S. home dropped 1.8
percent the first three months of 2007. According to Freddie Mac, typically,
more than half of all home sales occur in the April to June period.
• June 14: Goldman Sachs reports flat profit from a year ago due to
mortgage market problems.
• June 22: Bear Stearns pledges up to $3.2 billion to bail out one of its
hedge funds because of bad bets on subprime mortgages.
• June 26: Senator Schumer convenes housing experts to examine how to
protect homebuyers from subprime lending and other mortgage industry
abuses in a Banking Subcommittee hearing. The hearing focuses on the
mortgage origination process, abuses in mortgage lending industry,
responsible solutions to protect consumers in home-buying process and the
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impact of these proposed solutions on the market as a whole. The hearing
also examines the Borrower’s Protection Act of 2007 (S. 1299), which
seeks to address many of the abuses that have taken place in the
mortgage process by creating new regulations and requirements for
various mortgage originators.
JULY 2007
• July 10: Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s downgrade bonds backed by
subprime mortgages. Fitch follows suit.
• July 10: The Senate Appropriations Committee approves $100 million of
the requested $300 million for HUD Housing Counseling programs in the
Transportation, Housing, and Urban Development, and Related Agencies
FY08 Appropriations Bill. With these funds, non-profit agencies are able to
provide individual counseling by working one-on one with borrowers stuck
in unaffordable subprime loans.
• July 18: Bear Stearns announces its two hedge funds that invested
heavily in the subprime market are essentially worthless, having lost over
90% of their value, equal to over $1.4 billion.
• July 17: The Federal Reserve announces a pilot program to monitor
brokers, joining the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve with the
Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Trade Commission, and state
agencies represented by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors and the
American Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators, to conduct
targeted consumer-protection compliance reviews of underwriting
standards, oversight, and risk-management practices within nondepository lenders with significant subprime mortgage operations.
• July 18: Commerce Department announces housing starts are down 19.4
percent over the last 12 months. Also announced is a 7.5 percent plunge in
permits to build new homes, the largest monthly decline since January
1995. Permits are 25.2 percent below their level a year ago, reflecting
continued pessimism among builders over the near-term outlook for new
homebuilding.
• July 18 and 19: Chairman Bernanke testifies in front of the House
Financial Services Committee and the Senate Banking Committee in his
Second Monetary Report to Congress in 2007.
• July 19: The Dow Jones industrials close above 14,000 for the first time.
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• July 18 and 19: In two days of testimony in Congress, Chairman
Bernanke said there will be “significant losses” due to subprime mortgages,
but that such losses are “bumps” in “market innovations” (referring to
hedge fund investments in subprime mortgages). Bernanke reiterated that
problems in the subprime mortgage market have not spilled over into the
greater system. Bernanke also said the problems “'likely will get worse
before they get better.” He forecasts that the economy is poised for
moderate growth, but continuing problems in the housing market prompt
the Fed to slightly reduce its growth expectations.
• July 25: The JEC examines the impact of the subprime lending crisis on
Cleveland, Ohio, one of the hardest hit communities in the nation. The
hearing reveals the individual faces of the subprime mortgage crisis. Local
residents and city council members testify.
• July 30: IKB Deutsche Industriebank, a German bank, is bailed out
because of bad bets on U.S. mortgage-backed securities.
• July 31: Home prices continue to fall, marking the 18th consecutive
decline, beginning in December 2005, in the growth rate of housing prices,
according to the monthly S&P/Case-Shiller's Home Prices Indices, which
tracks housing prices in metropolitan areas and is considered a leading
measure of U.S. single-family home prices. The 10-City Composite index
showed an annual decline of 3.4% (it's biggest since 1991) and the 20-City
Composite reported an annual decline of 2.8%.
AUGUST 2007
• August 1: Two hedge funds managed by Bear Stearns that invested
heavily in subprime mortgages declare bankruptcy. Investors in the funds
file suit against Bear Stearns, alleging that the investment bank mislead
them about the extent of the funds’ exposure.
• August 6: American Home Mortgage files for bankruptcy.
• August 7: The Federal Open Market Committee leaves the overnight
federal funds rate at 5.25%, referring to tightening in the credit markets
and ongoing housing market crisis as a “correction”. Despite financial
market turmoil, the FOMC forecasts that “the economy seems likely to
continue to expand at a moderate pace over coming quarters, supported
by solid growth in the employment and incomes and a robust global
economy.”
• August 7: Senators Schumer and Dodd separately write to James B.
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Lockhart III, director of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO), urging him to consider temporarily raising the limit on purchases
of home loans by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in response to increasing
concerns of a credit crunch spilling into the broader mortgage market.
• August 7: Senator Clinton introduces a plan to address mortgage lending
abuses, including new regulations on brokers, strong state licensing
standards, and federal registration for brokers. The plan also proposes a $1
billion fund to assist state programs that help at-risk borrowers avoid
foreclosure.
• August 8: Senator Schumer writes to Federal regulators, urging them to
devise an action plan to deal with the current liquidity crunch in the
mortgage markets that threatens to spread across the economy as a
whole. Schumer expresses his concerns that regulators are
underestimating the spillover effects of the housing market crisis. "Nobody,
including me, wants or expects the Federal regulators to step in and lend a
hand to the private sector players who took risky gambles in the subprime
market,” says Schumer. “But when millions of Americans who have good
credit now face the real possibility of not being able to purchase a home
because of spillovers from the subprime market, we need the regulators to
play a leadership role to preserve market liquidity and minimize the
damage.”
• August 8: Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson says, “Borrowers weren't
quite as disciplined as they should be... Lenders clearly weren't as
disciplined as they should be. We've seen some excesses. We've seen it in
the subprime area, and that will be with us for a while.”
• August 9: American International Group, one of the biggest U.S.
mortgage lenders, warns that mortgage defaults are spreading beyond the
subprime sector. With delinquencies becoming more common among
borrowers in the category just above subprime.
• August 9: BNP Paribas, a French bank, suspends three of its funds
because of exposure to U.S. mortgages.
• August 9: President Bush addressing the housing market crisis, saying,
“The fundamentals of our economy are strong…I'm told there is enough
liquidity in the system to enable markets to correct.” Bush also said, “The
conditions for the marketplace working through these issues are good. My
hope is that the market, if it functions normally, will be able to yield a soft
landing.”
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• August 9 and 10: European Central Bank and Federal Reserve intervene
in markets by pumping billions of dollars of liquidity into the markets.
• August 10: John Edwards responds to President Bush’s comments, calling
on the Administration to act to moderate the housing crisis. Edward’s a
plan to protect homeowners and fight predatory lending includes strong
national legislation to regulate mortgage abuses and prohibit predatory
mortgage lending based on North Carolina’s state law and a Home Rescue
Fund to work with local non-profits, government agencies and community
financial institutions to help struggling homeowners renegotiate or
refinance their mortgages.
• August 10: In regards to lifting the caps on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
President Bush said he would like to see Congress gets GSEs “reformed,
get them streamlined, get them focused, and then I will consider other
options”.
• August 10: The federal regulator for Fannie Mae denies the mortgage
finance company's request to grow its investment portfolio, but did not
close the door on the possibility of lifting the cap in the future.
• August 13: Aegis Mortgage files for bankruptcy.
• August 15: Rep Barney Frank announces plans to hold hearings in the
House Financial Services Committee investigating credit rating agencies
role in the subprime mortgage crisis.
• August 16: Countrywide Financial, the nation’s largest mortgage lender,
draws down $11.5 billion from its credit lines.
• August 16: All three major stock indexes were 10% lower than their July
peaks – a marker indicating a correction of the stock market, due to
tightening in the credit markets.
• August 17: The Federal Reserve cuts the discount rate by half a point.
Stocks rally.
• August 22: RealtyTrac Inc announces foreclosures were up 93% in July
2007 from July 2006. The national foreclosure rate in July was one filing for
every 693 households. There were 179,599 filings reported last month, up
from 92,845 a year ago.
• August 22: In letters to more than 40 major market players, and federal
financial regulators including Chairman Bernanke and Secretary Paulson,
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Senator Schumer cautions that regulators’ efforts to bring liquidity to
tightened credit markets have so far overlooked the harrowing situation in
the underlying mortgage market that stoked the credit crunch in the first
place. Schumer urged banks, lenders, and loan servicers to direct
resources to the non-profits on the frontlines of the mortgage crisis in the
same vain as the Senate Appropriations Committee, which has set aside
$100 million for nonprofits that work with homeowners to prevent
foreclosure.
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PENDING FEDERAL LEGISLATION
1. H.R. 3838-To temporarily increase the portfolio caps applicable to
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, to provide the necessary financing to curb
foreclosures by facilitating the refinancing of at-risk.
2. H.R. 2061-Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices Reduction Act- To
protect home buyers from predatory lending practices.
3. H.R. 3535-Homebuyer's Protection Act of 2007- To amend the Truth in
Lending Act to require escrow accounts for the payment of property
taxes and insurance for all subprime loans, and to expand the coverage
of the appraisal requirements under the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, and for other purposes.
4. H.R.3777-Protecting Access to Safe Mortgages Act- To temporarily
raise the portfolio caps applicable to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, to
provide the necessary financing to curb foreclosures by facilitating the
refinancing of at-risk subprime borrowers into safe, prime loans, to
preserve liquidity in the mortgage lending markets, and for other
purposes.
5. S. 2036-Protecting Access to Safe Mortgages Act - A bill to temporarily
raise conforming loan limits in high cost areas and portfolio caps
applicable to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, to provide the necessary
financing to curb foreclosures by facilitating the refinancing of at-risk
subprime borrowers into safe, prime loans, to preserve liquidity in the
mortgage lending markets, and for other purposes.
6. H.R. 3012-Fair Mortgage Practices Act of 2007 - To amend the Truth in
Lending Act to provide for the establishment of fair mortgage practices,
generally, and for subprime mortgages in particular, to provide for a
national system for licensing or registering residential mortgage loan
originators, and for other purposes.
7. H.R. 3133-Financial Literacy for Homeowners Act - To authorize the
Secretary of the Treasury to make grants to States, units of general
local government, and nonprofit organizations for counseling and
education programs for the prevention of predatory lending and to
establish a toll-free telephone number for complaints regarding
predatory lending, and for other purposes.
8. S. 1222-STOP FRAUD Act - A bill to stop mortgage transactions which
operate to promote fraud, risk, abuse, and under-development, and for
other purposes.
9. H.R. 3666-Foreclosure Prevention and Homeownership Protection Act To establish a bipartisan commission to perform a comprehensive
examination of the current foreclosure and mortgage lending crisis and
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to make recommendations for legislative and regulatory changes to
address such problems.
10. H.R. 3019-Expand and Preserve Home Ownership Through
Counseling Act - To establish an Office of Housing Counseling to carry
out and coordinate the responsibilities of the Department of Housing
and Urban Development regarding counseling on homeownership and
rental housing issues, to make grants to entities for providing such
counseling, to launch a national housing counseling advertising
campaign, and for other purposes.
11. H.R 1852-Expanding American Homeownership Act of 2007 - To
modernize and update the National Housing Act and enable the Federal
Housing Administration to use risk-based pricing to more effectively
reach underserved borrowers, and for other purposes.
12. H.R. 1427-Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of 2007 - To reform
the regulation of certain housing-related Government-sponsored
enterprises, and for other purposes.
13. H.R. 3074-Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act- Making appropriations for the
Departments of Transportation, and Housing and Urban Development,
and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2008, and
for other purposes.
14. H.R. 3915- To amend the Truth in Lending Act to reform consumer
mortgage practices and provide accountability for such practices, to
establish licensing and registration requirements for residential
mortgage originators, to provide certain minimum standards for
consumer mortgage loans, and for other purposes.
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APPENDIX IV
GLOSSARY & COMMON MORTGAGE RELATED TERMS
•

7/23 and 5/25 Mortgages

•

3/1, 5/1, 7/1 and 10/1 ARMs

•

Acceleration

•

Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM)

•

Adjustment Date

•

Adjustment Interval

•

Adjustment Period

•

Amortization

•

Annual Percentage Rate (APR)

•

Balloon Mortgage

Mortgages with a one time rate adjustment after seven years and
five years respectively.
Adjustable rate mortgages in which rate is fixed for three year, five
year, seven year and 10-year periods, respectively, but may adjust
annually after that.
The right of the mortgagee (lender) to demand the immediate
repayment of the mortgage loan balance upon the default of the
mortgagor (borrower), or by using the right vested in the Due on
Sale Clause.
A mortgage in which the interest rate is adjusted periodically based
on a pre-selected index. Also sometimes known as a renegotiable
rate mortgage, or variable rate mortgage.
The date that the interest rate changes on an adjustable rate
mortgage (ARM).
On an adjustable rate mortgage, the time between changes in the
interest rate and/or monthly payment, typically one, three or five
years depending on the index.
The period elapsing between adjustment dates for an adjustable rate
mortgage (ARM).
Loan payment divided into equal periodic payments calculated to pay
off the debt at the end of a fixed period, including accrued interest on
the outstanding balance.
The measurement of the full cost of a loan including interest and loan
fees expressed as a yearly percentage rate. Because all lenders apply
the same rules in calculating the annual percentage rate, it provides
consumers with a good basis for comparing the cost of different
loans.
A loan which is amortized for a longer period than the term of the
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loan. Usually this refers to a thirty year amortization and a five or
seven year term. At the end of the term of the loan, the remaining
outstanding principal on the loan is due. This final payment is known
as a balloon payment.

•

Blanket Mortgage

•

Broker

•

Buy Down

•
•

A mortgage covering at least two pieces of real estate as security for
the same mortgage.
An individual in the business of assisting in arranging funding or
negotiating contracts for a client but who does not loan the money
himself. Brokers usually charge a fee or receive a commission for
their services.
When the lender and/or the home builder subsidized the mortgage
by lowering the interest rate during the first few years of the loan.
While the payments are initially low, they will increase when the
subsidy expires.
Caps (interest)
Consumer safeguards which limit the amount of change to the
interest rate for an adjustable rate mortgage.
Caps (payment)
Consumer safeguards which limit the amount of change to the
monthly payments for an adjustable rate mortgage.

•

Change Frequency

•

COFI

•

Conventional Loan

•

Conversion Clause

•

Debt-to-Income Ratio

•

Default

The frequency (in months) of payment and/or interest rate changes
in an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM).
An adjustable-rate mortgage with a rate that adjusts based on a
cost-of-funds index, often the 11th District Cost of Funds.
A mortgage not insured by FHA or guaranteed by VA.
A provision in an ARM allowing the loan to be converted to a fixedrate at some point during the term. Usually conversion is allowed at
the end of the first adjustment period. The conversion feature may
cost extra.
The ratio, expressed as a percentage, which results when a
borrower's monthly payment obligation on long term debts is divided
by his or her gross monthly income. See housing expenses-toincome ratio.
Failure to meet legal obligations in a contract, specifically, failure to
make the monthly payments on a mortgage.
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•

Deferred Interest

•

Delinquency

•

Equity

•

Escrow

•

•

•

When a mortgage is written with a monthly payment that is less than
required to satisfy the note rate, the unpaid interest is deferred by
adding it to the loan balance. See negative amortization.
Failure to make payments on time. This can lead to foreclosure.
The difference between the fair market value and current
indebtedness also referred to as the owner's interest. The value an
owner has in real estate over and above the obligation against the
property.
An account held by the lender into which the home buyer pays
money for tax or insurance payments. Also earnest deposits held
pending loan closing.
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation(FHLMC) also called "Freddie
Mac"
A government sponsored entity that purchases conventional
mortgage from insured depository institutions and HUD-approved
mortgage bankers.
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) also know as "Fannie Mae"
A government sponsored entity that purchases and sells conventional
residential mortgages as well as those insured by FHA or guaranteed
by VA.
FHA Loan

A loan insured by the Federal Housing Administration open to all
qualified home purchasers. While there are limits to the size of FHA
loans, they are generous enough to handle moderately priced homes
almost anywhere in the country.

•

First Mortgage

•

Fixed Installment

•

Fixed Rate Mortgage

•

Fully Amortized ARM

•

Foreclosure

The primary lien against a property.
The monthly payment due on a mortgage loan including payment of
both principal and interest.
The mortgage interest rate will remain the same on these mortgages
throughout the term of the mortgage for the original borrower.
An adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) with a monthly payment that is
sufficient to amortize the remaining balance, at the interest accrual
rate, over the amortization term.
A legal process by which the lender or the seller forces a sale of a
mortgaged property because the borrower has not met the terms of
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•
•

the mortgage. Also known as a repossession of property.
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA)

Also known as "Ginnie Mae." Provides sources of funds for residential
mortgages, insured or guaranteed by FHA or VA.
Graduated Payment Mortgage (GPM)
A type of flexible payment mortgage where the payments increase
for a specified period of time and then level off. This type of
mortgage has negative amortization built into it.

•

Growing Equity Mortgage (GEM)

•

Impound

•

Initial Interest Rate

•

Interest

•

Interest Accrual Rate

•

Interest Rate Buydown Plan

•

Interest Rate Ceiling

•

Interest Rate Floor

•

Investor

•

Jumbo Loan

A fixed rate mortgage that provides scheduled payment increases
over an established period of time. The increased amount of the
monthly payment is applied directly toward reducing the remaining
balance of the mortgage.
The portion of a borrower's monthly payments held by the lender or
servicer to pay for taxes, hazard insurance, mortgage insurance,
lease payments, and other items as they become due. Also known as
reserves.
This refers to the original interest rate of the mortgage at the time of
closing. This rate changes for an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM).
It's also known as "start rate" or "teaser."
The fee charged for borrowing money.
The percentage rate at which interest accrues on the mortgage. In
most cases, it is also the rate used to calculate the monthly
payments.
An arrangement that allows the property seller to deposit money to
an account. That money is then released each month to reduce the
mortgagor's monthly payments during the early years of a mortgage.
For an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM), the maximum interest rate,
as specified in the mortgage note.
For an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM), the minimum interest rate,
as specified in the mortgage note.
A money source for a lender.
A loan which is larger than the limits set by the Federal National
Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation. Because jumbo loans cannot be funded by these two
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agencies, they usually carry a higher interest rate.

•

Lien

•

Lifetime Payment Cap

•

Lifetime Rate Cap

•

Loan

•

Margin

•

Monthly Fixed Installment

•

Mortgage

•

Mortgage Banker

•

Mortgage Broker

•

Negative Amortization

•

One Year Adjustable Rate Mortgage

•

Payment Change Date

A claim upon a piece of property for the payment or satisfaction of a
debt or obligation.
For an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM), a limit on the amount that
payments can increase or decrease over the life of the mortgage.
For an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM), a limit on the amount that
the interest rate can increase or decrease over the life of the loan.
A sum of borrowed money (principal) that is generally repaid with
interest.
The amount a lender adds to the index on an adjustable rate
mortgage to establish the adjusted interest rate.
The portion of the total monthly payment that is applied toward
principal and interest. When a mortgage negatively amortizes, the
monthly fixed installment does not include any amount for principal
reduction and doesn't cover all of the interest. The loan balance
therefore increases instead of decreasing.
A legal document that pledges a property to the lender as security
for payment of a debt.
A company that originates mortgages for resale in the secondary
mortgage market.
An individual or company that charges a service fee to bring
borrowers and lenders together for the purpose of loan origination.
When your monthly payments are not large enough to pay all the
interest due on the loan. This unpaid interest is added to the unpaid
balance of the loan. The home buyer ends up owing more than the
original amount of the loan.
Mortgage where the annual rate changes yearly. The rate is usually
based on movements of a published index plus a specified margin,
chosen by the lender.
The date when a new monthly payment amount takes effect on an
adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) or a graduated-payment mortgage
(GPM). Generally, the payment change date occurs in the month
immediately after the adjustment date.
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•

Periodic Payment Cap

•

Periodic Rate Cap

•

•

A limit on the amount that payments can increase or decrease during
any one adjustment period.
A limit on the amount that the interest rate can increase or decrease
during any one adjustment period, regardless of how high or low the
index might be.
Points (Loan Discount Points)
Prepaid interest assessed at closing by the lender. Each point is equal
to 1 percent of the loan amount (e.g., two points on a $100,000
mortgage would cost $2,000).
Preapproval

The process of determining how much money you will be eligible to
borrow before you apply for a loan.

•

Primary Mortgage Market

•

Principal

•

Principal Balance

•

Principal, Interest, Taxes, and Insurance (PITI)

•

•
•

Lenders, such as savings and loan associations, commercial banks,
and mortgage companies, who make mortgage loans directly to
borrowers. These lenders sometimes sell their mortgages to the
secondary mortgage markets such as FNMA or GNMA, etc…
The amount borrowed or remaining unpaid. The part of the monthly
payment that reduces the remaining balance of a mortgage.
The outstanding balance of principal on a mortgage not including
interest or any other charges.
The four components of a monthly mortgage payment. Principal
refers to the part of the monthly payment that reduces the remaining
balance of the mortgage. Interest is the fee charged for borrowing
money. Taxes and insurance refer to the monthly cost of property
taxes and homeowners insurance, whether these amounts are paid
into an escrow account each month or not.
Private Mortgage Insurance (PMI)
In the event that you do not have a 20 percent down payment,
lenders will allow a smaller down payment - as low as 3 percent in
some cases. With the smaller down payment loans, however,
borrowers are usually required to carry private mortgage insurance.
Private mortgage insurance will usually require an initial premium
payment and may require an additional monthly fee depending on
your loan's structure.
Refinance

Obtaining a new mortgage loan on a property already owned often to
replace existing loans on the property.
Reverse Annuity Mortgage (RAM)
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A form of mortgage in which the lender makes periodic payments to
the borrower using the borrower's equity in the home as collateral for
and repayment of the loan.

•

Second Mortgage

•

Secondary Mortgage Market

•

Servicer

•

Step Rate Mortgage

•

Third Party Origination

•

Two Step Mortgage

•

Underwriting

A mortgage made subsequent to another mortgage and subordinate
to the first one.
The place where primary mortgage lenders sell the mortgages they
make to obtain more funds to originate more new loans. It provides
liquidity for the lenders.
An organization that collects principal and interest payments from
borrowers and manages borrower escrow accounts. The servicer
often services mortgages that have been purchased by an investor in
the secondary mortgage market.
A mortgage that allows for the interest rate to increase according to
a specified schedule (i.e., seven years), resulting in increased
payments as well. At the end of the specified period, the rate and
payments will remain constant for the remainder of the loan.
When a lender uses another party to completely or partially originate,
process, underwrite, close, fund, or package the mortgages it plans
to deliver to the secondary mortgage market.
A mortgage in which the borrower receives a-below-market interest
rate for a specified number of years (most often seven or 10), and
then receives a new interest rate adjusted (within certain limits) to
market conditions at that time. The lender sometimes has the option
to call the loan due with 30 days notice at the end of seven or 10
years. Also called "Super Seven" or "Premier" mortgage.
The decision whether to make a loan to a potential home buyer
based on credit, employment, assets, and other factors and the
matching of this risk to an appropriate rate and term or loan amount.

• Wraparound Mortgage
Results when an existing assumable loan is combined with a new loan,
resulting in an interest rate somewhere between the old rate and the
current market rate. The payments are made to a second lender or the
previous homeowner, who then forwards the payments to the first lender
after taking the additional amount off the top.
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Joint Informational hearing of
Assembly Banking & Finance Committee
&
Assembly Higher Education Committee
Impact of Credit Crunch on Student Loans

The global credit crisis that started early 2007 has garnered the most
attention for its impact on the home mortgage market. A prompt
realization of the credit risk concerning some investment vehicles and fast
deteriorating home prices have led to one of the most severe market
shake-ups in recent memory. The seizure of the credit markets has made
the securitization of several investment vehicles very difficult, and at times
impossible. In those cases where financing is flowing in the capital
markets, a steep premium is attached to those credit deals. This credit
crisis has now spilled over into the student lending market. The collapse of
the auction rate securities (ARS) market, a previously obscure financial
market for most people, has impacted municipal bonds and the student
loan market. The structure of student loan markets will be discussed in
more detail later. Additionally, the subprime lending crisis has had an
overlooked, and direct effect on the student loans as a borrower with a
foreclosure in the last five years is ineligible for a federal PLUS loan 35 . Due
to this credit crisis, private student loans will be underwritten with more
restrictive terms such as requiring increased FICO scores. It is estimated
that these changes alone will result in 100,000 families becoming ineligible
for both PLUS and private student loans. 36
Student lending is funded via private loan programs, the Federal Financial
Education Loan Program (FFELP), or the William D. Ford Federal Direct
Loan Program (Direct Loan) provided by the federal government. Direct
Loans are funded from public capital originating with the U.S. Treasury.
They are distributed through a channel that begins with the U.S. Treasury
Department and from there passes through the USDE, then to the college
or university and then to the student. Private loans and FFELP loans have
been stifled, to varying degrees, by shut down in securitizations for private
loans, and a 57% reduction in securitizations of FFELP loans and the cost of
those funds increasing 137 basis points. 37
35

Testimony by Mark Kantrowitz, Publisher, FinAid.org. Hearing of the US Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Impact on the Cost and Availability of Student
Loans. April 15, 2008
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid
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There are 5,966 institutions of higher education eligible to participate in the
Title IV loan programs. Of that number, 4,105 institutions actively
participate in the FFEL program, while 1,150 institutions actively participate
in the DL program. However, since February 2008 to today, more than
288 institutions have begun the process to switch to the DL program. This
compares with nine institutions switching during the same time period in
2007. Although there has been concern expressed in the community that
the DL program would be unable to handle a sudden shift in loan volume,
ED has assured institutions that it should be able to double its loan
volume. The process for an institution to switch from the FFEL to the DL
program might be difficult to accomplish in a very short period of time if a
school were to suddenly determine that its students had difficulty accessing
loans.
A recent New York Times article, "Student Loans Start to Bypass 2-Year
Colleges," highlighted the exodus student loan programs at two-year
colleges. Lenders are pulling out of this market based on analysis of higher
default rates, low numbers of borrowers and small loan amounts that
combined to make loans to these institutions less profitable. This is
occurring even with 95% of the value of these loans guaranteed by the
federal government. California's two-year colleges have been burdened
with budget reductions and other cost cutting measures due to multiple
state budget deficits. According to the College Board, 40% of the nation's
undergraduates attend two-year colleges, with a third of their graduates
taking out loans. Two-year colleges are often the gateway for students,
often facing financial difficulties, to enter the higher education system.
Four non-profit state loan agencies, Pennsylvania Higher Education
Assistance Agency (PHEAA), Massachusetts Education Financing Authority
(MEFA), Michigan Higher Education Student Loan Authority (MHESLA) and
Brazos (TX) have suspended all FFEL program originations. NorthStar
Guarantee had suspended all activity in the FFEL program but has
subsequently resumed making Stafford and PLUS loans, excluding
consolidation loans.
The lenders who have exited all or part of the FFEL program account for
over 12 percent of Stafford and PLUS loan origination volume and 83
percent of FFEL consolidation loan volume. These lenders originated more
than $7 billion in Stafford and PLUS loans and more than $39.3 billion in
consolidation loans in FY 07. All of the top ten and 38 of the top 100
consolidation lenders have stopped making consolidation loans, and 27 of
the top 100 originators have stopped making Stafford and PLUS loans.
In addition, a number of institutions are reporting anecdotally on email
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lists that some FFEL lenders have informed them that they will no longer
offer loans to the institution's students, usually because the volume of
loans from that college or university is too low.
According to the National Association of College and University Business
Officers, as of May 22, 2008, eighty-nine education lenders have exited or
suspended their participation in all or part of the FFEL program. Seventytwo lenders have suspended participation in the entire FFEL program, 17
lenders have suspended participation in the consolidation loan program
only, and 26 lenders have suspended their private student loan programs.
This reduction in lending has occurred in spite of Asset Backed Securities
(ABS) associated with student loans being AAA rated. Around 7.5 million
borrowers took out $91.8 billion in FFELP loans during the current school
year at 4,500 institutions. 38
Student Lending Marketplace.
The majority of student loans are originated via the FFELP or the Direct
Loan program with colleges and universities generally participating in
either one or the other.
•

•

Under the FFELP the loan is originated by a private lending institution
but guaranteed by the federal government. Furthermore, these
loans contain interest rates caps with subsidies to the lenders and
guarantors that ensure the student borrower is able to get the most
cost effective loan possible.
The Direct Loan program is a loan that is made by and repaid to the
federal USDE. These two lending programs are not available at every
educational institutions.

These programs offer two types of undergraduate loans:
• Subsidized Stafford Loans: These are needs-based loans that cover
the difference between a student's resources and the cost of
attending a college or university, up to $13,500. The federal
government pays the interest while the student is attending the
college or university and subsidizes the interest throughout the life of
the loan.
•

38

Unsubsidized Stafford Loans: Not based on financial need, these
loans generally cover the difference between the subsidized Stafford
Loan and the total cost of attending college. Loans are made by
private lending institutions and repayment is guaranteed by the

Robert Tomsho. Tough Assignment: Find College Loans, Wall Street Journal. June 1, 2008
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federal government. The federal government sets the interest rates
and fees.
It is estimated that three quarters of postsecondary schools participate in
the FFELP, while only 25% participate in the Direct Loan program. The
differences in participation for these programs vary due to differences in
subsidies and support offered for depending on the loan program. For
example, more generous subsidies are offered to lenders in the FFEL
program, and schools received administrative assistance that is not
available through the Direct Loan program. Furthermore, the Direct Loan
limits have not kept pace with the cost of education; however, one could
also argue that neither grants nor loans are able to keep pace with
increasing costs of education in general.
Another loan program, designed for credit worthy parents of dependent
students, are PLUS Loans. These are not needs-based and are federally
guaranteed. Federal student loans to parents: Usually these are PLUS
loans (formerly standing for "Parent Loan for Undergraduate Students").
Unlike loans made to students, parents can borrow much more — usually
enough to cover any gap in the cost of education. However, there is no
grace period as payments start immediately. Parents are responsible for
repayment on these loans, not the student. The parents have signed the
master promissory note to pay and, if they do not do so, it is their credit
rating that suffers. As mentioned in the opening of this document, the
foreclosure crisis has had a direct impact on these types of loans as
foreclosures have a sever impact on credit ratings, and can completely
eliminate eligibility to receive these types of loans.
Another option for students is access to the private student loan market.
These are loans that are not guaranteed by a government agency and are
made to students by banks or finance companies. Advocates of private
student loans suggest that they combine the best elements of the different
government loans into one: They generally offer higher loan limits than
direct-to-student federal loans, ensuring the student is not left with a
budget gap. However, unlike to-the-parent government loans, they
generally offer a grace period with no payments due until after graduation.
This grace period ranges as high as 12 months after graduation, though
most private lenders offer six months.
Private loans generally come in two types: school-channel and direct-toconsumer. School-channel loans offer borrowers lower interest rates but
generally take longer to process. School-channel loans are 'certified' by the
school, which means the school signs off on the borrowing amount, and the
funds for school-channel loans are disbursed directly to the school. Directto-consumer private loans are not certified by the school; schools don't
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interact with a direct-to-consumer private loan at all. The student simply
supplies enrollment verification to the lender, and the loan proceeds are
disbursed directly to the student. While direct-to-consumer loans generally
carry higher interest rates than school-channel loans, they do allow
families to get access to funds very quickly — in some cases, in a matter of
days. Some argue that this convenience is off-set by the risk of student
over-borrowing and/or use of funds for inappropriate purposes, since there
is no third-party certification that the amount of the loan is appropriate for
the education finance needs of the student in question. Direct-toconsumer private loans are the fastest growing segment of education
finance and, as such, a number of providers are introducing products. Loan
providers range from large education finance companies to specialty
companies that focus exclusively on this niche. Such loans will often be
distinguished by the indication that "no FAFSA is required" or "Funds
disbursed directly to you."
Lenders that participate in the federal program may also offer private
loans.
Capital Markets & Student Loans:
Not-for-profit lenders and state-based student loan secondary market
organizations and non-traditional lenders (e.g., Sallie Mae) use a variety of
strategies to raise capital in the marketplace, which is, in turn, offered as
student loans. All of these types of organizations may participate in both
the FFEL program and the private loan market, with varying levels of
participation by each affiliated organization. Many traditional deposit
banks (e.g., Chase, Bank of America, Wachovia, and Citibank) have
participated in the FFEL program and offer private loans. In FY 06,
traditional banks held nearly 24 percent of outstanding volume while nonbanks held over 76 percent of volume.
Like mortgage lending, student lending is also funded and operated
through complex secondary market transactions and investment vehicles.
Secondary markets include Sallie Mae, commercial banks, state guaranty
agencies, non-profits and non-depository banking entities. These
secondary market participants either keep the loans on their books or fund
them through the issuance of ARS or ABS. In selling the loans to the
secondary market, banks free up their capital and are able to make
additional loans to students. Many of the not-for-profit lenders also buy
loans from the banks on the secondary markets, which means that if the
not-for-profit lenders are facing a short-term liquidity problem, the banks
may face a long-term liquidity problem when the secondary market is not
available to buy their loans.
Sallie Mae is the largest purchaser of secondary market student loans in
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the market. However, the recent market turmoil has caused Sallie Mae to
scale back its overall market participation with a complete exit from the
loan consolidation market. Sallie Mae was created in 1972 via
congressional action as a Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE), much
like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to provide a secondary market to
encourage the origination of loans to students who were considered a
credit risk. In 2004, Congress terminated its charter and it became a
private company.
Approximately, 85% of FFELP loans have been financed through issuance
of ABS, however since September 30, 2007, no loan originated has been
funded through securitization 39 . In the first quarter of 2008 only $8.4
billion of student loan ABS was issued, compared to $21.7 billion in the
first quarter of 2007. 40 According to statistics from Sallie Mae, the total
outstanding amount of student loans from both FFELP and the private
market is $405 billion. The ARS market, in 2007 held $80 billion with $230
billion held in the ABS market. Sallie Mae does most of its funding through
the ABS market.
In the standard ABS financing, student loans are transferred from lenders
into a bankruptcy remote securitization trust that then issues securities to
investors. In these trusts, the underlying loan is the collateral for
repayment of the investment, and with a FFELP guarantee up to 97% of
the loan, these securities are relatively stable and safe investments. The
ABS backed by the loans are divided up into tranches based on quality of
the underlying asset ranging and rated by credit rating agencies from AAA
to AA. ABS backed by loans from the FFELP are usually rated AAA due to
the large federal guarantee in the event of default. Investors in these
securities receive various floating rates of interest based on the rating and
maturity of the security. The recent market turmoil has lead to investor
demanded rate spreads that are too expensive to make newly originated
loans profitable.
As mentioned previously the other sector of financing for student loans is
the ARS market. ARSs are long-term bonds bearing interest rates that are
set during an auction but can be held at intervals as short as one week.
During the auction, those bondholders who wish to sell their bonds can do
so if sufficient buyers bid. Generally speaking, the more market interest
there is in purchasing an auction rate security, the lower the rate the issuer
must pay bondholders. The less market interest, the higher the rate the
39

Testimony of Tom Deutsch, American Securitization Forum. Hearing of the US Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Impact on the Cost and Availability of Student
Loans. April 15, 2008
40
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101

issuer must pay. If there are insufficient buyers to purchase the auction
rate securities that holders wish to sell, the bondholders must keep their
bonds (turning a liquid investment into a less liquid one), and the issuer
must pay a rate (the "failed auction rate") that is specified in the bond
documents. The failed auction rate is typically much higher than the rates
the market has traditionally accepted, which places financial pressure on
the issuer. Historically, investment banks would step in to purchase any
otherwise un-purchased auction rate securities. However, the liquidity
crunch that has affected nearly all market participants has left them unable
to support the volume of bonds that investors want to sell. Early this year
over 700 auctions failed in a single week. In addition to being issued by
student loan finance authorities, they are issued by municipalities, nonprofit hospitals, and housing finance agencies.
The crisis in the ABS and ARS markets has been exacerbated, according to
many players in the student loan market, by the College Cost Reduction
and Access Act of 2007.
College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007.
Many lenders have pointed to other changes in the student lending market
that have reduced the attractiveness of these loans for investors. The
largest of those changes was the passage of the HR 2669 (Miller), the
College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 (CCRAA), which reduced
both borrower interest rates and reduced the subsidy rates that the
government would pay to lenders. Furthermore, the Congressional Budget
Office estimated the total reduction in lender subsidies, resulting from
CCRAA, would exceed $40 billion over 10 years , a reduction that some
lenders have felt would make it virtually impossible to continue to offer
loans in a such a market.
CCRAA cut the subsidy rates on loans in order to free up money for an
increase in Pell Grants, starting with a $490 increase for the first two
years, rising to $1,090 for the 2012-2012 school year and as a response to
troubling developments involving lenders and student aid officers steering
students into questionable loans. Key provisions relating to students loans
are as follows:
•

The bill gradually cuts interest rates on subsidized Stafford loans for
undergraduate students in half, according to the following schedule:
o 6.8 percent for loans first disbursed July 1, 2006 to July 1,
2008
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o 6 percent for loans first disbursed July 1, 2008 to July 1, 2009
o 5.6 percent for loans first disbursed July 1, 2009 to July 1,
2010
o 4.5 percent for loans first disbursed July 1, 2010 to July 1,
2011
o 3.4 percent for loans first disbursed July 1, 2011 to July 1,
2012
•

Loan payments will be limited to 15 percent of a borrower's
discretionary income or 15 percent of the amount that a borrower's (and
spouse's if applicable) adjusted gross income exceeds 150 percent of
the poverty line, divided by 12. Unpaid interest and principal are
capitalized and any outstanding loan balance is forgiven after 25 years
of repayment.

•

PLUS Loans made on behalf of a dependent student and Direct
Consolidation Loans that contain PLUS loans are not eligible for the
income-based repayment program.

•

Holders of these loans must apply the borrower's payments first to
interest, second to fees, and then toward the principal of the loan.

•

Any interest due and not covered by the borrower shall be paid by the
Secretary of Education for up to three years except for periods that a
borrower is in deferment due to economic hardship.

•

The lender shall also capitalize the interest due when the borrower
stops participating in the income-based repayment program, or begins
making payments larger than what is specified under income-based
repayment.

•

Principal due and not paid under income-base repayment shall be
deferred.

•

Borrowers may remain in income-based repayment more than 10
years.

•

When borrowers leave the program the maximum payment required on
the loan shall not exceed the monthly amount based on a 10-year
repayment period when the borrower first joined income-based
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repayment. The time the borrower is permitted to repay the loan may
exceed 10 years.
•

The Department must repay or cancel any outstanding loan principal
and interest for borrowers after 25 years of repayment.

•

Borrowers currently repaying loans according to income-contingent
repayment or income-sensitive repayment plans will have the choice to
continue in their current plans or may participate in the program
created by this bill.

•

The USDE must establish procedures to annually determine borrowers'
eligibility for the program, including verification of a borrower's income
and the amount of their loans.

•

Reductions to Lenders in the FFELP program.
o Eliminate the "Exceptional Performer" status that allows
lenders that meet certain requirements established by the
Secretary of Education to receive higher insurance rates on
defaulted loans
o Reduce the insurance paid by the federal government to
lenders on defaulted loans from 98 percent to 97 percent of
unpaid principal balances through October 1, 2012 at which
point the insurance will be reduced to 95 percent
o Reduce the amount that guarantors may keep through
collections on defaulted loans from 23 percent to 16 percent
o Reduce the special allowance payments (SAP) from the
Department to lenders based on their tax status. For-profit
lenders would receive a 55 basis point SAP reduction and nonfor-profit lenders would receive a 40 basis point SAP reduction.
To ensure that only nonprofit lenders benefit from the
increased subsidization, nonprofit lenders that are owned inwhole or in-part by a for-profit entity would not be eligible for
the reduced subsidy reductions. Nonprofit lenders that are
purchased by for-profit entities would also lose their higher
subsidization rates on the date of the sale.
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o Increase the loan fee paid to the Department by lenders - that
cannot be passed on to borrowers - from 0.5 percent to 1
percent of the principal amount of each newly originated loan
made on or after October 1, 2007
o Decrease the account maintenance fees paid by the
Department to guarantors from .10 percent to .06 percent on
newly originated loans
o The definition of economic hardship is also changed under from
100 percent of the poverty line for a family of 2 to 150 percent
of the poverty line applicable to the family size.
Recent Developments:
The lender-of-last-resort (LLR) is a proposed solution to the current crisis, but
this program directly involves guaranty agencies, not institutions of higher
education.
Specifically, current law requires guaranty agencies to develop policies and
operating procedures to ensure that a borrower in the geographic area
serviced by that guaranty agency is able to obtain a loan. The agency can
make the loan or direct the borrower to a designated lender. The
Secretary of USDE is authorized to advance loan capital to the guaranty
agency if it is needed in order to enable the agency to make loans under
these provisions.
The federal guarantee on these loans is 100 percent, which is three percent
higher than what lenders would receive if they made a loan under FFELP.
Otherwise, the terms and conditions on these loans are the same as loans
made under current law. The USDE issued guidance to guaranty agencies
on LLR services in the FFEL program. The original intent of the LLR
provisions was to deal with situations when individual students were not
able to get loans, rather than to serve as a large-scale lending platform.
On Wednesday, May 21, 2008, the USDE released the implementation details of
H.R. 5715, the Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008,
which was signed into law by President Bush on May 7, 2008. In a Dear
Colleague letter, the Department discuses the following four steps of its
plan to ensure access to student loans:
1. As authorized by HR 5715, the Department will purchase loans from
the FFEL program lenders for the 2008-2009 academic year and offer
lenders access to short-term liquidity;
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2. The Department pledges to continue working with the FFEL program
community in the short-term to explore programs that might reengage the capital markets;
3. The Department will make available, if needed, an enhanced lenderof-last resort program; and
4. The Department has the capability of doubling the capacity of the
Direct Loan program, should it be needed.
Sallie Mae, the nation’s largest originator of federally-guaranteed student
loans, announced that they will continue to originate loans following
previous reports that the student loan organization might withdraw from
the federal program. This federal response is fluid and is changing moment
by moment, even at the time of this writing. Time will tell if efforts to
boost market liquidity will have an impact.
California's Nexus with Federal Loan Programs:
The state's guarantor of FFELP student loans is the California Student Aid
Commission (CSAC) established in 1955. CSAC guarantees principle and
interest on federal student loans. EdFund was created on January 1997 as
a non-profit corporation to act as an auxiliary for CSAC. Today, CSAC may
be best known for administering the $800 million Cal Grant Program.
As the second largest provider of guarantee services in the nation, EdFund
processed over $9 billion in loan guarantees in fiscal year 2006-07, and
has the capacity to scale its operations to process LLR loan volume, as
needed. CSAC and EdFund operate a single line of business as guarantors
of loans as they do not engage in direct lending.
On May 30, 2008, the Assembly Budget Subcommittee #2 approved
language to ensure that CSAC is able to exercise all options as a lender of
last resort and that EdFund must follow directives of CSAC in utilizing its
authority to provide greater market liquidity for student loans.
On May 16, 2008, CSAC filed a detailed report with the USDE regarding
their proposed participation in the LLR program as required by 34 CFR
682.401(c)
Conclusion:
All participants in the student loan market are hopeful that the latest plans
to inject liquidity in the marketplace will ensure that student loans are
available as needed. However, the changes that have occurred over the
last year have raised many questions about the future of the student
lending market. Due to liquidity concerns, the lending environment is
beginning to change direction to a focus that may require increased role for
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state guarantor agencies. Furthermore, as the facts on the ground change
moment to moment it is unclear whether the LLR program will become the
predominant standard method of issuing student loans and not the
exception as in the past.
Further, questions remain as to whether this the rapid change in student
loans resulted from the credit crisis or the subsidy cuts contained in
CCRAA. The National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators
released a white paper, The Student Loan Credit Crunch, on April 29, 2008
to that discussed the impacts of the credit crunch on student loans. In
addressing the issue of originations of this crisis they wrote the following:
Some lenders attribute their current troubles to subsidy cuts made by the
College Cost Reduction and Access Act (CCRAA) signed into law on
September 27, 2007. However, NASFAA agrees with the opinions
expressed by a number of lenders in their testimony during several
congressional hearings: While the subsidy cuts in the CCRAA may have
exacerbated the problems in the capital market, this alone has not created
the current credit crunch.
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On November 1, 2007, the Assembly Banking and Finance Committee
conducted an informational hearing "Subprime Mortgage Crisis in
California, A Community Hearing to Examine Solutions and Mitigation
Efforts," that examined the mortgage crisis through the testimony of
consumer advocates, community leaders and industry experts. At the time
of that hearing it was clear that the subprime mortgage crisis was only the
beginning of larger problem that would go on to shake up capital markets
worldwide. Insufficient risk calculation, as well as, the abuse of certain
mortgage loan features led to a downward spiral of both credit and
confidence. Years of insufficient underwriting standards combined with a
bubble in home price appreciation created the perfect combination of
financial disaster. Mortgages offered to borrowers who often had no ability
to repay the loan combined with over inflated property values were
packaged into securities and sold on the secondary market where the
inherent risk of these products was overlooked or even ignored. These
securities garnered high rates of return, a gold mine in a market that was
flush with liquidity and those willing to spend it. This encouraged a cycle
were the rates of return were so great on these products that Wall Street
demanded more investment in mortgages, which in turn led many
mortgage lenders to churn out subprime mortgages with little or no
secondary review. At the time of the November, 2007 hearing several
large subprime lenders had filed for bankruptcy or were in the process of
being absorbed by larger financial institutions in order to avoid a complete
collapse of the mortgage market.
In California, lenders filed 72,571 "notices of default" on borrowers in the
third quarter of 2007, eclipsing a record of 61,541 set in 1996, according
to DataQuick Information Systems. In Stockton, California in the 3rd
quarter of 2007 1 in every 27 home had received some time of foreclosure
filing. Today that statistic, for the second quarter of 2008 was 1 in 25
homes. Additionally, foreclosure filings were reported on 739,714 U.S.
properties during the second quarter of 2008, a nearly 14 percent increase
from the previous quarter and a 121 percent increase from the second
quarter of 2007. That means that 1 in every 171 U.S. households received
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a foreclosure filing. The California cities of Stockton and Riverside-San
Bernardino take the No. 1 and No. 2 spots with the most foreclosure
activity nationwide, with 10 of California's metropolitan areas in the top
twenty nationwide (Stockton at No. 1, San Bernadino/Riverside at No. 2,
Bakersfield at No. 4, Sacramento at No. 5, Oakland at No. 8, Fresno at No.
9, San Diego at No. 11, Orange at No. 15, Ventura at No. 16 and Los
Angeles at No. 19.)
A large percentage of foreclosure filings are notices of default (NODs).
However, not all NODs lead to a foreclosure sale and due the legally
mandated timelines for the foreclosure process it can take up to a year to
determine how many NODs have actually led to a home loss, though the
data reflects that more than half of NODs lead to a foreclosure sale. For
example, Foreclosureradar.com looked back to NODs filed in June of 2007
and found that 60% of those resulted in the property sold at auction.
Is the crisis getting better? The expert consensus is that the worst of the
crisis is not over. Home prices continue a rapid decline as the housing
market is oversupplied with homes, many of which are foreclosed
properties. Credit standards have tightened as the availability of easy
credit has dwindled. Now, even borrowers with good credit are facing
some difficulties getting financing for a home.
Additionally, more loans continue to default as we now see new classes of
loans in the Alt-A loan market face growing pressure and stress. Many
subprime and Alt-A loans that are currently avoiding large payment
increases due to lower interest rates will potentially face higher payment
potential when rates normalize in the next few years.
Alt-A home loans are issued to borrowers with good credit ratings who
often lack adequate income documentation to satisfy the requirements for
a conventional prime loan. As of April 2008, an estimated 16.3% of the
Alt-A loans issued in 2006 and 2007 were under water, in that the
debt exceeds the value of the property, and the number of under water
loans is expected to grow. These loans are at high risk of default and
foreclosure even in the face of some lender’s willingness to reduce interest
rates or otherwise modify terms. Fourteen months after origination, 4.21
percent of Alt-A loans made in 2006 face 90-plus-day delinquencies. The
90-day default rate was 1.59 percent for 2005 Alt-A loans and 0.91 percent
for 2004 originations after 14 months of existence. The figures exclude
exotic loans such as pay-option adjustable rate loans (POARMs) which
allow borrowers, within certain specified parameters, to choose a payment
amount each month. The large proportion of Alt-A loans used to finance
second homes and investment properties further increases the risk that
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borrowers will default and allow the property to be foreclosed.
Over the next two years, up to 5 million homeowners are at risk of default,
representing only half of the total borrowers who have negative equity
positions. 41 Additionally, home prices are expected to fall by another 10%,
making the total from peak to floor decline 25% with the bottom being
reached in the third quarter of 2009. 42 Another analysis finds that up to
2.7 million subprime loans will go into foreclosure by the end of 2012 with
a total of 6.5 million loans of multiple varieties going into foreclosure over
the next five years, with a peak of 2.8 million between 2008 and 2009. 43
The total dollar amount of losses related to residential mortgages will be
$525 billion. 44
Recently, the Hope Now coalition of mortgage lenders, servicers, investors
and community advocacy groups, designed to streamline assistance with
loan modifications to trouble borrowers released its report for the month of
June. More than 76,000 borrowers had their loans modified in June, up
9% from May. Another 105,000 homeowners were given repayment plans,
which are less effective over the long term, which made up 58% of all
mortgage workouts in June. This attempts have still not stemmed the tide
of foreclosures as Hope Now reported that 82,039 people lost their homes,
up 12% from May. For California, it is estimated that in the second half of
2008 up to 83,829 homes will fall into foreclosure. 45
The statistics and outlook for the next two years is certainly grim. Rising
foreclosures distress local communities and hamstring government finance.
Hundreds of local governments throughout California face budget deficits
that are related to the housing crisis.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine and review the recently proposed
and adopted changes to the Federal Reserve Regulation Z, as well as,
examine the events that have taken place since this committee last
convened a hearing on the mortgage crisis.
LOAN MODIFICATIONS.
In September of 2007, the commissioner of the Department of
Corporations (DOC) designed a voluntary survey to query the loan
41
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modification efforts of loan servicers. DFI also engaged in a survey of
state chartered banks and credit unions. Subsequent to this survey effort,
Governor Schwarzenegger and DOC commissioner DuFauchard announced
an agreement with five of the largest loan servicers to streamline the
modification process. The agreement was reached with four lenders
representing 25 percent of the sub-prime loan market in California with the
agreement consisting of three basic principles providing that mortgage
lenders will:
•

Reach out proactively to borrowers well before their loans reset;

•

Streamline the processes by which they determine whether
borrowers may reasonably be expected to be able to make the reset
payment; and

•

For people who are in their homes and making timely payments now
at the starter rate, but who lenders determine cannot make the reset
payment, keep them at that starter rate for a sustainable period of
time.

Additionally, DOC continued to collect data from their licensees who service
mortgage loans to determine the pace and scope of loan modification
efforts. DOC has collected and reported this data on a monthly basis with
the Commissioner pledging to collect this data for a long as necessary.
Additional observations made by the Commissioner, together with survey
data, are available on the department's web site, at
http://www.corp.ca.gov/press/news/SubprimeLending.asp
In early December 2007, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson announced an
agreement to streamline and establish standards for loan modification and
in some cases freezing the interest rate on some loans for five years. This
agreement
(http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/FinalASFStatement
onStreamlinedServicingProcedures.pdf) was reached in conjunction with
the American Securitization Forum (ASF), an organization that represents
companies that issue mortgage backed securities, as well as investors, loan
servicers and rating agencies. The ASF modification parameters sorts
subprime borrowers whose rates are about to reset into three categories:
1) Those who are current on their loans, have decent credit scores and
equity in their homes, and are likely to be eligible for refinancing. The
plan "encourages" servicers to refinance these loans without
prepayment penalties, but there are no guarantees.
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2) Those who are current on their loans but are not eligible to refinance
because of poor credit scores or zero to 3 percent equity in their homes.
This is the group that could be fast-tracked into a five-year freeze at the
loan's introductory rate, to prevent their monthly payments from
shooting up.
3) Those who are delinquent on their loans even at the introductory rate
and do not qualify for refinancing. This group could very well end up in
foreclosure or have to "short sell" their home if no other option can be
worked out.
The ASF plan also called for voluntary data collection by its members on
loan modifications and workout arrangements.
In February 2008, the State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group
(SFPWG), released its first of two reports, summarizing data collected by a
working group comprised of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors and
representatives
of the Attorneys General of 11 states, including California. The SFPWG's
first report summarized data provided by 13 servicers, representing
approximately 58% of the subprime servicing market, for the month of
October 2007. Its second report, released in April 2008, included data
from the same servicers, for loans made from October 2007 through
January 2008. The SFPWG's reports can be found at
http://www.csbs.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Home/StForeclosure
Main.htm
In February 2008, the HOPE NOW Alliance released its first set of national
data, and has subsequently added state-specific data. The HOPE NOW
Alliance is an industry-led group that has grown to include virtually all of
the large, federally-regulated financial institutions that service residential
mortgage loans, as well as many of the large state-regulated institutions.
To date, it has released state-specific and national data on foreclosure
starts, foreclosure sales completed, repayment plans established, loan
modifications completed, and repayment plan inventory for all four
quarters of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008 (the same time period
reflected in Commissioner DuFauchard's data). HOPE NOW's most recent
data release includes data from 21 servicers, representing 66% of all
outstanding residential mortgage loans and 85% of outstanding subprime
residential mortgage loans. The HOPE NOW data can be found at
http://www.hopenow.com/media/press_release.php.
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LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES.
In September 2006, the five federal banking agencies (OCC, OTS, FRB,
FDIC, and NCUA) issued guidance on nontraditional mortgage product
risks. The guidance applies to both prime and nonprime loans and covers
federally-regulated financial institutions, their subsidiaries and affiliates,
and federally-insured financial institutions. Nontraditional loans are those
that allow borrowers to defer repayment of principal, and in some cases,
interest. They are also known as alternative or exotic mortgages.
Borrowers who obtain these loans are given the opportunity to make
relatively low payments during an initial low interest rate period in
exchange for agreeing to make much higher payments during a later
amortization period. Nontraditional loans are not unique to the subprime
market; they are sold in the prime, alt-A, and subprime markets. Common
loan types covered by the federal guidance include payment option
mortgages and interest-only mortgages (readers are directed to the
background paper for Senate Banking & Finance Committee’s January 31,
2007 hearing for the definitions and common terms of these loan
products).
Key components of the federal guidance include the following:
1) Financial institutions’ analyses of borrowers’ repayment capacity should
include an evaluation of ability to pay the fully indexed rate, not just the
initial low introductory rate. Analyses of repayment capacity should
avoid over-reliance on credit scores as a substitute for income
verification;
2) Institutions should avoid the use of loan terms and underwriting
practices that will heighten the need for a borrower to rely on the sale
or refinancing of the property once amortization begins;
3) Higher pricing of loans with elevated risks should not replace the need
for sound underwriting;
4) Second mortgages with minimal or no owner equity should not have a
payment structure that allows for delayed or negative amortization
unless the risk is mitigated;
5) Institutions with high concentrations of nontraditional products should
have good risk management practices in place and capital levels
commensurate with the risk; and,
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6) Institutions that offer nontraditional mortgage products should make the
potential consumer of these products aware of all possible risks and
should provide this information to potential borrowers in a clear,
balanced, and timely manner. Payment shock, negative amortization,
prepayment penalties, and the cost of reduced documentation loans
should be explained. Monthly statements on payment-option adjustable
rate mortgages should explain the consequences of each payment
option.
In issuing the guidance, the federal regulators urged states to work quickly
to apply similar guidance to state-regulated entities engaged in mortgage
lending and brokering. Last year, this committee passed SB 385
(Machado) Chapter 301, Statutes of 2007 which implemented the Guidance
for state licensed entities. Subsequent to the enactment of this legislation,
the Department of Real Estate and Department of Corporations passed
regulations to implement the guidance on their licensees. The imposition
of the Guidance was a good first step as recognized by the Federal Reserve
Board:
The guidance issued by the federal banking agencies has helped to
promote safety and soundness and protect consumers in the subprime
market. Guidance, however, is not necessarily implemented uniformly by
all originators Guidance also does not provide individual consumers who
have suffered harm because of abusive lending practices and opportunity
for redress. 46
With the convening of session earlier this year, the Legislature responded
to this crisis with numerous bills addressing the current crisis and
addressing mortgage issues on a going forward basis. The legislature
introduced 15 bills designed to address this crisis though strengthening
regulations and consumer protections.
AB 69 (Lieu) clarifies that DOC has ability to request loan modification data
from its licensees. This bill is pending on the Senate floor.
AB 180 (Bass) revises the law related to foreclosure consultants to ensure
that those facing foreclosure do not become further victimized by scams or
outrageous fees. Provide for a registration process for persons acting as
foreclosure consultants. This bill is pending before Senate Appropriations.
AB 529 (Torrico) requires lenders to notify borrowers of an impending
interest rate reset of an adjustable rate mortgage. This bill is currently on
46

Official staff commentary of the Federal Reserve Board on publication of final rule amending Regulation Z.
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Senate third reading.
AB 1830 (Lieu) Provides California regulators with authority to enforce
provisions of federal law relative to mortgages. Currently in Senate
Appropriations Committee.
AB 1837 (Garcia) bans payment of compensation for originating a
subprime loan or nontraditional loan with an interest rate above the
wholesale par rate for which the consumer qualifies. Currently in Assembly
Banking and Finance.
AB 2161 (Swanson), requires the Department of Corporations, Department
of Financial Institutions and Department of Real Estate to compile a report
concerning consumer complaints relating to mortgage lenders. This bill is
currently pending in Senate Appropriations.
AB 2187 (Caballero) requires each notice of default and foreclosure to
include a homeowner bill of rights that provides a list of their legal rights
and responsibilities in the foreclosure process. This bill was held on
suspense in Assembly Appropriations Committee.
AB 2880 (Wolk) specifies, among other things, that that mortgage brokers
have a fiduciary responsibility to their clients, and requires licensees to
maintain a surety bond with their regulator. This bill was held on suspense
in Assembly Appropriations Committee.
AB 2359 (Jones) would prohibit a broker, trustee, or mortgagee, or his or
her agent, beneficiary, or assigns from requiring as a condition of an
agreement regarding a high-cost covered loan, subprime loan, or
nontraditional mortgage, as defined, that a borrower or an applicant for the
loan waive any rights, duties, remedies, obligations forums, or
procedures of California law with respect to a residential mortgage or
mortgage foreclosure. Held in Senate Banking, Finance and Insurance.
AB 2509 (Galgiani), would establish the Homeownership Preservation
Mortgage Guarantee Program, as specified, administered by the Business,
Transportation & Housing Agency. Held in Senate Banking, Finance and
Insurance.
AB 2740 (Brownley) provides that a loan servicer, or a bank, credit union,
or finance lender that services loans secured by residential real property,
owes a duty of good faith and fair dealing to a borrower. The bill would
regulate the fees and charges that may be imposed by loan servicers or
mortgage loan servicers. The bill would also establish various other
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prohibited acts and requirements applicable to the servicing of residential
mortgage loans. Held in Senate Banking, Finance and Insurance.
SB 1053 (Machado) requires every real estate broker licensed by DRE who
makes, brokers, or services mortgages to notify DRE about those activities
on an annual basis; Requires supervising real estate brokers (those in
charge of mortgage brokerage businesses) to submit detailed compliance
reviews of their books and records to DRE annually, along with business
activity reports detailing the loans their businesses brokered, made, and
serviced during the prior year. Held in Assembly Banking and Finance
Committee.
SB 1054 (Machado): Gives the Department of Real Estate (DRE) the ability
to ban individuals who have been found guilty of violating the Real Estate
Law from real estate-related employment for up to three years. Held in
Assembly Banking and Finance Committee.
SB 1137 (Perata): This bill enacts several changes to the procedures that
must be followed before the holder of a mortgage may issue a notice of
default or notice of trustee sale, requires the holder of a mortgage to mail
a specified notice to the tenant(s) of a property on which foreclosure
proceedings have begun, and imposes penalties on property owners who
fail to adequately maintain foreclosed properties, as specified. Chapter
69, Statutes of 2008
SB 1604 (Machado): Under finance lenders law, requires that applicants
show a minimum tangible net worth of $25,000 for “brokers,” $50,000 for
“a broker engaged in the business of negotiating or performing acts in
connecting with residential mortgage loans,” and $250,000 for finance
lenders (of residential mortgage loans), and require that licensees maintain
the applicable net worth at all times; Maintains surety bond generally at
$25,000, but increases to $50,000 for finance lenders (of residential
mortgage loans); Requires any person seeking employment with a finance
lender or broker to complete a specified employment. Currently in
Assembly Appropriations Committee.
Thus far, the only bill to reach the Governor has been SB 1137 (Perata)
which contained an urgency clause. SB 1137 represents the Legislature's
efforts to mitigate the current impacts of the housing crisis by requiring
increased contact between lenders/servicers and borrowers before the
property enters the foreclosure process. Specifically, this bill requires that
the mortgagee or trustee contact the borrower, or attempt to make
contact, at least 30 days prior to mailing a NOD. Furthermore, it requires
that the owners maintain vacant properties or face $1,000 per day fine. It
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also provides the owner 30 days to correct a violation once notification has
been received from the local government. Finally, it provided enhanced
protections for renters by allowing for additional time for renters in
foreclosed properties.
Another key component of this legislative package is AB 1830 (Lieu). AB
1830 has been amended several times in order to strike a compromise
between consumer and industry advocates. The goal of AB 1830 is to
provide consumer protections for higher priced loans building upon the
recent announcement of changes to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Key
components of AB 1830 have included the regulation and restriction of
prepayment penalties, limits on the use of yield spread premiums, and
establishing rights for individual borrowers.
FEDERAL RESPONSE:
On January 9, 2008 the Federal Reserve Board (Board) published proposed
rules that would amend Regulation Z (Reg Z), which implements TILA and
the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA). The proposal
included new restrictions or requirements for mortgage lending and
servicing designed to protect consumers from abusive mortgage product
features and deceptive acts. This proposal creates a new class of loans for
coverage called "higher-priced loans." These loans are considered to be
those that have most dominated the subprime marketplace. Whereas,
previous efforts, such as the Interagency Guidance on Subprime Lending
defined subprime lending in terms of borrower characteristics, the changes
to regulation Z focus on the features of the actual loan products. In the
Board staff comments on the final Reg Z changes the commentary
acknowledged that the best way to identify the subprime market is through
"loan price, rather than by borrower characteristics."
The Board received 4700 comments on the proposal from community
banks, mortgage brokers, bank holding companies, secondary market
participants, credit unions, state and national financial services trade
associations, realtors, realtor trade groups, individual consumers, state and
federal regulators, and national community groups and consumer
organizations.
The specific of the proposal and final rule follow.
Higher-priced loan Definition.
The proposal defined higher-priced mortgage loans as a consumer credit
transaction secured by the consumer's principal dwelling for which the APR
118

on the loan exceeds the yield on comparable Treasury securities by at least
three percentage points for first-lien loans, or five percentage points for
subordinate-lien loans. This definition excludes reverse mortgages,
construction-only loans and bridge loans.
After taking into consideration numerous arguments during the comment
period the Board decided to adopt a definition that is similar to the
proposal, but different in the particulars. Instead of tying the definition to
the yield on Treasury securities, the final definition will use the average
offer rates for the lowest-risk prime mortgages, termed "average prime
offer rates." The Board identified two main difficulties with using Treasury
yields to set APR thresholds into law. First, the spread between mortgage
rates and Treasuries changes in both the short term and long term.
Second, it is difficult to determine the comparable Treasury security for a
given mortgage loan.
The final threshold will be 1.5 percentage point above the average prime
offer rate on comparable transactions for first-lien loans, and 3.5
percentage points for subordinate-lien loans.
It is possible that the selected thresholds for the definition of higher-priced
loans could spill over and capture part of the Alt-A market. In the staff
commentary to the final proposal (12 CFR Part 226, Truth in Lending: Final
Rule. Federal Register, Wednesday July 30, 2008) the Board concluded:
If the selected thresholds cover more than the subprime market,
then they likely extend into what has been known as the alt-A market. The
alt-A market is generally understood to be for borrowers who typically
have higher credit scores than subprime borrowers but still pose more risk
than prime borrowers because they make small down payments or do not
document their incomes, or for other reasons. The definition of this market
is not precise, however. The Board judges that the benefits of extending
§226.35’s restrictions into some part of the alt-A market to ensure overage
of the entire subprime market outweigh the costs. This market segment
also saw undue relaxation of underwriting standards, one reason that its
share of residential mortgage originations grew sixfold from 2003 to 2006
(from two percent of originations to 13 percent). To the extent § 226.35
covers the higher-priced end of the alt-A market, where risks in that
segment are highest, the regulation will likely benefit consumers more than
it would cost them.
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Ability to Repay.
The proposal prohibited creditors from extending credit without regard of
the borrower's ability to repay from sources other than collateral. The
ability to repay also require that the borrower must be able to repay the
loan plus applicable real estate taxes and hazard insurance premiums. The
proposal requires that creditors verify income and assets using reliable
third party documentation. The proposed rule included a "pattern and
practice" standard to determine when a violation has occurred.
The Board found that the most risky types of loans often were made to
borrowers without any consideration of their ability to repay the loan over
its entire life cycle. For example, on a 2/28 ARM the borrower was
qualified to pay the loan on the first two years of the fixed rate but no
consideration was given to repayment ability after the interest rate
adjustment at the end of year two.
The final rule is substantially similar to the proposal. The major difference
is the final rule removed the "pattern and practice" language. The Board
commented:
The Board believes that removing ‘‘pattern or practice’’ is necessary
to ensure a remedy for consumers who are given unaffordable loans and to
deter irresponsible lending, which injures not just individual borrowers but
also their neighbors and communities. The Board further believes that the
presumption of compliance the Board is adopting will provide more
certainty to creditors than either ‘‘pattern or practice’’ or the proposed safe
harbor. The presumption will better aid creditors with compliance planning,
and it will better help them mitigate litigation risk.
Prepayment Penalties (PPPs).
One of the most controversial and least understood features of subprime
lending has been PPPs. PPPs are typically a feature of subprime mortgage
loans that require that a borrower pay a percentage amount of their loan
should they pay-off (refinance) the loan within a certain time-frame. On
average, a PPP is around 3% of the outstanding balance of the loan. With
the high cost of homes in California this can range from $2500-$6,000.
According to First American LoanPerfomance data, three-quarters of
securitized subprime loan pools originated from 2003 through the first half
of 2007 had a PPP. Furthermore, approximately 55% of subprime 2/28
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ARMS originated from 2000-2005 prepaid while the PPP was in effect.
As recent media accounts have portrayed, these penalties are a source of
much controversy. Media reports abound with stories of borrowers
"trapped" into ARMs with rates set to rise above what they can afford, but
they are unable to refinance due to the prepayment penalty.
On the other side of this debate, some contend that PPPs can actually
provide for an interest rate reduction for the borrower because loans with
this feature command more value on the secondary market. For a
borrower who is educated on their mortgage loan options, a PPP may make
perfect sense for them to reduce their interest rate. However, far too
many stories reveal that most borrowers do not understand the trade off
they are making, nor is the imposition of the penalty properly explained in
context of the interest rate. Furthermore, due to the secondary market
appetite for these provisions, the incentive to offer a loan with a
prepayment penalty may have altered some lender's concerns with risk.
The Board's proposal only allowed PPPs if:
•

The penalty period does not exceed five years from loan
consummation.

•

The borrower's debt to income ratio, at consummation does not
exceed 50%.

•
•

The penalty period expires 60 days prior to an interest rate reset.
The penalty does not apply if there is a refinancing by the same
creditor or its affiliate.

The Board's final proposal was stronger than many had predicted. In their
commentary on the final proposal the Board concluded:
The Board concludes that prepayment penalties’ injuries outweigh
their benefits in the case of higher-priced mortgage loans and HOEPA
loans designed with planned or potential payment increases after just a
few years. For other types of higher priced and HOEPA loans, however, the
Board concludes that the injuries and benefits are much closer to being in
equipoise. Thus… the final rule prohibits penalties in the first case and
limits them to two years in the second.
The final rule bans PPPs for higher priced loans if the payment can change
with the first four years after consummation. With most adjustable rate
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loans ranging from two to three years, this provision effectively bans PPP
for ARMS. Additionally, for loans that do not have a payment change the
PPP is limited to the just the first two years after consummation.
Escrows for Taxes and Insurance.
While escrows are common in the prime mortgage market, the opposite is
true in the subprime market where a majority of borrowers do not have
escrow accounts for taxes and insurance. Creditors who do not offer
escrows can quote lower monthly payments than those creditors who do
offer escrows. Furthermore, the lack of escrows provides for additional
problems as it can take advantage of borrowers who are shopping for the
lowest monthly payment. A loan with an escrow account built in will
inherently cost more per month than one without. In the Board's staff
commentary on the final change regarding escrows they found:
The lack of escrows in the subprime market increases the risk that
consumers will base borrowing decisions on unrealistically low assessments
of their mortgage-related obligations.
The proposed rule required creditors to establish an escrow account for
property taxes and homeowners insurance on higher-priced loans secured
by the first lien on the principle dwelling. The creditor may allow the
consumer to cancel the escrow account 12 months after consummation.
The final rule adopts the proposal.
Creditor Payments to Mortgage Brokers.
The Board had proposed to prohibit a creditor from paying a mortgage
broker, in a covered transaction, more than the consumer agreed to in
writing that the broker would receive.
This was the Board's attempt to regulation what are known as yield spread
premiums. YSPs are points paid by the lender to the broker for originating
a loan at an above par rate, meaning slighting higher than that for which
the borrower may qualify. A YSP is financed over a particular time period
during the loan. This practice, in recent years, has come under increasing
scrutiny due to the appearance that it is an enticement for brokers to steer
borrowers into more costly loans than they could otherwise get. Industry
has responded that YSPs serve as a way for borrowers to pay no money
toward closing cost as the YSP is used to refund the broker their payment
for cost associated with the transaction. This view is a subject of dispute
among several parties.
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The Board attempted to design model language for an agreement and
disclosures. The Board conducted tests and interviews with consumers and
based on the results of those tests decided to abandon the proposal. The
Board concluded that the proposed agreement and disclosures would
actually confuse consumers and undermine their decision-making ability.
The Board committed to revisiting this issue at a future date.
Coercion of Appraisers.
The Board proposed to prohibit creditors and mortgage brokers and their
affiliates from coercing, including, or otherwise encouraging appraisers to
misstate or misrepresent the value of a consumer's principle dwelling. The
Board adopted the rule as proposed with some limited changes regarding
examples of prohibited conduct.
Servicing Abuses.
The Board proposed to prohibit certain practices of servicers. The proposal
provided that no servicer shall:
•

Fail to credit a consumer's periodic payment as of the date received.

•

Impose a late fee or delinquency charge where the late fee or
delinquency charge is due only to a consumer's failure to include in a
current payment a late fee or delinquency charge imposed on earlier
payments.

•

Fail to provide a current schedule of service fees and charges within
a reasonable time of request.

•

Fail to provide an accurate payoff statement within a reasonable
time of request.

The final rule adopted most of the proposal except for the fee schedule
language. Some consumer groups argued that the fee disclosure would
not help because borrowers can not shop for servicers. Additionally, some
industry groups argued that the disclosure of fees would be difficult due to
the use of third party providers and the possibility that the listing of all
potential fees could take numerous pages. The Board chooses not to act
on this part at this time but may reexamine the issue of servicer fees in
upcoming reviews of Reg Z.
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Advertising Restrictions.
The Board proposed new advertising rules for open-end home equity plans
(HELOCs) and closed end loans. The new disclosure for HELOCs require
that their terms be disclosed in a clear and conspicuous manner with clear
disclosure of an initial promotional term associated with the loan.
Specifically, the advertising must disclose the following in a clear and
conspicuous manner:
•

The period of time during which the promotional rate or promotional
payment will apply;

•

In the case of a promotional rate, any annual percentage rate that will
apply under the plan; and,

•

In the case of a promotional payment, the amount and time periods of
any payments that will apply under the plan.

•

In variable-rate transactions, payments determined based on
application of an index and margin to an assumed balance would be
required to be disclosed based on a reasonably current index and
margin.

For closed end loans, the Board also proposed advertising changes to
ensure that rates and promotional rates are disclosures clearly. The Board
also proposed changes for Prohibited Acts or Practices relating to mortgage
advertisements. The Board proposed to prohibit the following seven acts
or practices:
•

The use of the term ‘‘fixed’’ to refer to rates or payments of closed-end
home loans, unless certain conditions are satisfied;

•

Comparison advertisements between actual and hypothetical rates and
payments, unless certain conditions are satisfied;

•

Falsely advertising a loan as government supported or endorsed;

•

Displaying the name of the consumer’s current lender without
disclosing that the advertising mortgage lender is not affiliated with
such current lender;

•

Claiming debt elimination when one debt merely replaces another debt;
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•

The use of the term ‘‘counselor’’ or ‘‘financial advisor’’ by for-profit
brokers or lenders; and

•

Foreign language advertisements that provide required disclosures only
in English.

The final rule concerning advertising is substantially similar to the
proposal.
Consumer Disclosures.
The Board proposed a requirement that creditors deliver required loan
disclosures three business days after application and before the consumer
has paid any fee, other than a fee for obtaining the consumer's credit
report. The Board concluded that current requirements were not enough
to ensure that borrowers had the opportunity to fully review their loan
documents. When borrowers receive their documents at the closing table,
they may feel trapped in the transaction or falsely believe that they have
reached a point of no return.
The final rule is substantially similar to the proposal.
Operative Dates.
Finally, the final changes to Reg Z will go into effect October 1, 2009, with
an exception regarding the escrow requirement for higher priced loans.
The implementation of the rule concerning escrow accounts is effective
April 1, 2010.
HR 3221: American Housing Rescue and Foreclosure Prevention Act
of 2008
The American Housing Rescue and Foreclosure Prevention Act (H.R. 3221)
was signed into law by President Bush on July 30, 2008. The legislation
combines a number of bills including measures to modernize the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) and reform the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
These changes are intended to provide crucial liquidity to the mortgage
markets, and also strengthen regulation and oversight for the future.
In addition, HR 3221 will help families facing foreclosure keep their homes,
help other families avoid foreclosures in the future, and help the recovery
of communities harmed by empty homes caught in the foreclosure
process.
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The subsequent discussion will examine each part of HR 3221.
The “Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act of 2008"
This title strengthens and modernizes the regulation of the housing
government sponsored enterprises – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the
enterprises) and the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) – and expands the
housing mission of these GSEs. In addition, it creates a new program at
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) that will help at least 400,000
families save their homes from foreclosure by providing for new FHA loans
after lenders take deep discounts.
Safety and Soundness Regulation of the Housing GSEs
The “Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act of 2008" establishes a
new, independent, regulator for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal
Home Loan Banks. The legislation endows this regulator with broad new
authority, equivalent to the authority of other federal financial regulators,
to ensure the safe and sound operations of the GSEs, including the power
to:
• establish capital standards;
• establish prudential management standards, including internal controls,
audits, risk management, and management of the portfolio;
• enforce its orders through cease and desist authority, civil money
penalties, and the authority to remove officers and directors;
• restrict asset growth and capital distributions for undercapitalized
institutions;
• put a regulated entity into receivership; and,
• review and approve (subject to notice and comment) new product
offerings of the enterprises.
Mission Improvement
The new legislation also significantly enhances the affordable housing
component of the GSEs’ mission, and expands the number of families that
the enterprises can serve by raising the loan limits in high cost areas above
the standard conforming limit to 115 percent of median house price up to
150 percent of the conforming loan limit.
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Currently, this would be $625,500, and would be adjusted for inflation. For
the enterprises, the legislation tightens targeting requirements of the
affordable housing goals, and rewrites those goals to ensure that the
enterprises provide liquidity to both ownership and rental housing markets
for low and very-low income families. The legislation requires the
enterprises to serve a variety of underserved markets, such as rural areas,
manufactured housing, and the preservation market. The legislation
improves reporting requirements for affordable housing activities, including
the expansion of the public use database, and strengthens the new
regulator’s ability to enforce compliance with the housing goals.
Finally, the legislation creates a new Housing Trust Fund and a Capital
Magnet Fund, financed by annual contributions from the enterprises, which
will be used for the construction of affordable rental housing.
For the FHLBs, the legislation requires new affordable housing goals similar
to those that apply to the enterprises for FHLB mortgage purchase
programs. The legislation also requires the FHLBs to create a public use
database for such programs. Treasury-certified Community Development
Financial Institutions (CDFIs) are made eligible to join FHLBs. Finally,
community financial institution members of the FHLBs may use FHLB
advances for community development purposes.
Treasury Emergency Authority
The legislation contains several temporary provisions requested by
Secretary of the Treasury Paulson designed to shore up the confidence of
the financial markets in the GSEs and the FHLBs, including the authority for
Treasury to purchase debt securities issued by the GSEs and the authority
for Treasury to purchase common stock of the enterprises with the
agreement of the companies. This authority expires on December 31,
2009. Before exercising these temporary powers, the Treasury would have
to determine that actions taken under this authority are necessary to:
• protect the taxpayer;
• provide stability to the financial markets; and,
• prevent disruptions in the availability of mortgages.
The Treasury would set the terms and conditions regarding any use of the
temporary authority, including requiring that repayments to the
government receive priority or preference. In addition, the emergency
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authority gives the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)
the authority over executive compensation, whether or not the government
exercises its temporary authority to purchase debt or stock.
Finally, the legislation requires the new Director to consult with Governors
of the Federal Reserve when developing regulations or guidance regarding
capital, portfolios, and prudential management standards, taking into
consideration the risks posed by the regulated entities to the financial
system. This requirement also expires on December 31, 2009.
Mortgage Broker and Originator Licensing
The “Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act (SAFE Act) is
intended to create greater accountability and transparency by establishing
a uniform licensing and registration system for all loan originators,
including mortgage brokers and loan officers. Under this provision, all loan
originators at federally-regulated institutions will have to be registered
through the nationwide system, and all other loan originators will be
required to be licensed by the state or through a HUD-backup system if a
state does not establish a licensing system. To meet the requirements
under this provision, within 12 months, states will have to develop
licensing requirements to ensure that applicants meet minimum standards
including educational requirements, background checks, and testing. If a
state does not establish a licensing system that meets the minimum
requirements, HUD is directed to establish a licensing system for loan
originators in the state. Under this provision, borrowers and lending
institutions will be able to access information about all loan originators,
including their background and history as a loan originator.
Summary of the “HOPE for Homeowners Act of 2008"
The “HOPE for Homeowners Act of 2008" creates a new, temporary,
voluntary program within FHA to back FHA-insured mortgages to distressed
borrowers. The new mortgages offered by FHA-approved lenders will
refinance the loans of distressed owner-occupants at risk of losing their
homes to foreclosure at significant discounts. In exchange, homeowners
will share future appreciation with FHA.
The program is built on five principles:
1) Long-term affordability. The program is built on the idea, expressed by
Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke, that creating new equity for
troubled homeowners is likely to be a more effective way to avoid
foreclosures. New loans will be based on a family’s ability to repay the
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loan, ensuring affordability and sustainable homeownership.
2) No investor or lender bailout. Investors and/or lenders will have to take
significant losses in order to benefit from the proceeds of the loans
refinanced with government insurance. However, these losses would be
less than the losses associated with foreclosure.
3) No windfall for borrowers. Borrowers will share their new equity and
future appreciation equally with FHA. Borrowers will pay for the FHA
insurance.
4) Voluntary participation. This will be a voluntary program. No lenders,
servicers, or investors will be compelled to participate.
5) Restore confidence, liquidity, and transparency. Credit markets are
fearful and frozen in part because banks and other financial institutions
do not know what their subprime mortgages and related securities are
worth. The uncertainty is forcing lenders to hoard capital and stop the
lending necessary for economic growth. This program will help restore
confidence and get markets flowing again.
The new program will be overseen by a Board made up of the Secretary of
HUD, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, and the Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC). The Board will have the authority to develop standards within the
framework of the legislation.
Only owner-occupants who are unable to afford their mortgage payments
are eligible for the program. No investors or investor properties will qualify.
Homeowners must certify, under penalty of law, that they have not
intentionally defaulted on their loan to qualify for the program and must
have a mortgage debt-to-income ratio greater than 31 percent as of March
1, 2008. Lenders must document and verify borrowers’ income with the
IRS.
The size of the new FHA-insured loan will be the lesser of the amount the
borrower can afford to repay, as determined by the current affordability
requirements of FHA, or 90 percent of the current value of the home.
Loans must be 30-year, fixed rate loans.
In order to avoid a windfall to the borrower created by the new 90% loanto-value FHA-insured mortgage, the borrower must share the newlycreated equity and future appreciation equally with FHA. This obligation will
continue until the borrower sells the home or refinances the FHA-insured
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mortgage. Moreover, the homeowner’s access to the newly created equity
will be phased-in over 5 years.
In order to protect against adverse selection, the program prohibits the
Secretary from paying an insurance claim whenever the representations
and warranties required to be made by lenders are violated, or in cases in
which a borrower has an early payment default and misses the first
payment. The Act provides the Board the authority to establish other
protections against adverse selection, such as requiring “seasoning” for
certain higher risk loans before they can be insured under the program.
Appraisers of property insured by FHA must be certified by the state where
the property is located, or by a nationally recognized professional appraisal
organization, and have “demonstrated verifiable education” in FHA
appraisal requirements. Before participating in this program, all
subordinate liens must be extinguished. This will have to be done through
negotiation with the first lien holder.
The legislation provides servicers with an incentive to participate in the
program by offering a safe harbor against legal liability. The program is
authorized to insure up to $300 billion in mortgages and is expected to
serve approximately 400,000 homeowners.
The program will begin October 1, 2008 and sunset on September 30,
2011. CBO say the program will net nearly $250 million for taxpayers. The
program is paid for by using part of the Affordable Housing Trust Fund; the
GSE bill provides a further $2 billion cushion for the government by
establishing a reserve fund at Treasury over ten years. If the program
costs less than projected, the unused funds are returned to the Affordable
Housing Trust Fund. If the program more than pays for itself (as was the
case during the Roosevelt Administration), any excess savings are
dedicated to reducing the national debt.
Summary of the “Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008"
The Foreclosure Prevention Act contains the following provisions:
• Assisting Communities Devastated by Foreclosures. Homes that
have been foreclosed upon and are sitting unoccupied lead to declines in
neighboring house values, increased crime and significant disinvestment.
To ensure that communities can mitigate these harmful effects of
foreclosures, $3.92 billion is provided to communities hardest hit by
foreclosures and delinquencies. These supplemental Community
Development Block Grant Funds will be used to purchase foreclosed
homes, at a discount, and rehabilitate or redevelop the homes to
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stabilize neighborhoods and stem the significant losses in house values of
neighboring homes.
• Providing Pre-Foreclosure Counseling for Families in Need. To help
families avoid foreclosure, this legislation provides $150 million in
additional funding for housing counseling. These funds will be distributed
by the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation by the end of 2008 to
ensure families can quickly get the help they need. As many as 250,000
additional families are expected to connect with their mortgage servicer
or lender to explore options that will keep them in their homes as a
result of these counseling funds. In addition, $30 million is provided to
help provide legal services to distressed borrowers.
• Enhancing Mortgage Disclosure. To ensure that consumers are
provided with timely and meaningful disclosures in connection with
mortgages, the legislation expands the types of home loans subject to
early disclosures (within three days of application) under the Truth In
Lending Act (TILA) to include all mortgages, including refinances and
home equity loans. The legislation requires that disclosures be provided
no later than 7 days prior to closing so borrowers can shop for another
loan if not satisfied with the terms. The bill requires a new disclosure that
informs borrowers of the maximum monthly payments possible under
their loan, and also doubles the range of statutory damages for TILA
violations to $400 to $4000.
• Housing Assistance for Veterans. To assist returning soldiers avoid
foreclosure, this bill lengthens the time a lender must wait before
starting foreclosure from three months to nine months after a soldier
returns from service and also provides returning soldiers with one year
relief from increases in mortgage interest rates. In addition, the
Department of Defense is required to establish a counseling program to
ensure veterans and active service members can access assistance if
facing financial difficulties. Also included is a provision that increases the
VA loan guarantee amount, so that veterans have additional
homeownership opportunities. The legislation contains provisions to do
the following: increase benefits paid to veterans with disabilities such as
blindness for the purpose of adapting their housing; provide a moving
benefit to servicemen and women who are forced to move out of rental
housing because the owner of the housing was foreclosed on; provide
that veterans benefits received in a lump sum are treated the same for
the purposes of eligibility for housing assistance as monthly benefits; and
to allow the Veterans Administration to provide for improvements and
structural alterations to homes of veterans with service-connected
disabilities.
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MORTGAGE CRISIS HISTORICAL TIMELINE
JULY 2008
July 30: President signs the American Housing Rescue and Foreclosure
Prevention Act (H.R. 3221). The centerpiece of the legislation is a program
that will allow homeowners facing foreclosure to refinance into lower-cost,
government -insured mortgages they can afford to repay.
July 14: The Federal Reserve Board approves a final rule for home
mortgage loans to better protect consumers and facilitate responsible
lending. The rule prohibits unfair, abusive or deceptive home mortgage
lending practices and restricts certain other mortgage practices.
July 10: Foreclosure filings for June 2008 have jumped 53 percent from
this time last year. According to Realty Trac, foreclosure filings were
reported on 252,363 homes last month the second straight month in which
more than a quarter of a million properties received foreclosure filings.
July 10: With market fears that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will continue
to lose money in a declining housing market, the stock prices of the two
Government Sponsored Enterprises have dropped 76 and 83 percent
respectively. News reports have begun to indicate that the Bush
administration has begun planning for the more serious possibility that one
or both of these mortgage giants could falter.
July 8: The Federal Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission
announced that they have entered into an information-sharing agreement
in order to execute their respective regulatory duties.
July 2: According to the American Bankers Association, the share of
delinquencies for home equity lines of credit has nearly doubled in the last
year. 1.1 percent of all home equity loans were delinquent in the first
quarter; up from just 0.6 for the same period in 2007.
JUNE 2008
June 25: Home prices nationwide are down 15.3 percent from a year ago.
The Case-Shiller Index, using numbers from April has shown that home
prices in 20 major housing markets are now back down to their 2004
levels.
June 25: The State of Illinois is suing mortgage giant Countrywide. The
lawsuit charges that Countrywide sold misleading, intentionally risky loans
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to people who couldn’t otherwise qualify for comparable loans.
June 21: According to data from the Census Bureau, Americans are renting
houses and apartments at the highest level since 2002. The drop in
households headed by homeowners was the sharpest decline in over 20
years. This report shows that much of the homeownership growth during
the Bush administration has vanished, in part due to the subprime
mortgage crisis.
June 20: 406 people have been arrested since January as part of the FBI's
crackdown on mortgage fraud. According to the Justice Department, those
indicted during Operation Malicious Mortgage were responsible for up to $1
billion in losses.
June 20: Two Bear Stearns executives, Matthew Tannin and Ralph Cioffi,
were charged with nine counts of fraud for misleading investors and
lenders prior to the bank's collapse. The managers failed to disclose the
imminent collapse of their funds to individual investors. While their funds
plunged in value, Tannin and Cioffi painted a rosy picture to allay fears
from worried investors. They are the first executives from Wall Street
investment banks to be criminally charged over the credit crisis.
June 16: According to the New York Times, Wall Street's largest banks
wrote down a staggering $107.2 billion worth of assets over the last year –
fueled by staggering losses in subprime mortgage backed securities. These
losses wiped out nearly half of the gains this sector enjoyed during the
previous three years.
June 13: During the month of May, over 73,000 American families lost
their homes. According to Realty Trac, the foreclosure explosion marked a
158% increase from May 2007. This gloomy data, coupled with a 14.1%
decrease in national home prices over the past year, proves that the rug
continues to be pulled out from under the American homeowner.
June 12: Conflicts of interest and limited disclosure prompted the
Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) to propose stricter rules for
the credit rating industry. The S.E.C. has pushed for greater openness in
the credit rating industry after the three major firms all failed to identify
the risks in subprime mortgage backed securities.
June 9: The Federal Housing Administration (F.H.A.) announced that it
expects $4.6 billion in losses from high default rates on home loans. The
F.H.A.’s clients primarily consist of first-time buyers, minorities, and lowincome owners, who were hurt by the weak economic conditions and
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subsequently defaulted. The expected loss is the highest since 2004. Brian
Montgomery, the F.H.A. commissioner, said: “Unless we take action to
mitigate these losses, F.H.A. will soon either have to shut down or rely on
appropriations to operate.”
June 7: In May, the US unemployment rate had its highest jump in 22
years. According the Labor Department, the rate spiked to 5.5%, marking
the 5th straight month of job losses and the highest unemployment figure
in 3.5 years. Many experts fear the US is spiraling into a recession.
June 5: For the first time in history, more than one million homes are now
in foreclosure. According to a Mortgage Bankers Association report, the
number of homes in foreclosure now is 1.1 million - up from the 938,000
homes that were in foreclosure at the end of last year. This marks the first
time that more than one million homes have been in foreclosure Also in the
report were indications that the foreclosure crisis is worsening; 448,000
homes began the foreclosure process during the first quarter, up from
382,000 that began the process in the last quarter of 2007. According to
the MBA, loans at subprime rates are to blame for 39% of the foreclosures
MAY 2008
May 27: First quarter data revealed that US home prices plummeted
14.1% from their prices last year. The S&P/Case-Shiller index recorded the
fastest rate of decline in the history of the index. This evidence indicated
that the mortgage crisis is only worsening. David Blitzer, the chairman of
S&P’s index committee, warned, “There are very few silver linings that one
can see in the data. Most of the nation appears to remain on a downward
path.”
May 22: Moody’s, which provides credit ratings, began investigating
whether internal computer errors caused the company to assign high
ratings to poor securities. The announcement raised many questions about
the reliability of Moody’s ratings, which are heavily relied upon by investors
of all sizes. Following the announcement, its shares fell 15.9%.
May 21: The Mortgage Bankers Association released its weekly report of
mortgage application volume, which shows that applications dropped by
7.8% during the week ending May 16. This week’s survey is exactly five
years after the peak in the housing boom, mortgage applications now
stand at one-third of the volume at the high point in May 2003.
May 14: According to Reality Trac, the number of foreclosure filings hit a
record in April, with filings spiking 65% compared with the same month a
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year earlier. April saw the largest number of foreclosure filings since data
tracking began in January 2005. This marked a 4% increase from March,
indicating that the housing crisis is showing no signs of letting up.
Furthermore, the report showed that home prices nationwide have plunged
7.7% in this year alone.
May 12: Real estate analyzer First American Core Logic revealed that the
rise in mortgage delinquencies currently being experienced will continue to
grow during the next six to twelve months. In their forecast, First American
released an index of foreclosure risk, which increased 16% from the same
period last year. These projected delinquencies are expected to increase as
declining home prices and difficult economic conditions persist.
May 12: MBIA announced a $2.4 billion loss during the first quarter of
2008. The company exposed itself to more and more risk as mortgage
defaults rose from the subprime crisis. In contrast, MBIA posted a profit of
$199 million for the first quarter of last year.
May 9: AIG, one of the world’s largest insurance companies, experienced
its worst three months in its 89-year history, losing $7.81 billion and $3.09
a share. The plunge was four times worse than Wall Street’s expectations.
May 7: Fannie Mae reported a $2.2 billion loss during the first quarter.
Over the same period a year ago, Fannie reported a $961 million profit. As
defaults and foreclosures in the housing market have mounted, the
government has increasingly depended on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. On
top of the $2.2 billion loss, Fannie is projecting losses to continue into the
next several quarters. The report showed the amount of unrealized losses
on mortgage investments has nearly doubled from the last quarter of
2007, increasing from $4.8 billion to $9.3 billion.
May 7: UBS reported that it sold $15 billion worth of subprime mortgage
debt to the wealth management firm BlackRock at a 32% discount. The
Swiss bank also announced it would cut 5,500 jobs by the middle of 2009.
May 6: House Speaker Nancy Pelosi issued a report entitled, “Stabilizing
Housing Is Key to America’s Economic Recovery.” In this report, Speaker
Pelosi chronicled the millions of foreclosures, declining home values, and
trillions of dollars lost in household wealth.
May 5: Federal, state, and local agencies have stepped up efforts in their
investigation of the subprime crisis, with a special focus on Wall Street.
Investigations into the valuation of UBS’ mortgage-security holdings and
last summer’s collapse of hedge funds at Bear Stearns are already
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underway. The task force has expanded since the FBI began it in
January as details on companies’ lending practices have emerged.
Countrywide alone is facing scrutiny from federal prosecutors in California
and Illinois, the United States Trustee, and the S.E.C.
May 1: The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve lowered the Fed
funds rate by 25 basis points. This marked the 7th rate cut since
September - reflecting the economy fragility. In a statement, the Fed
acknowledged the economy is weak, “household and business spending has
been subdued and labor markets have softened further. Despite the
lowering of this key interest rate, financial markets remain under
considerable stress.” The Fed also cited “tight credit conditions and the
deepening housing contraction” as justification for the rate cut. Critics
warned that low interest rates will only cause more inflation
APRIL 2008
April 29: First quarter data prepared by Realty Trac revealed a 112% jump
in foreclosure filings compared with the same period last year. In this year
alone, more than 155,000 families have lost their homes to foreclosure.
Nationwide, one in every 194 U.S. homes received a foreclosure filing this
quarter, with Nevada hit the hardest, where 1 of every 54 households
received filings. Foreclosure filings only worsened towards the end of the
quarter, with a 5% jump in foreclosure filings from February to March. It
appears the housing crisis will only worsen, with experts warning that
foreclosures will peak in the 3rd or 4th quarter.
April 29: Countrywide recorded a nearly $900 million loss in the first
quarter as housing market woes torpedoed the lender’s bottom line. The
loss, which comes out to $1.60 per share, was a far cry from the expected
profit of 2 cents a share. Despite Countrywide’s poor earnings, the firm’s
top two executives will receive a combined payout of $19 million in stock
through the impending buyout from Bank of America. President David
Sambol will receive an additional $28 million in cash.
April 22: UBS released a report in which it detailed the “blind drive for
revenue” that pushed the bank to take imprudent risks. The investment
bank has written off nearly $38 billion since the subprime crisis began, $19
billion of which came in the first quarter of 2008.
April 21: The profits of the nation’s second-largest bank, Bank of America,
sunk by 77% during the first quarter. The company was forced to set
aside $4.8 billion for its home equity, small business and homebuilder
divisions, signaling the deepening impact of the mortgage crisis.
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April 18: Citigroup announced quarterly losses of $5.1 billion. Citi’s banking
division lead the sea of red ink as it contains all of Citi’s liabilities in the
subprime lending crisis. The downward trend continued from the previous
quarter, when Citigroup reported its largest quarterly drop in its company’s
history at $9.83 billion. The bank was forced to raise capital totaling over
$30 billion, much of it from sovereign wealth funds, in late 2007.
April 17: Merrill Lynch announced losses of $1.96 billion in the first quarter
of 2008 - compared with a $2.16 billion profit over the same period in
2007. Merrill’s loss in profits was coupled with another announcement that
it will cut 2,900 jobs—10% of its workforce. The firm has written-down
$27.4 billion over the last three quarters.
April 15: Realty Trac announced that foreclosure actions in the U.S. shot up
57% during the month of March. Foreclosure papers were filed for
234,685 homes last month. Since last year, banks have repossessed 129%
more homes than the year before.
MARCH 2008
March 31: The Treasury Department released its plan to overhaul financial
regulatory agencies. This blueprint was a response to the failure of these
agencies to recognize the warning signs of the mortgage lending crisis. The
proposal gives the Federal Reserve more authority over Wall Street Firms,
but does not apply stricter rules to markets for risk and hedging, which are
largely unregulated. It also recommends merging the S.E.C. with the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The plan was quickly met with
criticism. Senator Dodd, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee said,
“It fails to realize that the Fed helped create this crisis by ignoring the red
flags as far back as five years ago. It does not make sense to give a bigger
shovel to the very people who helped dig us into this hole.”
March 31: Janet Yellen, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco, urged the government to provide more financial education for
minority and low-income borrowers. Yellen said they will be hardest hit by
the housing crisis and the least informed. She warned that leaving lowincome borrowers uninformed and devoid of resources could lower property
values, increase crime, and deplete government revenues.
March 27: A five-month investigation by the Justice Department into New
Century Financial, one of the nation’s biggest subprime lenders, revealed
that accountants are largely to blame for the mortgage crisis. According to
the report, New Century’s “significant improper and imprudent practices”
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were enabled by the lack of oversight from auditors.
March 25: The S&P/Case-Shiller index reported that home prices dropped
once again in the month of January. January’s drop represents the 19th
straight month that home prices dropped and the largest single-month
drop in the 20 year history of the report.
March 24: JPMorgan Chase announced it would raise its offer for embattled
Bear Stearns Co to $10 a share from the previous bid of $2/share. Even by
quintupling the price JPMorgan is willing to pay, Bear Stearns is valued
90% lower that it was when its stock reaches its $170 high last year.
March 20: Citigroup announced that it will be cutting another 2,000 jobs.
This is on top of the 4,200 layoffs already announced by Citigroup in
January. Over the past year, more than 60,000 jobs have been cut
throughout the financial sector, in large part due to contracting subprime
mortgage lending divisions.
March 19: Federal regulators finally acted to allow Fannie Mae and Freddy
Mac to buy more mortgages, easing pressures on the cash strapped
mortgage market.
March 18: On the heels of the collapse of Bear Stearns, Wachovia has
released a report showing that Merrill Lynch is the most at risk major
broker behind Bear Stearns due to their vulnerability from subprime
securities.
March 16: Investment bank Bear Stearns announced that it will sell itself to
JPMorgan Chase for $2 a share – a 93% discount on the current stock
price. This fire sale comes as worldwide markets showed concern that Bear
Stearns was close to folding under the pressure of their subprime liabilities.
March 7: Employers cut 63,000 jobs in February, the largest single month
decline in the workforce in almost five years. Also, December and January
numbers were revised to reflect dimmer employment markets than
previously reported.
March 6: Numbers released by the Mortgage Bankers Association showed
that by the end of 2007, 2.04% of all mortgages were in the foreclosure
process. This marks the highest level of foreclosure ever recorded in the
Mortgages Bankers Association’s report.
March 5: Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke urged mortgage
lenders to forgive some of the debt held by homeowners on the brink of
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foreclosure. This position is in stark contrast to the Bush administration
who has consistently opposed debt forgiveness
March 4: The Treasury Department announced that the administration’s
“Hope Now” program designed to assist homeowners struggling to repay
subprime mortgages has helped 45,000 people in its first month.
Meanwhile, industry experts question whether the program centered on
extending repayment periods is doing enough to alleviate the core issues of
the foreclosure crisis.
March 3: The Commerce Departments revealed that construction spending
plummeted by 1.7% in the month of January. This is the single biggest
single month drop in the sector in 14 years.
February 29: A report from market analysts at UBS shows that losses
within the financial sector from subprime mortgage back securities could
reach $600 billion. This new report on expected losses marks a 50% rise
from previous estimations made just months ago.
FEBRUARY 2008
February 25: In January, the median home price fell and, for the sixth
straight month, existing home sales dropped. The 0.4% drop in sales along
with the 4.6% drop in price have been spurred by lenders making it more
difficult for families to take out mortgages, making it more costly to receive
a loan.
February 19: Credit Suisse, the second largest Swiss bank announced it
would write down $1 billion in subprime losses. Up to this point, Credit
Suisse had been one of the few major international financial institutions
who hadn’t been affected by the subprime collapse.
February 15: The nation’s fourth largest bond insurer, FGIC announced it
would seek to split its company into two. After receiving a tarnished credit
rating from all of the major ratings agencies, FGIC hopes to protect its
municipal bond sector from the subprime backed securities which has
caused the ratings drop.
February 13: The bipartisan economic stimulus package is signed into law.
With this measure, taxpayers can expect $300-$1200 tax rebate checks to
arrive in the second half of 2008. This $162 billion package was passed due
to the looming threat of recession spurred by the subprime mortgage
crisis.
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February 12: Bank of America, Citigroup, Countrywide, JPMorgan Chase,
Washington Mutual, and Wells Fargo announced a joint venture to assist
mortgage borrowers struggling underneath the burdens of rising monthly
payments. “Project Lifeline”, as it will be called, will be in addition to the
Bush administration backed “Hope Now” which has come under fire from
critics who say it wasn’t a large enough step towards helping American
homeowners.
JANUARY 2008
January 30: Standard and Poor’s announced it would be cutting the credit
ratings of $534 billion in subprime mortgage backed securities.
Downgrades of these securities could lead to another $265 billion in losses
for the financial industry.
January 30: UBS, the world’s largest wealth manager, announced the need
to write down another $4 in subprime-related losses. This new write-down
brings the total for UBS subprime losses over $18.4 billion. Subprime
related losses pushed the company its worst year of performance in its
institutional history.
January 29: The Wall Street Journal reported that federal investigators
have begun inquiries into possible criminal actions taken by 14 companies
due to their role in the securitization of subprime mortgages.
January 29: The House of Representatives passed an economic stimulus
package with $146 billion in targeted tax relief.
January 29: The number of houses in foreclosure rose 79 percent in 2007,
according to Reality Trac. December also marked the fifth straight month
where 200,000 or more foreclosure filings were made.
January 28: New home sales dropped 26.4% in 2007, according to a
Commerce Department report. In addition, the median price of new homes
fell by 10.4% from December 2006 - the biggest 12 month decline in 37
years.
January 17: Lehman Brothers said it would no longer continue the practice
of wholesale mortgage lending. As a pioneer in issuing mortgage backed
securities, Lehman Brothers also announced it would cut 1,300 jobs. These
job cuts come on top of 2,500 other jobs eliminated since June 2007.
January 15: Citigroup the largest bank in the U.S. announced that its
mortgage portfolio dropped in value by $18.1 Billion. This news led
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Citigroup to its first quarterly loss in 16 years.
January 11: Merrill Lynch, the nation’s third largest securities firm,
announced it would need to write down more than double its initial
projection related to subprime mortgage losses. Initial projections showed
Merrill Lynch would lose around $7 Billion; however, it now appears that
number could reach $15 Billion.
January 11: Bank of America, the nation’s second largest banking
institution, announced that it would buy Countrywide Financial, the nation’s
largest mortgage lender. This acquisition ended days of speculation that
Countrywide, due to its role in the proliferation of subprime mortgages,
would be forced to declare bankruptcy.
January 10: Countrywide Financial reported that late mortgage payments
and foreclosures reached the highest level ever recorded this past
December. The foreclosure rate on Countrywide’s mortgages grew from
just 0.7% a year ago to 1.44% last month. On the announcement of this
news, shares in Countrywide dropped to their lowest price in over a
decade.
January 4: The Labor department announced that the unemployment rate
skyrocketed from 4.7% to 5% in December. These numbers were fueled
by the loss of 28,500 jobs in residential construction and 7,000 jobs lost in
the mortgage lending industry throughout 2007. The fall to 5% made
December’s unemployment jump the largest unemployment increase since
the days after Sept. 11, 2001.
DECEMBER 2007
December 20: Reeling from the subprime mortgage crisis, investment bank
Bear Stearns announced the first quarterly loss in the institution’s eightdecade history. With this announcement from Bear Stearns, Wall Street’s
losses had reached a combined $40 Billion from the subprime mortgage
crisis.
December 19: Morgan Stanley announced it would be writing down an
additional $9.4 billion in losses on subprime linked investments. The
company also announced it would be selling a $5 billion dollar stake to a
foreign investment fund.
December 18: The Commerce Department reported that housing
construction was down 3.7 percent for the month of November to a
seasonally adjusted rate of 1.187 million units. This marked a 24.2 percent
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drop in new home construction in the 12 month period and the lowest level
of home construction in more than 16 years.
December 17: Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson announced he favors
temporarily allowing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase home loans
in excess of $417,000.
This allows Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to provide home loans in more
areas throughout the country.
December 14: The US Senate passed legislation giving needed tax relief to
those at risk of foreclosure on their subprime mortgages. The Mortgage
Forgiveness Debt Relief Act both extends the tax deductions on mortgage
insurance premiums and eliminates taxes accrued by receiving debt
forgiveness. Previous to this legislation, debt forgiveness was treated as
income and taxed accordingly, further crippling struggling American
families.
December 11: The Federal Reserve Board announced only a 25 basis-point
cut in the discount rate
December 11: Washington Mutual announced that it expected its fourth
quarter loan losses would reach $1.6 Billion. In addition, it expected that
3,000 Washington Mutual employees would be laid off as a result of
investments in subprime mortgage-backed securities.
December 10: Swiss bank UBS announced it would write down an
additional $10 Billion in subprime losses –possibly resulting in a net loss for
all of 2007. UBS also announced it has solicited a cash infusion of $11.5
Billion from GIC, Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund, and an unknown
Middle Eastern investor.
December 10: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac announce that they are
changing their criteria for purchasing delinquent home loans. The two
government-sponsored entities, which together own or guarantee
approximately two-fifths of U.S. home mortgage debt, have recently set
aside billions of dollars to compensate for bad home loans. Their profits
have declined at a time when home prices are falling and defaults are
soaring on high-risk mortgages.
December 6: Standing between Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and
Housing and Urban Development Secretary Alphonso Jackson, President
Bush announces measures to help many struggling homeowners. President
Bush touts the HOPE NOW Alliance as an example of government uniting
members of the private sector to address voluntarily the housing crisis
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without taxpayer subsidies or government mandates. The President calls
upon Congress to, among other actions, reform both the Federal Housing
Administration and the Government Sponsored Enterprises Freddie Mac
and
Fannie Mae.
December 5: The Wall Street Journal reports that New York Attorney
General Andrew M. Cuomo sent out subpoenas to major Wall Street firms
including Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, Bear Sterns, and
Lehman Brothers over the late summer to explore further their role in the
packaging and selling of subprime mortgages.
November 2007
November 29: According to Realty Trac, there were 222,451 foreclosure
filings last month. It is a 94 percent increase from October 2006 and
represents one foreclosure filing for every 555 households in the nation.
The 2 percent increase from
September 2007 indicates that the subprime crisis is only getting worse.
November 29: According to a government report released today, there
were 516,000 new homes for sale at the end of October. It would take 8.5
months to clear that inventory at the current sales pace.
November 29: Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson meets with leading
banking regulators and industry representatives, including loan servicing
companies responsible for collecting and distributing loan payments, to
discuss a subprime plan
aimed at controlling resetting interest rates for subprime borrowers. No
official details are announced.
November 29: Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, speaking to a
group of business executives in Charlotte, N.C., indicates that the economy
may need another general rate cut. He expects consumers to suffer from
the deepening housing slump.
November 29: California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger rolls out a $1.2million education campaign to help borrowers
and lenders restructure loans before a home is lost to foreclosure.
Speaking at a press conference in Riverside, CA, Governor Schwarzenegger
says that hundreds of thousands of monthly mortgage payments in the
state are expected to soar by hundreds of dollars over the next few years.
November 28: The National Association of Realtors reports that sales of
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existing single-family homes and condominiums dropped by 1.2% in
October to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 4.97 million units. The
median price of a home sold in October declined to $207,800, a drop of 5.1
percent from October 2006. It is the single largest one year decline on
record.
November 28: With the subprime housing credit crisis spreading, the
Commerce Department reports that orders to factories for big-ticket
manufactured goods declined by 0.4% in October. It was the third
consecutive decline, the longest slump in nearly four years.
November 21: Shares of Countrywide, the largest U.S. Mortgage Lender,
close below $10 for the first time in more than five years.
November 19: Fannie Mae shares are down 7.3% to $37.70 on reports
from Credit Suisse that the government sponsored entity may report a loss
of between $1 billion to $5 billion on its subprime AAA portfolio.
November 15: The U.S. House of Representatives approves H.R. 3915,
“The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007,” by a vote
of 291 to 127. The historic bipartisan legislation reins in the abusive
lending practices that contributed to the current mortgage crisis.
November 15: Barclays Group PLC takes a $2.7 billion write-down for
losses on securities linked to the U.S. subprime mortgage market collapse.
November 14: According to Realty Trac, foreclosure filings rose in 77 of the
largest 100 metropolitan areas from the prior quarter. Overall, residential
foreclosure filings nearly doubled in the third quarter from a year earlier.
November 14: HSBC Holdings PLC, Europe’s biggest bank, reports that it
took a $3.4 billion impairment charge at its U.S. consumer finance division,
HSBC Finance Corp.
November 8: Testifying before the Joint Economic Committee, Federal
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke expresses his concern over the subprime
housing crisis and floats the idea of providing governmental guarantees
against defaults on so-called “jumbo” loans, those above the $417,000
limit on mortgages that can be backed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.
November 6: David Trone, a securities analyst at Fox-Pitt Kelton,
downgrades Morgan Stanley amid speculation that the brokerage firm will
suffer losses of $6 billion due to the reduced value of credit investments. In
his report, Trone writes: “We suggest an outright avoidance until either
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management discloses more specific exposure data and it proves smaller
than we thought, or they actually take write-downs big enough to get
beyond this.”
November 4: On top of the $5.9 billion write-down reported in early
October, Citigroup says it will take an additional $8 billion to $11 billion
write-down related to subprime mortgages. In a memo to employees
announcing his resignation, C.E.O. Charles O. Prince III writes: “It is my
judgment that the size of these charges makes stepping down the only
honorable course for me.” Mr. Prince leaves with $105.2 million in cash and
stock – in addition to the $53.1 million in compensation he took home over
the past four years.
OCTOBER 2007
October 31: In a nearly unanimous decision, the Federal Reserve Board
lowers the federal funds rate by one-quarter percentage point to 4.50%.
October 30: Shareholders sue Merrill Lynch & Co for issuing false and
misleading statements regarding its expo sure to risk mortgage
investments. The lawsuit seeks class-action status on behalf of purchasers
of Merrill stock between February 26 and October 23, 2007.
October 30: Reports from the S&P/Case-Shiller index indicate that housing
prices have again fallen at record rates. In the largest drop since June
1991, the 10 city index declined 5 percent in August 2007 as compared to
the same month during the previous year.
October 29: John Robbins, former chairman of the Mortgage Bankers
Association, says approximately a half of million U.S. mortgage borrowers
each year for the next few years risk foreclosure. He expects that 1 million
borrowers will lose favor with their lenders each year and that 500,000 of
them will not be able to save their home loans.
October 24: Merrill Lynch writes down $7.9 billion due to exposure to
collateralized debt obligations, complex debt instruments, and subprime
mortgages. As a result, the firm takes a $2.3 billion loss, the largest in the
firm’s history.
October 17: The Commerce Department reports that U.S. home
construction starts fell 10.2% last month to their lowest level in more than
14 years. Building permit activity, an indicator of future construction plans,
declined 7.3%, the largest drop since January 1995.
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October 17: The Federal Reserve’s “Beige Book,” a survey of businesses,
indicates that the housing crisis is intensifying and that businesses are
concerned that other areas of the economy are likely to suffer as a result.
October 16: The National Association of Home Builders reports that its
housing market index, which tracks builders’ perceptions of conditions and
expectations for home sales over the next six months, dropped to 18, its
lowest level since the inception of the index in 1985. The housing market
index has declined for eight straight months. Builder confidence increased
in the Midwest by two points, but the region still has the lowest overall rate
in the nation.
October 15: Strongly urged to act by the Treasury Department, Citigroup,
JPMorgan Chase, and Bank of America announce the creation of a new
entity, called a Master Liquidity Enhancement Conduit, to raise $200 billion
in order to purchase securities that are otherwise likely to be dumped on
the market and further depress the housing debt crisis.
October 15: Citigroup acknowledges that its risk management models
failed its customers and shareholders during this summer’s credit crisis,
leading to the company’s 57 percent drop in third-quarter profit. Citigroup
was forced to write off $3.55 billion and set aside $2.24 billion to cover
anticipated losses stemming from failing mortgages and consumer loans.
October 15: Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke says that the housing
crisis is far from over and will create a “significant drag” on domestic
economic growth into next year.
October 10: The National Association for Realtors revises down its outlook
for home sales. It lowers its prediction for existing home sales for the year
from 5.92 million to 5.78 million. Although demand for applications to
purchase homes and refinance existing mortgages rose during the
preceding week, consumers continue to have trouble getting loans
approved. New home sales are projected to fall to 805,000 this year and to
752,000 next year.
October 10: The Bush administration announces a new mortgage industry
coalition to help homeowners stay in their homes. Treasury Secretary
Henry M. Paulson Jr. estimates that the new initiative, dubbed Hope Now,
will assist 2 million homeowners whose initial mortgage rates are resetting
to higher and often unaffordable rates. The coalition includes 11 of the
largest mortgage service companies, which represent 60 percent of all
mortgages in the nation. They will be joined by mortgage counseling
agencies, investors, and large trade organizations.
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October 9: The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announces
its intention to review potential conflicts of interest in the credit rating
agencies due to questionable practices associated with the ratings given to
mortgage-backed securities that have contributed to the spreading housing
crisis. SEC Chairman Christopher Cox says: “We have underway right now
the beginnings of examinations that are focused on conflicts of interest,
and books and records examinations, and whether the agencies are
following their own procedures.”
October 4: The credit ratings agency, Moody’s Investors Service, reports
that subprime mortgage bonds originated in the first half of 2007 include
loans that are going delinquent at the fastest recorded rate. The Moody’s
report predicts that accelerating delinquencies from 2007 bonds are likely
to surpass the number of delinquencies in 2006, which hit a peal not seen
since 2000.
October 3: Residential foreclosures in New York City hit 698 during the
third quarter. It represents a 64% increase from the same period last year.
Yet the spike in New York pales in comparison to the third quarter
increases in Los Angeles (247%) and Miami (168%). Miami’s foreclosure
rate per household is 116% higher than Los Angeles and 852% higher than
New York City.
October 1: Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan says the
housing crisis is far from over. “As in similar situations of inventory excess,
I would expect home prices declines to continue until the rate of inventory
liquidation reaches its peak.” Greenspan adds that the consumer and
broader economy will suffer as a result.
October 1: UBS reports its first quarterly loss in nine years. The largest
wealth manager in the world plans to write down $3.4 billion in its fixedincome portfolio and other departments and to cut 1,500 jobs in its
investment bank. The loss is attributed to the spreading credit crisis
stemming from the emerging housing depression.
SEPTEMBER 2007
September 27: Luminent Mortgage Capital, a home-loan investment
company, downgrades its second-quarter profit as the company struggles
to gain access to credit and bankers seize assets.
September 27: The Commerce Department reports that sales of singlefamily homes decreased by 8.3% last month, the lowest level in seven
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years. The median price of a new home declined by 7.5% to $225,000 in
August 2007 as compared to the same month a year ago.
September 25: The National Association of Realtors releases new housing
statistics that reveal sales of existing single-family homes dropped by 4.3
percent in August, compared to July. It is the sixth straight decrease,
pushing sales to the lowest point in five years. The fall in sales pushes the
inventory of unsold homes to a record 4.58 million in August.
September 25: According to the S&P/Case-Shiller’s Home Prices Indices,
which track housing prices in metropolitan areas, home prices continue to
fall at an increasing rate. The 10-City Composite index shows an annual
decline of 4.5 percent– the largest in 16 years.
September 21: HSBC Holdings announces its plans to close its U.S.
subprime unit, Decision One Mortgage, and record an impairment charge of
about $880 million. HSBC states that it no longer believes the mortgage
business is sustainable. Approximately 750 U.S. employees are expected
to be affected by the decision.
September 20: Testifying before the House Financial Services Committee,
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke says that the credit crisis has
created “significant market stress” and that the Fed is “committed to
preventing problems from recurring, while still preserving responsible
subprime lending.” Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson adds that the
administration is considering raising the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loan
limits so that they can temporarily buy, bundle, and sell as securities any
loans exceeding $417,000. But Secretary Paulson emphasizes that any
changes to include so-called jumbo loans must include stricter regulations
for oversight.
September 19: The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO), the regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, agrees to relax
restrictions on the mortgage finance companies’ investment holdings,
enabling Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to buy $20 billion more in subprime
mortgages. But OFHEO Director James Lockhart reaffirms the
administration’s stance that he will not allow “any major increases in the
(investment) portfolio levels.”
September 19: The Commerce Department reports that construction of
new homes fell by 2.6 percent in August to the slowest pace in 12 years.
September 18: Realty Trac Inc. announces that home foreclosure filings
surged to 243,000 in August, up 115 percent from August 2006 and 36
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percent from July, marking the highest number of foreclosure filings since
Realty Trac began tracking monthly filings. The foreclosure filing rate
nationally is now one in every 510 homes.
September 18: The mortgage lending crisis intensifies as Impact Mortgage
Holdings Inc. says it will quit most lending activities, while Accredited
Home Lenders Holding Co. posts a major quarterly loss and says its
survival remains in doubt.
September 18: Federal Reserve cuts target federal funds rate by a half
point to 4.75 percent. It is the first rate reduction in four years and the
steepest in nearly five years. The Fed openly admits that the housing
downturn is much more severe than initially anticipated. In response to the
rate cut, the Dow Jones industrial average jumps 200 points and closes up
335 points at 13, 739.39.
September 18: The U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly passes
H.R. 1852, the “Expanding American Homeownership Act of 2007,” which
expands funding for housing counseling, authorizes lower down payments
for borrowers who can afford mortgage payments, and directs the Federal
Housing Administration to offer mortgage loans to higher risk – but
qualified – borrowers.
September 17: Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc.'s $1.3 billion bet on subprime
lending takes a turn for the worse when the world's largest brokerage
confirms job cuts at its First Franklin Financial Corp. unit. Merrill Lynch
declines to say how many jobs are being cut. Recently filed reports with
U.S. banking regulators show that Merrill Lynch Bank & Trust Co., where a
lot of the First Franklin franchise is housed, lost $111 million through the
first half of 2007.
September 17: NovaStar Financial Inc gives up its real estate investment
trust, effectively abandoning the lending business, because it cannot pay a
$157 million dividend.
September 14: Merrill Lynch & Co., the biggest underwriter of collateralized
debt obligations, signals that the subprime mortgage crisis may hurt thirdquarter earnings. The New York-based firm reports that it made ``fair
value adjustments'' for potential losses to date on unspecified holdings and
financing commitments.
September 12: According to the quarterly Anderson Forecast by the
University of California at Los Angeles, the spreading housing crisis will
push the national economy to the brink of recession but growth in other
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sectors of the economy could lead to a moderate recovery by 2009. David
Shulman, senior economist for the forecast, lowers his forecast for housing
starts to an annual rate of 1 million to 1.1 million, down from a range of
1.2 million to 1.3 million.
September 12: Speaking to representatives of leading financial firms,
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson says that the turbulence that has hit
financial markets will take some time to be resolved, especially in the area
of subprime mortgages. He urges the large firms to work with the
administration to help ensure that subprime homeowners get assistance in
dealing with sharply rising mortgage payments as their initial low
adjustable rate mortgages now reset to higher levels.
September 6: Concerned by the exploding subprime mortgage crisis,
Federal Reserve Governor Randall Kroszner says fallout may spread
beyond housing market into general economy.
September 6: The Mortgage Bankers Association releases a quarterly
report showing that the delinquency rate (the number of people who are
behind in their payments but have not yet entered the foreclosure process)
for mortgage loans on one-to four-unit residential properties was 5.12
percent of all loans outstanding in the second quarter of 2007, up 28 basis
points from the first quarter of 2007, and up 73 basis points from one year
ago. The delinquency rate for subprime loans was up from 13.77 in the
first quarter to 14.82 percent in the second quarter. The delinquency rate
for prime loans rose from 2.58 percent to 2.73 percent. Compared to this
time last year, the seriously delinquent rate is 23 basis points higher for
prime loans and 304 basis points higher for subprime loans.
September 5: The National Association of Realtors releases statistics on
pending sales for existing homes. The figures reveal a 16.1 percent decline
in July from a year ago and a 12.2 percent decline from the prior month.
The July 89.9 level is the second lowest in the history of the index and its
lowest since the September 11th terrorist attacks that severely disrupted
the national economy.
September 5: The Federal Reserve releases its Beige Book, a largely
anecdotal report on the economy based on interviews with business leaders
throughout the country. Counter to investor sentiment, the findings do not
indicate that the housing crisis is expanding into the general economy. The
Dow Jones industrial average drops nearly 200 points.
September 4: The six banking regulators, including the Federal Reserve,
call on mortgage companies to work with struggling homeowners likely to
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lose their homes as their adjustable rate mortgage interest rates escalate.
Citing the benefit to both lenders and borrowers, Fed Governor Randall
Kroszner says: “Keeping families in their homes is a matter of great
importance to the Federal Reserve.”
AUGUST 2007
August 31: President Bush holds a press conference to highlight the
growing problems in the subprime mortgage market. He says the
“government has a role to play” in the growing crisis and calls upon the
Federal Housing Administration to help subprime borrowers refinance into
loans insured by the federal agency. The modest FHA program is expected
to assist 60,000 delinquent borrowers. President Bush announces an
additional program expected to help another 20,000 homeowners by
reducing insurance premiums for those who pose less of a credit risk.
August 27: National Association of Realtors reports that existing home
sales declined by 0.2 percent in July, leaving the level of sales 9.0 percent
below the level 12 months prior.
August 22: Realty Trac Inc announces foreclosures were up 93% in July
2007 from July 2006. The national foreclosure rate in July was one filing for
every 693 households. There were 179,599 filings reported last month, up
from 92,845 a year ago.
August 17: The Federal Reserve cuts the discount rate by half a point.
Stocks rally.
August 16: Countrywide Financial, the nation’s largest mortgage lender,
draws down $11.5 billion from its credit lines.
August 16: All three major stock indexes were 10% lower than their July
peaks – a marker indicating a correction of the stock market, due to
tightening in the credit markets.
August 13: Aegis Mortgage files for bankruptcy.
August 9 and 10: European Central Bank and Federal Reserve intervenes in
markets by pumping billions of dollars of liquidity into the markets.
August 9: American International Group, one of the biggest U.S. mortgage
lenders, warns that mortgage defaults are spreading beyond the subprime
sector. With delinquencies becoming more common among borrowers in
the category just above subprime.
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August 9: BNP Paribas, a French bank, suspends three of its funds because
of exposure to U.S. mortgages.
August 6: American Home Mortgage files for bankruptcy.
August 1: Two hedge funds managed by Bear Stearns that invested heavily
in subprime mortgages declare bankruptcy. Investors in the funds file suit
against Bear Stearns, alleging that the investment bank mislead them
about the extent of the funds’ exposure.
JULY 2007
July 31: Home prices continue to fall, marking the 18th consecutive
decline, beginning in December 2005, in the growth rate of housing prices,
according to the monthly S&P/Case-Shiller's Home Prices Indices, which
tracks housing prices in metropolitan areas and is considered a leading
measure of U.S. single-family home prices. The 10-City Composite index
showed an annual decline of 3.4% (it's biggest since 1991) and the 20-City
Composite reported an annual decline of 2.8%.
July 30: IKB Deutsche Industrie bank, a German bank, is bailed out
because of bad bets on U.S. mortgage-backed securities.
July 25: The JEC examines the impact of the subprime lending crisis on
Cleveland, Ohio, one of the hardest hit communities in the nation. The
hearing reveals the individual faces of the subprime mortgage crisis. Local
residents and city council members testify.
July 19: The Dow Jones industrials close above 14,000 for the first time.
July 18 and 19: In two days of testimony in Congress, Chairman Bernanke
said there will be “significant losses” due to subprime mortgages, but that
such losses are “bumps” in “market innovations” (referring to hedge fund
investments in subprime mortgages). Bernanke reiterated that problems in
the subprime mortgage market have not spilled over into the greater
system. Bernanke also said the problems “'likely will get worse before they
get better.” He forecasts that the economy is poised for moderate growth,
but continuing problems in the housing market prompt the Fed to slightly
reduce its growth expectations.
July 18 and 19: Chairman Bernanke testifies in front of the House Financial
Services Committee and the Senate Banking Committee in his Second
Monetary Report to Congress in 2007.
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July 18: Commerce Department announces housing starts are down 19.4
percent over the last 12 months. Also announced is a 7.5 percent plunge in
permits to build new homes, the largest monthly decline since January
1995. Permits are 25.2 percent below their level a year ago, reflecting
continued pessimism among builders over the near-term outlook for new
homebuilding.
July 18: Bear Stearns announces its two hedge funds that invested heavily
in the subprime market are essentially worthless, having lost over 90% of
their value, equal to over $1.4 billion.
July 17: The Federal Reserve announces a pilot program to monitor
brokers, joining the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve with the
Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Trade Commission, and state
agencies represented by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors and the
American Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators, to conduct
targeted consumer-protection compliance reviews of underwriting
standards, oversight, and risk-management practices within nondepository lenders with significant subprime mortgage operations.
July 10: Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s downgrade bonds backed by
subprime mortgages. Fitch follows suit.
July 10: The Senate Appropriations Committee approves $100 million of
the requested $300 million for HUD Housing Counseling programs in the
Transportation, Housing, and Urban Development, and Related Agencies
FY08 Appropriations Bill. With these funds, non-profit agencies are able to
provide individual counseling by working one-on-one with borrowers stuck
in unaffordable subprime loans.
JUNE 2007
June 22: Bear Stearns pledges up to $3.2 billion to bail out one of its
hedge funds because of bad bets on subprime mortgages.
June 14: Goldman Sachs reports flat profit from a year ago due to
mortgage market problems.
June 12: Realty Trac announces U.S. foreclosure filings surged 90 percent
in May from May 2006. Foreclosure filings were up 19 percent from April.
There were 176,137 notices of default, scheduled auctions and bank
repossessions in May. The median price for a U.S. home dropped 1.8
percent the first three months of 2007. According to Freddie Mac, typically,
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more than half of all home sales occur in the April to June period.
June 6: ZipRealty Inc., a national real-estate brokerage firm, announces
that the number of homes listed for sale in 18 major U.S. metropolitan
areas at the end of May was up 5.1% from April. This is a striking deviation
from the general trend as tracked by the Credit Suisse Group, which says
on a national basis; inventories of listed homes have typically been little
changed in May during the past two decades.
MAY 2007
May 25: The National Association of Realtors reports that sales of existing
homes fell by 2.6 percent in April to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of
5.99 million units, the slowest sales pace since June 2003. The number of
unsold homes left on the market reached a record total of 4.2 million.
May 17: At the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Forty-Third Annual
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Chairman Bernanke
reiterates his March statement by saying the Fed does not foresee a
broader economic impact from the growing number of mortgage defaults.
May 9: The Federal Open Market Committee meets and leaves rates
unchanged. The FOMC states in their minutes, “The correction of the
housing sector was likely to continue to weigh heavily on economic activity
through most of this year, somewhat longer than previously expected.”
However, the FOMC continued to refer to the housing crisis as a
“correction”.
APRIL 2007
April 24: The National Association of Realtors announces that sales of
existing homes fell 8.4% in March from February, the sharpest month-tomonth drop in 18 years.
April 18: Freddie Mac announces plans to refinance up to $20 billion of
loans held by subprime borrowers who would be unable to afford their
adjustable-rate mortgages at the reset rate.
April 12: According to the Los Angeles Times, Tony Fratto, Spokesman for
the White House, said “individuals need to make smart decisions in taking
on debt, and there has to be some responsibility for making those
decisions.” He also said that any federal action would be unwelcome and
would encourage “risky behavior.”
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April 6: American Home Mortgage writes down the value of risky
mortgages rated one step above subprime.
April 2: New Century Financial files for bankruptcy.
MARCH 2007
March 27: At a Joint Economic Committee hearing, Ben Bernanke,
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, says
housing market weakness "does not appear to have spilled over to a
significant extent.” More Bernanke: “At this juncture, however, the impact
on the broader economy and financial markets of the problems in the
subprime market seems likely to be contained. In particular, mortgages to
prime borrowers and fixed-rate mortgages to all classes of borrowers
continue to perform well, with low rates of delinquency.”
March 20: People’s Choice files for bankruptcy.
March 8: New Century Financial, the second largest subprime lender in
2006, stops making loans.
March 2: Fremont General stops making subprime loans and puts its
subprime business up for sale.
March 2: The Federal Reserve announces draft regulations to tighten
lending standards. Lenders would be required to grant loans on a
borrower's ability to pay the fully indexed interest rate that would apply
after the low, initial fixed-rate period of two or three years. New
regulations are met with skepticism in Congress.
FEBRUARY 2007
February 20: Nova Star Financial reports a surprise loss.
February 12: ResMae Mortgage files for bankruptcy.
.
DECEMBER 2006
December 28: Ownit Mortgage Solutions files for bankruptcy.
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200 North Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
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Assembly Banking & Finance Committee &
Assembly Public Employees, Retirement & Social Security
Committee
Joint Informational Hearing
"Insight into the Financial Market Bailout: Present and Future
Actions"
Beginning last year the Assembly Banking & Finance Committee convened
its first hearing to examine the impact of the mortgage crisis on California
and the devastating impact on communities and homeowners. As noted
then, the subprime crisis that was impacting homeowners was only the tip
of the spear as the breadth of the true crisis and its impacts were yet
unknown. Subsequently, the committee conducted several other hearings
regarding the direct impacts of the foreclosure and subprime crisis.
The last few weeks and months have revealed the true nature of this crisis
as major financial institutions have failed, markets have plummeted and as
University of Chicago economists Douglas Diamond and Anil Kashyap have
pointed out "the most remarkable period of government intervention into
the financial system since the Great Depression." First we witnessed the
U.S. Treasury takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with combined
assets and guarantees of over $5 trillion. Not long after, Lehmon brothers
became the largest bankruptcy in American history, while a few days later
the federal government bailed out American International Group (AIG) with
$85 billion dollars.
In the week right after the passage of HR 1424 the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, the bill which was intended to provide confidence
in the markets, the DOW lost 20% of its value. This current liquidity crisis,
a direct result of inadequate risk management on the part of financial
institutions has now rebounded to an irrational fear of lending money, even
in the best of circumstances. The London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR),
the calculation used by banks to determine the rate at which they will lend
to each other has been hovering around 4.75% a full 3% ahead of where it
was prior to 2007. This is indicative of the lack of lending among banks
and eventually to consumers and businesses.
On October 14, 2008 U.S. officials announced a plan to take stakes in the
nine largest financial institutions as the beginning of a program to funnel
$250,000,000,000 directly into banks to free up liquidity and credit. This
first round of this plan will involve Treasury purchasing $25 billion in
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preferred stock of Bank of America, J.P. Morgan and Citigroup, between
$20 billion and $25 billion in Wells Fargo; $10 billion in Goldman and
Morgan Stanley; $3 billion in Bank of New York Mellon; and about $2
billion in State Street.
Institutions that participate in this direct injection would have to comply
with the executive compensation restrictions put in place under HR 1424
that do the following:
•

Ensure that incentive compensation for senior executives does not
encourage unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of
the financial institution;

•

Require claw-back of any bonus or incentive compensation paid to a
senior executive based on statements of earnings, gains, or other
criteria that are later proven to be materially inaccurate;

•

Prohibit a financial institution from making any golden parachute
payment to a senior executive; and

•

An agreement not to deduct for tax purposes executive compensation
in excess of $500,000 for each senior executive. Treasury is issuing
interim final rules for these executive compensation standards.

Additionally, and in order to free up day-to-day lending among banks, the
FDIC will temporarily guarantee for certain types of new debt called senior
unsecured debt issued by banks and thrifts.
Executive Compensation
Prior to the financial market meltdown, a number of CEO's were living the
high life with bonuses, exuberant salaries and exceptional stock options.
Oddly enough, the latest occurrences in the financial arena show that
although these companies failed, those still coming off on top are the
CEO's. CEO's continue to collect bonuses although the nation is in financial
turmoil. The amount of money paid out in bonuses and golden parachutes
is more money than one person sees in a lifetime. Should someone lose
their job or close a business, there is no golden parachute to lean on to
save the day. With such perverse incentives there is little to prevent
inordinate risk taking or failed management strategies.
According to the Department of Labor in 2007, the average annual salary
in the United States was $40,690. The top CEO's of many of the failed
financial institutions make more than 100 times that. The latest market
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shocks pose the question of, if the business fails should these CEO's still
receive a well above average compensation? The first of many CEO's to
receive a golden parachute was Angelo Mozilo of the California based
company, Countrywide Financial. Although this previous mortgage giant,
now owned by Bank of America, was under scrutiny and facing criticism for
questionable lending practices, Mr. Mozilo still made out with $361.7
million for the 2005-2007 year, most of it from gains on options. At this
point, as the following data shows, a number of CEO's began planning
ahead by rewarding themselves and employees' colossal bonuses,
increasing salaries and selling stock options.
The next big blow came with Fannie Mae, a company once thriving on the
fact that it was separated from direct government control. The federal
government had no choice but to step in and take it over. In the end,
Fannie Mae became over-extending with too much subprime debt that
ultimately wiped out the shareholders. This is a case where CEO Daniel
Mudd was denied a golden parachute worth $9.8 million, by one estimate,
though this was only made possible due to direct government action. But
he still took home $11.6 million during the boom years of 2005-07,
according to Equilar, an executive compensation analysis company,
including $8.3 million in bonus pay.
Similar to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac also suffered from inadequate risk
management with a portfolio burdened by subprime exposure. Freddie
was also taken over by the government after conditions worsened. Freddie
Mac shareholders got wiped out, and the fiasco contributed to fears that
bad mortgage debt would take down the economy. Additionally, small
community banks that did not really participate in the subprime boom were
punished due to investments in preferred stock of both Fannie and Freddie.
The former Freddie Mac CEO Richard Syron walked away with $12.9 million
from 2005-07, including $8 million in bonuses. But regulators did snag his
golden parachute, worth an estimated $9.8 million.
Following Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae the public had to endure watching
Bear Stearns hitting the bottom. Bear Stearns was the first Wall Street
giant to show out of proportion weaknesses. The federal government had
to guarantee up to $29 billion in bad mortgage-related assets and from
there JPMorgan Chase took them over. CEO James Cayne, who left in
January, lost millions on Bear stock during the plunge but he had also
cashed out millions in stock before the fall. He took home $42.3 million in
his final three years on the job, 2005-07, Equilar says, including $29.8
million in bonus pay for accomplishments that included leading Bear
Stearns into the arena of mortgage-backed securities.
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Unlike Bear Stearns, Lehman Bros. was not able to secure government
backing therefore they had no other choice but to file for bankruptcy
protection. The chief obstacle was concern about a $30 billion portfolio of
shaky commercial-real-estate assets compiled under the watch of CEO
Richard Fuld. When Lehman filed for bankruptcy, investors were wiped
out, and employees lost their jobs. Despite the consequences of filing for
bankruptcy felt by almost everyone at Lehman Bros. Fuld walked away
with $186.5 million in earnings from the prior three years, Equilar says.
Fuld, who seemed to defend his compensation while testifying before a
congressional panel on Oct. 6, 2008 got most of that by cashing out
options but he also took home $36.8 million in bonus and incentive pay.
The big insurance giant, American International Group (AIG), under the
leadership of CEO Martin Sullivan, got itself in deep trouble through the use
of exotic financial products known as credit default swaps. In September,
the insurer needed an $85 billion bailout from the Federal Reserve to avoid
bankruptcy. AIG shareholders were virtually wiped out in the deal but
Sullivan, who left the company in June, came out of it a multimillionaire.
He raked in $25.4 million in take-home pay over three years, according to
Equilar. Furthermore, recent revelations have shown that AIG spent
$440,000 on a spa get-away junket not long after accepting the federal
bailout.
Next came, Merrill Lynch under the leadership of Stan O'Neal. Merrill
Lynch took more than $10 billion in write-downs on bad debt in the second
quarter. Fears about what was yet to come forced Merrill to accept a
buyout from Bank of America to avoid disaster. O'Neal left Merrill a year
ago with $66 million in earnings under his belt for 2005-07. That included
$32.6 million in bonuses.
Kerry Killinger, CEO of Washington Mutual plunged headfirst into the kinds
of adjustable-rate mortgages and home-equity loans that failed to account
for potential future difficulties for homeowners who could not refinance due
to depressed markets or that their income had not risen as much as
anticipated. The largest U.S. savings and loan faced losses from residential
mortgages of as much as $19 billion when it was seized by the FDIC and
then sold to JPMorgan Chase. Killinger took home $36 million in 2005-07.
That included $11 million in bonus pay for his performance.
Like Washington Mutual, bad loans piled up too high at Wachovia; in the
second quarter of 2008 alone, the bank reported an $8.9 billion loss. The
chief culprit: "pick-a-pay" loans that came in the door when Wachovia
bought California thrift Golden West Financial in 2006. Golden West
specialized in those risky mortgages. Wachovia seems to have become an
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inquisition of Wells Fargo. CEO G. Kennedy Thompson, who left in June,
did well during his tenure. He took home $16 million during 2005-07,
including $10 million in bonus pay, according to Equilar.
Last but not least, Citigroup has took on more than $57 billion in writedowns and losses since the crunch hit. Citigroup has been forced to cut its
dividend and raise more than $30 billion. The man at the helm while the
mess developed was CEO Charles Prince, who has since left the company.
He earned $35.6 million in bonus pay during the boom years of 2005-07
and took home a total of $41.5 million.
As the failures show, CEO's are walking away with a lot of cash in their
pockets while taxpayers are ask to pay the bill to prop up failed
enterprises.
Corporate Governance:
How has corporate governance impacted the credit crisis? It is too early to
make any conclusions about the management of certain banks over others.
However, the lack of transparency regarding certain exotic financial
instruments has been a major criticism of the corporate structure of the
financial industry. Innovation and risk taking has been rewarded in
contrast with transparency and conservative growth.
The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) a global body
for professional accountants has singled out poor corporate governance at
banks as a principal cause of the global credit crunch. In a recently
released policy paper, ACCA said unacceptable practices had encouraged
short-term thinking and poor risk assessment fuelling the ongoing financial
crisis.
Key elements of good corporate governance principles include honesty,
trust and integrity, openness, performance orientation, responsibility and
accountability, mutual respect, and commitment to the organization.
Of importance is how directors and management develop a model of
governance that aligns the values of the corporate participants and then
evaluate this model periodically for its effectiveness. In particular, senior
executives should conduct themselves honestly and ethically, especially
concerning actual or apparent conflicts of interest, and disclosure in
financial reports.
Commonly accepted principles of corporate governance include:
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•

Rights and equitable treatment of shareholders: Organizations should
respect the rights of shareholders and help shareholders to exercise
those rights. They can help shareholders exercise their rights by
effectively communicating information that is understandable and
accessible and encouraging shareholders to participate in general
meetings.

•

Interests of other stakeholders: Organizations should recognize that
they have legal and other obligations to all legitimate stakeholders.

•

Role and responsibilities of the board: The board needs a range of skills
and understanding to be able to deal with various business issues and
have the ability to review and challenge management performance. It
needs to be of sufficient size and have an appropriate level of
commitment to fulfill its responsibilities and duties. There are issues
about the appropriate mix of executive and non-executive directors. The
key roles of chairperson and CEO should not be held by the same
person.

•

Integrity and ethical behavior: Ethical and responsible decision making
is not only important for public relations, but it is also a necessary
element in risk management and avoiding lawsuits.

•

Organizations should develop a code of conduct for their directors and
executives that promotes ethical and responsible decision making. It is
important to understand, though, that reliance by a company on the
integrity and ethics of individuals is bound to eventual failure. Because
of this, many organizations establish compliance and ethics programs to
minimize the risk that the firm steps outside of ethical and legal
boundaries.

•

Disclosure and transparency: Organizations should clarify and make
publicly known the roles and responsibilities of board and management
to provide shareholders with a level of accountability. They should also
implement procedures to independently verify and safeguard the
integrity of the company's financial reporting. Disclosure of material
matters concerning the organization should be timely and balanced to
ensure that all investors have access to clear, factual information.
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HR 1424
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
Faced with an ongoing economic crisis that has not improved despite
several instances of direct government intervention, Congress passed HR
1424, what has commonly been referred to as the $700 billion bailout
package. The core of the proposal will provide access to the Treasury
Secretary of up to the $700 billion over stages with $250 billion being
made available immediately. They key driver of the bailout package is the
ability of the government to purchase troubled assets, namely mortgage
back securities and other financial instruments tied to mortgages.
Since the passage of HR 1424, Wall Street has continued to see record
losses. Some indications have emerged at the time of writing this review
that Treasury may alter the plan to allow government to buy stakes in
financial institutions or provide direct injections of liquidity. This injection
could amount to $200 billion, though early news is unclear as to whether
this is part of, or in addition to the $700 billion previously authorized.
The following is a summary of the provisions of HR 1424. It is important to
note that based on the provisions of the bill that Treasury Secretary is now
the most powerful cabinet level position in the executive branch.
PURPOSE AND MISSION:
•

Provide authority for the Secretary of the Treasury to take action as
necessary to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system.

•

Ensure that the authorities provided for in the legislation are used to:
o Protect home values, college funds, retirement accounts and
life savings;
o Preserve homeownership;
o Promote jobs and economic growth;
o Maximize returns to the taxpayers; and
o Provide transparency and accountability.

TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM (TARP):
•

Defines "troubled assets" as residential or commercial mortgages and
any securities, obligations, or other instruments that based on or
related to such mortgages, that in each case was originated or issued
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on or before March 14, 2008, the purchase of which will promote
financial market stability; and any other financial instrument in which if
purchased would promote financial market stability.
•

Provides authority to the Secretary to purchase and make
commitments to purchase trouble assets from any financial institution
on terms and conditions determined by the Secretary.

•

Implements TARP under the new Office of Financial Stability headed by
the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury to be appointed by the
President.

•

Provides the Secretary to take such actions as deemed necessary to
carry out the provisions of TARP including, but not limited to:
o Direct hiring authority;
o Ability to enter into contracts for services;
o Designating financial institutions as financial agents of the
Federal Government.
o Establish vehicles to purchase, hold and sell troubled assets;
and
o Issue regulations and guidance that may be necessary.

•

Requires that within the first two days of the purchase of troubled
assets the Secretary shall publish program guidelines and procedures.

•

Requires the Secretary to take such steps as necessary to prevent
unjust enrichment of financial institutions participating in TARP.

INSURANCE OF TROUBLED ASSETS:
•

In addition to the power to purchase, trade and hold troubled assets,
the Secretary is also authorized to set up a guarantee program for
these assets.

•

Establishment of a guarantee program will also require the
establishment of premiums for such guarantees.

•

Premiums will vary based on product risk and the Secretary shall
publish the methodology for setting premiums.

•

Upon request of a financial institution, the Secretary may guarantee
the timely payment of principal of, and interest on, troubled assets in
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amounts not to exceed 100% of such payments.
•

Establishes the Troubled Assets Insurance Financing Fund (TAIF) that
will collect premiums to pay potential guarantee claims.

GUIDELINES AND CONSIDERATIONS:
•

In exercising his authority, the Secretary shall take into consideration
the following:
o Protecting the interest of the taxpayers;
o Providing stability and preventing disruption to financial
markets;
o Assist and help families keep their homes and stabilize
communities;
o Determining if the purchase of assets meat long term viability
of TARP;
o Ensuring that all financing institutions are eligible to
participate in the program;
o Providing financial assistance to community banks and to
financial institutions that serve low and moderate income
communities that have assets less than one billion dollars and
that as a result of devaluation of Fannie and Freddie
preferred stock will drop in capital levels;
o The need to ensure stability for United States public
instrumentalities; and
o Protecting retirement accounts.

FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT BOARD (FSOB):
•

Creates FSOB, which shall be responsible for:
o Reviewing the exercise of authority under TARP;
o Making recommendations to the Secretary regarding use of
authority under TARP; and
o Reporting any suspected fraud, misrepresentation, or
malfeasance to the Special Inspector General for the Troubled
Assets Relief Program or the Attorney General of the United
States.

•

FSOB will be composed of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the
Secretary, Director of FHA, Chairman of the SEC and the Secretary of
HUD.
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•

Requires FSOB to report to Congress quarterly.

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
•

Requires the Secretary to report to Congress within 60 days of the first
exercise of authority granted under TARP to report every 30 days
thereafter.

•

Requires the reports to include the following:
o An overview of actions taken under TARP;
o Actual obligations and expenditures of funds provided for
administrative expenses.
o A detailed financial statement with respect to the exercise of
authority including:









•

All agreements made or renewed;
All insurance contracts entered into;
All transactions occurring during the reporting period;
The nature of the assets purchased;
Projected costs and liabilities;
Operating expenses;
The Valuation or pricing method used for each
transaction; and
A description of vehicles established to assist in the
exercise of the authority granted under TARP.

Requires specified Tranche Reports to Congress that include:
o A description of all the transactions made during the reporting
period;
o Justification for the price paid for and other financial terms
associated with transactions;
o A description of the impact of TARP on the financial system;
o A description of challenges that remain in the financial system;
and
o An estimate of additional actions under the authority provided
that be necessary to meet new challenges.

•

Requires the Secretary to review the current state of the financial
markets and regulatory system and submit a report to Congress
analyzing financial markets and providing recommendations regarding
potential new regulatory action.
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FORECLOSURE MITIGATION EFFORTS:
Like most provisions of the bailout bill, this section is very broad yet
unspecific regarding the actions that the Treasury Secretary may take to
encourage loan modifications. In granting authority to the Treasury
Secretary is uses terms such as the Secretary may "encourage"
modification efforts, instead of a clear grant of power to enforce such
modifications. However, with $700 billion at his disposal, the Treasury
Secretary encouragement may have the same effect as a mandate. It is
too early to tell the full effects of this package.
Specifically, section 109 does the following:
•

Requires the Secretary to implement a plan to maximize assistance to
homeowners and use the authority provided to "encourage" loan
servicers to take advantage of the HOPE for Homeowner's Program or
other available programs to minimize foreclosures. The guidelines for
the HOPE program, as passed in HR 3221 (Housing & Economic
Recovery Act of 2008) are as follows:
o The borrowers mortgage must have originated on or before
January 1, 2008;
o The mortgage debt-to-income must be at least 31 percent;
o The borrower does not own second homes.
o Maximum 90 percent loan-to-value ratio (This requires a write
down of principle to 90% of the current value as appraised by
FHA);
o $550,440 maximum mortgage amount;
Considering the stringent debt-to-income ratio requirements and the
requirement that lenders must write down the principle of the
mortgage this program will probably suffer from little to no
utilization. Also, FHA estimates that this program will only assist
400,000 borrowers.

•

Provides that the Secretary may use guarantees and credit
enhancements to facilitate loan modifications.

•

Requires the Secretary to coordinate with other federal agencies and
entities that hold troubled assets to identify opportunities for the
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acquisition of troubled assets that would improve the loan modification
and restructuring process and to permit tenants to remain in their
homes under the terms of the lease.
•

In cases where the Treasury owns all or part of the assets of a
mortgage pool the Secretary shall consent to "reasonable" requests for
loss mitigation measures, including term extensions, rate reductions,
principle write downs, or other means to remove limitations on
modifications.

•

Requires the Federal Property Manager (FPM) to implement loan
modification and assistance plans within 60 days of enactment of the
bill.

•

Requires the FPM a report to Congress every 30 days on the number
and types of loan modifications made and the number of actual
foreclosures occurring during the reporting period.

•

Provides that when the FPM does not own a mortgage loan, but holds
as interest in obligations or pools of obligations secured by mortgage
loans the FPM shall encourage implementation of loan modifications by
servicers and assist in facilitating any modifications to the extent
possible.

Adam Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, at Georgetown University
concludes that the buying up of mortgage backed securities by the
government is not enough to give the government the ability to unilaterally
modify mortgages. Typical pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs)
specify that it takes two-thirds of all the MBS holers in a pool to consent to
a modification. Under this scenario, Treasury would have to buy up twothirds of the MBS in a pool to force across the board modifications.
However, even if Treasury could or was willing to purchase the necessary
amount, the conversion of MBS into collateralized debt obligations further
dilutes the ability to purchase the sufficient number of securities. Professor
Levitin advocates the best way to engage in loan modifications is too allow
judges to write down values in bankruptcy proceedings.
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION:
As noted earlier in this background, executive compensation has become a
hot button issue as Americans witness CEOs walking away with multimillion dollar paydays after the collapse of their company in what can only
be described as utter failures in leadership and responsibility. These are
the types of failures that would get most middle income workers,
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regardless of industry, fired on the spot. When the first bailout plan was
floated to Congress it did not include limits on executive compensation.
Subsequently, Congress and the public expressed outrage at the handover
of billions of dollars of taxpayer money without any limits on CEO pay or
the use golden parachutes.
HR 1424 contains the following limits on compensation:
•

When the Secretary directly purchases trouble assets from
institutions without a bidding process and such sale results in the
government having an equity or debt position in the institution, then
the institution must meet specified governance and executive
compensation standards.

•

These standards are:
o Exclusion of incentives for senior executive officers of
institutions to take unnecessary and excessive risks that
threaten the institution during the period in which the
government holds and equity position.
o A provision for recovery of any bonuses or incentive
compensation based on statements of earnings, gains or other
criteria that are later proven to be materially inaccurate.
o A prohibition on the making of any golden parachute during the
period in which the government has an equity or debt position.

•

If troubled assets are purchased at auction and when the investment
in a single institution is at least $300,000,000 the Secretary shall
prohibit, for such financial institution any new employment contracts
that provide a golden parachute in the event of an involuntary
termination, bankruptcy filing, insolvency or receivership.

The provisions in this section may provide little long term comfort to those
concerned with executive compensation. The limits and terms are vague
and narrow. For example, assistance to an institution is not enough for the
protections to kick in. It requires that the government either have an
actual ownership position in the institution or an investment over
$300,000,000. So the TARP plan could provide $299,000,000 in assistance
to one entity but the limits on executive compensation would not apply.
Furthermore, recovery of bonuses or incentives is allowed if statements of
earnings, etc are proven to be inaccurate. The legislation is unclear on
who would make such a finding, either a court or the Secretary? Lastly,
the limits only apply for the duration that the government holds an equity
position so the day after that relationship ends the institution could begin
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to adversely reward executives even though they only survived due to
government intervention.
COORDINATION WITH FOREIGN AUTHORITIES AND CENTRAL
BANKS:
•

Requires the Secretary to coordinate with foreign financial authorities
and central banks to work toward the establishment of similar
programs by foreign authorities and central banks.

The federal government and several members of Congress have, over the
last few years, expressed concerns regarding the influence and reach of
sovereign wealth funds, particularly those from Arab counties such as the
United Arab Emirates. Ironically, the TARP program may be the beginning
of the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world.
MINIMIZATION OF LONG-TERM COSTS AND MAXIMAZATION OF
BENFITS FOR TAXPAYERS:
In carrying out the TARP program the Secretary is required to develop
policies that will minimizes risks to the taxpayers by taking into account
direct outlays, potential long-term returns and the overall economic
benefits to the program. In order to carry out this provision the Secretary
shall:
•

Hold assets to maturity or for resale until such time that the market
is optimal for selling such assets;

•

Sell such assets at a price that the Secretary determines, based on
available financial analysis, will maximize return on investment for
the Federal Government;

•

Make purchases of assets at the lowest price; and

•

Use market mechanism such as auctions and reverse auctions.

Discretion is provided to the Secretary to determine whether market
mechanisms are feasible, or if direct purchase would better suit the goals
of the program. This section leaves this authority to make such
determines entirely to the discretion of the Secretary.
Finally, TARP provides that the Secretary may not purchase any troubled
assets from a financial institution, unless the Secretary receives from a
publicly traded institution a warrant giving the right to the Secretary to
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receive nonvoting common stock or preferred stock when deemed
appropriate. If the institution is not publicly traded the Secretary shall
receive a senior debt instrument.
MARKET TRANSPARENCY:
•

Requires the Secretary to make available to the public a description,
amounts, and pricing of assets acquired under this Act, within 2
business days of purchase, trade, or other disposition.

•

Provides the Secretary to determine if public disclosure of off-balance
sheet transactions, derivatives, instruments, contingent liabilities and
similar sources of exposure is adequate to provide sufficient
information to the public that reveals the true financial condition of
the entity.

OVERSIGHT AND AUDITS:
HR 1424 establishes oversight by the Comptroller General of the United
States on a continuing basis that will review and audit key provisions of the
act, as well as, the performance of any agents and representatives of
TARP. The subjects of Comptroller oversight include:
•

The performance of TARP, particularly performance issues related to,
o Foreclosure mitigation;
o Cost reduction;
o Ability and effectiveness is providing stability to the financial
markets; and
o Protection of taxpayers.

•

The financial condition and internal controls of the TARP, its
representatives and agents.

•

Characteristics of transaction and commitments.

•

Characteristics and disposition of acquired assets.

•

Efficiency of the operations of the TARP in the use of appropriated
funds.

•

Compliance with all applicable laws and regulations.
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•

The efforts of the TARP to prevent, identify, and minimize conflicts of
interest involving any agent or representative performing activities
on behalf of or under authority of the TARP.

•

The efficacy of contracting procedures.

Finally, the TARP is required to annually prepare and issue to the
appropriate Congressional committees the public audited financial
statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles, and the Comptroller shall annually audit such statements.
STUDY AND REPORT ON MARGIN AUTHORITY:
Requires the Comptroller General to undertake a study to determine the
extent to which leverage and sudden de-leveraging of financial institutions
was a factor behind the financial crisis. This report must be submitted no
later than June 1, 2009. The study shall include:
•

An analysis of the roles and responsibilities of the Federal Reserve
Board, SEC, the Secretary, and other Federal banking agencies with
respect to monitoring leverage and acting to curtail excessive
leveraging.

•

An analysis of the authority of the Board to regulate leverage.

•

An analysis of any usage of margin authority by the board.

•

Recommendations for the Board and Congress with respect to the
existing authority of the Board.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM:
Creates a special Inspector General to review and monitor the TARP with
the responsibility of auditing and investigating the purchase, management,
and sale of assets by the Secretary including the collection of the following
information:
•

A description of the categories of troubled assets purchased or
otherwise procured by the Secretary.

•

A listing of the troubled assets purchased.
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•

An explanation of the reasons the Secretary deemed it necessary to
purchase each troubled asset.

•

A listing of each financial institution that such trouble assets were
purchased from.

•

A listing of and detailed biographical information on each person or
entity hired to manage such troubled assets.

•

Current estimate of the total amount of troubled assets purchased
and sold and a detailed account of the profits and losses incurred
from the disposition of each asset.

•

A listing of insurance contracts issued.

AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND MARK-TO-MARKET ACCOUTING:
First, what is mark-to-market accounting? Also known as “fair value”
accounting it requires institutions to value assets on their balance sheets
based on what those assets would be valued at on the market. If the
current trading value of an asset is 85 cents on the dollar then that the
amount that would be claimed on the balance sheets, thus causing a write
down in value of 15 cents per dollar. Mutual funds make these types of
reports every day on the value of the stocks in their portfolio while
investment banks like Goldman Sachs do these reports every quarter.
During the subprime boom financial institutions created such exotic
instruments that there was no real market to which one could base a
realistic pricing analysis. In these cases, the investment firms used
complex algorithms to “guess” at what the true market value of these
products might be or tied their fortunes to indices that were most likely to
face volatility in such a distressed market and that’s exactly what has
happened. Additionally, this accounting rule as required many banks to
write down holdings based on the current value of real estate that backs up
mortgage securities. This had contributed to a massive write down in
values. Several policy makers, investors, CEOs and others have called for
suspension of the mark-to-market rule, blaming it in large part for the
current financial crisis, pointing out that such exotic products as
collateralized debt obligations cannot possible be priced correctly in such a
panicked marketplace. However, it should be noted that no one
complained about the mark-to-market rules with the market place was
overly optimistic and firms were able to mark large returns on their balance
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sheets.
HR 1424 provides the SEC with authority to suspend by rule, regulation or
order the mark- to-market rule if need for the protection of investors.
Additionally, the SEC will study the mark-to-market accounting standards
with an emphasis on:
•

The effects of such accounting standards on a financial institutions
balance sheet.

•

The impacts of such accounting on bank failures.

•

The impact of such standards on the quality of financial information
available to investors.

•

The process used by the Financial Accounting Standards Board in
developing accounting standards.

•

The advisability and feasibility of modifications to such standards.

•

Possible alternative accounting standards to those currently provided
under mark-to-market.

TEMPORARY INCREASE IN DEPOSIT AND SHARE INSURANCE
COVERAGE:
In order to instill consumer confidence in the retail banking sector, the
FDIC deposit insurance limit has been raised from $100,000 to $250,000
through December 31, 2009.
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Secure & Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing
(SAFE) Act of 2008
Title V of Public Law 110-289

Background:
Under California law, mortgage loans can be made and originated under
several different structures and licensing regimes. Mortgage brokers
operate under a real estate license from the Department of Real Estate.
This license requires several hours of educational training and ongoing
direct oversight by the department.
Under the California Finance Lenders Law or the Residential Mortgage
Lending Act, originators offer loans under the umbrella license of the
company they work for. Under this structure, the loan originator is not
licensed nor statutorily mandated to maintain certain levels of educational
experience. This is the similar to a loan officer works at a bank or credit
union. The logic in with this model is that the wrongdoing of an individual
places the whole license in jeopardy so institutions are more likely to self
regulate. Some distinctions have been made in recent years regarding
individual employees. For example, several legislative proposals have
come forward in recent years that have put some requirements on
individuals in these cases such as expanded background checks.
On July 30, 2008 President Bush signed into law HR 3221, the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008. This legislation provides reforms for
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as, new programs designed to assist
homeowners facing foreclosure. Among its many provisions, HR 3221
contained a section known as the SAFE Act (Title V of P.L. 110-289), a
wholesale regulatory change of the licensing and regulation of mortgage
originators.
The SAFE Act requires California and other states to have a framework in
place by August 1, 2009, or face direct oversight and implantation from the
Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). States
may receive an extension if they are making a good faith effort to
implement the requirements. Since the creation of California's multilayered framework, the system has been somewhat of an arbitrage where
lenders could pick and choose licenses based on their business models or
market needs. Some lenders have acquired licenses across all licensing
laws.
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Implementation of the SAFE Act will be the easiest for the Department of
Real Estate (DRE) as currently all real estate agents and mortgage brokers
are individually licensed. The Department of Corporations (DOC) will face
the most challenge as the current license system for finance lenders and
residential mortgage lenders is a corporate licenses where employees work
under the licenses of their employer. A change to the requirements of the
SAFE Act will require a wholesale restructure of those licensing
frameworks.

The Regulation of Mortgage Lenders
As mentioned previously, there are a variety of regulators at both the
state and federal level who oversee lenders and administer mortgage
lending laws. Below is a brief summary of this regulatory framework.
Non-Depository Mortgage Lenders
Department of Corporations (DOC)
In California, non-depository institutions may make mortgage loans
under two separate licenses administered by DOC, the residential
mortgage lender's (RML) license or a California finance lender's (CFL)
license.
The California Residential Mortgage Lending Act was enacted in 1994 to
provide a unique license for mortgage bankers that act as loan originators
and/or loan servicers. A RML licensee may also serve as a mortgage
broker who secures a mortgage loan on behalf of a borrower from a third
party lender.
The RML authorizes licensees to make federally related mortgage loans.
Those loans are made, insured, guaranteed or assisted in any way by the
federal government, made in connection with a US Department of Housing
and Urban Development program or intended to be sold by the originating
lender on the secondary mortgage market to a government-sponsored
enterprise such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.
Applicants for a RML must:
•

Be an approved lender and/or servicer from the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA), Veterans Administration (VA), Farmers Home
Administration (FmHA), Government National Mortgage Association
(Ginnie Mae), Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae);
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•

Demonstrate a minimum tangible net worth of $250,000; and

•

Maintain a surety bond in the amount of $50,000.

For each RML, the DOC conducts on-site audits at least every 4 years.
Those audits are conducted to determine each licensee's compliance with
the provisions of the various laws governing mortgage lenders.
Under the California Finance Lenders Law, "any person who is engaged in
the business of making consumer loans or making commercial loans" is a
finance lender. Under the CFL Law, licensees may make first and second
mortgages, personal loans and business loans.
A CFL license may be issued to a corporate entity and individual employees
are not required to obtain a license. A corporation or person applying for a
finance lender license must submit an application to DOC, pay a $300
initial fee and have a net worth of $25,000. The DOC reviews all
applications to ensure that various requirements are met. In general, the
company's principals may not have a criminal history or a history of noncompliance with regulatory requirements.
Once a license is obtained, licensees:
•

Are subject to periodic examination that each licensee must pay for;

•

Must pay an annual assessment each year;

•

Have to file an annual report with DOC;

•

Must maintain a $25,000 surety bond at all times.

In addition to the ability to make loans directly, the CFL Law provides
some ability for finance lenders to broker loans as long as the loans are
only brokered to other licensed CFLs.

Department of Real Estate (DRE)
California's real estate law provides for the licensing and regulation of real
estate brokers by DRE. Under the law, licensed real estate brokers may:
•

Buy, sell or solicit prospective buyers and sellers of real property;

•

Serve as a property manager who leases or rents real property; and
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•

Serve as a mortgage broker who, on behalf of borrowers or lenders,
negotiates loans secured by liens on real property.

In most transactions, the mortgage broker is usually an agent for the
purpose of arranging the home loan transaction.
To obtain a salesperson's licensees or a real state brokers license, the
applicant must have completed the following educational requirements:
Successful completion of the following college-level courses is
required to become a real estate salesperson:
•

Real Estate Principles; and

•

Real Estate Practice; and

One course from the following list:
•

Real Estate Appraisal

•

Property Management

•

Real Estate Finance

•

Real Estate Economics

•

Legal Aspects of Real Estate

•

Real Estate Office Administration

•

General Accounting

•

Business Law

•

Escrows

•

Mortgage Loan Brokering and Lending

•

Computer Applications in Real Estate

•

Common Interest Developments

The following educational requirements are necessary for a real estate
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brokers licenses.
•

Real Estate Practice

•

Legal Aspects of Real Estate

•

Real Estate Finance

•

Real Estate Appraisal

•

Real Estate Economics or General Accounting

And three courses from the following group:
•
•

Real Estate Principles
Business Law

•

Property Management

•

Escrows

•

Real Estate Office Administration

•

Mortgage Loan Brokering and Lending

•

Advanced Legal Aspects of Real Estate

•

Advanced Real Estate Finance

•

Advanced Real Estate Appraisal

•

Computer Applications in Real Estate

•

Common Interest Developments

In additional to the educational requirements, in order to receive a brokers
license, the applicant must have two years of experience as a salesperson,
or a four year degree, or be a member of the state bar.

Depository Institutions
Depository institutions (e.g., banks, thrifts and credit unions) may be
chartered by the state through the Department of Financial Institutions.
Alternatively, these types of institutions may choose a national charter
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regulated primarily by one of three federal regulators: the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision or the National
Credit Union Administration.
Regardless of whether they hold a state or federal charter, banks and
thrifts are also subject to regulation by the Federal Reserve and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).

Department of Financial Institutions (DFI)
The DFI oversees state chartered depository institutions such as banks,
credit unions, industrial banks and savings association. These depository
institutions make a variety of loans to borrowers including loans on real
property. These licensees may also broker mortgage loans to other
lenders.
The authority to make mortgage loans is an inherent part of the lending
authority as a DFI-licensed financial institution. While the California
Financial Code does not contain a "mortgage lending" section with respect
to these institutions, their mortgage loans are governed by various laws
throughout the Financial Code and by the numerous federal laws that apply
to loans on real property and regulate lending practices. In addition, these
institutions are subject to all general state laws governing mortgage
lending such as the state's covered loan law.
Each DFI licensee is subject to a periodic examination at least once
every two years.

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
The OCC charters, regulates, and supervises all national banks. It also
supervises the federal branches and agencies of foreign banks.
Of the federal regulators, the OCC has been the most active in warning the
institutions it charters against engaging in predatory lending practices. For
example, in an Advisory Letter issued in 2003 (AL 2003-3), the OCC
concludes:
"National banks may confront risks when they obtain loans through
brokers or through purchase transactions that contain or reflect
abusive lending practices. . . . Failure to [take affirmative steps to
avoid them] could raise serious supervisory concerns, and could
result in supervisory or other actions directed against national banks,
their operating subsidiaries, and the third-party brokers and
181

originators involved in the transaction."

National Credit Union Administration (NCUA)
The NCUA is an independent federal agency that charters and supervises
federal credit unions.

Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) is the primary regulator of all
federally chartered thrift institutions, which include savings banks and
savings and loan associations.
Purpose and Methods of the SAFE Act.
The SAFE Act is designed to encourage every state, through consultation
and coordination with the Conference of State Bank Supervisors and the
American Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators to establish a
Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System that will accomplish the following:
1. Provides uniform license applications and reporting requirements for
State-licensed loan originators.
2. Provides a comprehensive licensing and supervisory database.
3. Aggregates and improves the flow of information to and between
regulators.
4. Provides increased accountability and tracking of loan originators.
5. Streamlines the licensing process and reduces the regulatory burden.
6. Enhances consumer protections and supports anti-fraud measures.
7. Provides consumers with easily accessible information, offered at no
charge, utilizing electronic media, including the Internet, regarding
the employment history of, and publicly adjudicated disciplinary and
enforcement actions against, loan originators.
8. Establishes a means by which residential mortgage loan originators
would to the extent possible, be required to act in the best interest of
the consumer.
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9. Facilitates responsible behavior in the subprime mortgage market
place and provides comprehensive training and examination
requirements related to subprime mortgage lending.
10.
Facilitates the collection and disbursement of consumer
complaints on behalf of State and Federal mortgage regulators.
Definitions:
1. Defines "loan originator" as an individual who:
a. Takes a residential mortgage loan application; and
b. Offers or negotiates terms of a residential mortgage loan for
compensation or gain.
c. It does not include those who provide clerical or administrative
task on behalf of a "loan originator" or a person or entity that
only performs real estate brokerage services.
2. Defines "Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry" as a
mortgage licensing system developed and maintained by the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) and the American
Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators (AARMR) for the
State licensing and registration of State-licensed loan originators and
the registration of registered loan originators or any system
established by the Secretary under section 1509.
3. Defines Nontraditional mortgage product as meaning any mortgage
product other than a 30-year fixed rate mortgage.
4. Defines "registered loan originator" as any individual who-a. meets the definition of loan originator and is an employee of-1. a depository institution;
2. a subsidiary that is-a. owned and controlled by a depository
institution; and
b. regulated by a Federal banking agency; or
c. an institution regulated by the Farm Credit
Administration; and
b. is registered with, and maintains a unique identifier through,
the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry.
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5. Defines "residential mortgage loan" as any loan primarily for
personal, family, or household use that is secured by a mortgage,
deed of trust, or other equivalent consensual security interest on a
dwelling (as defined in section 103(v) of the Truth in Lending Act) or
residential real estate upon which is constructed or intended to be
constructed a dwelling (as so defined).
6. Defines "Loan Processors" or "Underwriters" as an individual who
performs clerical or support duties at the direction of and subject to
the supervision and instruction of—
a. a State-licensed loan originator; or
b. a registered loan originator.
Requirements for registration and compliance:
1. Prohibits an individual from engaging in the business of a loan
originator without first-a. obtaining, and maintaining annually-i. a registration as a registered loan originator; or
ii. a license and registration as a State-licensed loan
originator; and
iii. obtaining a unique identifier.
2. Provides that a loan processor or underwriter who does not represent
to the public, through advertising or other means of communicating
or providing information (including the use of business cards,
stationery, brochures, signs, rate lists, or other promotional items),
that such individual can or will perform any of the activities of a loan
originator shall not be required to be a State-licensed loan originator.
3. Provides that an independent contractor may not engage in
residential mortgage loan origination activities as a loan processor or
underwriter unless such independent contractor is a State-licensed
loan originator.
4. Provides that in connection with an application to any state for
licensing and registration as a state-licensed loan originator, the
applicant shall, at a minimum, furnish to the Nationwide Mortgage
Licensing System and Registry (System) information concerning the
applicant's identity, including-184

a. fingerprints for submission to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and any governmental agency or entity
authorized to receive such information for a State and national
criminal history background check; and
b. personal history and experience, including authorization for the
System to obtain—
i. an independent credit report obtained from a consumer
reporting agency described in section 603(p) of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act; and
ii. information related to any administrative, civil or criminal
findings by any governmental jurisdiction.
5. The minimum standards for licensing and registration as a Statelicensed loan originator shall include the following:
a. The applicant has never had a loan originator license revoked
in any governmental jurisdiction.
b. The applicant has not been convicted of, or pled guilty or nolo
contendere to, a felony in a domestic, foreign, or military
court-i. during the 7-year period preceding the date of the
application for licensing and registration; or
ii. at any time preceding such date of application, if such
felony involved an act of fraud, dishonesty, or a breach of
trust, or money laundering.
c. The applicant has demonstrated financial responsibility,
character, and general fitness such as to command the
confidence of the community and to warrant a determination
that the loan originator will operate honestly, fairly, and
efficiently within the purposes of this title.
d. The applicant has completed the pre-licensing education
requirement.
e. The applicant has passed a written test that meets the test
requirement.
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f. The applicant has met either a net worth or surety bond
requirement, or paid into a state fund, as required by the state
6. Specifies that in order to meet the pre-licensing education
requirement a person shall complete at least 20 hours of education
approved in accordance with which shall include at least-a. 3 hours of Federal law and regulations;
b. 3 hours of ethics, which shall include instruction on fraud,
consumer protection, and fair lending issues; and
c. 2 hours of training related to lending standards for the
nontraditional mortgage product marketplace.
7. Provides that pre-licensing education courses shall be reviewed, and
approved by the System.
8. Requires loan originators to pass a qualified written test developed
by the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry and
administered by an approved test provider.
9. Requires the written test to measure the applicant's knowledge and
comprehension in appropriate subject areas, including—
a. ethics;
b. Federal law and regulation pertaining to mortgage origination;
c. State law and regulation pertaining to mortgage origination;
d. Federal and State law and regulation, including instruction on
fraud, consumer protection, the nontraditional mortgage
marketplace, and fair lending issues.
10.
Provides that an individual shall not be considered to have
passed a qualified written test unless the individual achieves a test
score of not less than 75 percent correct answers to questions and
provides the following allowances and limitations to retest.
a. An individual may retake a test 3 consecutive times with each
consecutive taking occurring at least 30 days after the
preceding test.
186

b. After failing 3 consecutive tests, an individual shall wait at least
6 months before taking the test again.
c. A State-licensed loan originator who fails to maintain a valid
license for a period of 5 years or longer shall retake the test,
not taking into account any time during which such individual is
a registered loan originator.
11.
Each mortgage licensee shall submit to the Nationwide
Mortgage Licensing System and Registry reports of condition, which
shall be in such form and shall contain such information as the
Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry may require.

License Renewal Standards.
1. The minimum standards for license renewal for State-licensed loan
originators shall include the following:
a. The loan originator continues to meet the minimum standards
for license issuance.
b. The loan originator has satisfied the annual continuing
education requirements described in subsection (b).
2. In order to meet the annual continuing education requirements
referred to in a state-licensed loan originator shall complete at least
8 hours of education which shall include at least-a. 3 hours of Federal law and regulations;
b. 2 hours of ethics, which shall include instruction on fraud,
consumer protection, and fair lending issues; and
c. 2 hours of training related to lending standards for the
nontraditional mortgage product marketplace.
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